Mirsad Turanović

KEMALISM AND THE ISLAM

Legitimizing Discrimination Against Veiled Students in Turkish Daily Newspapers

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Sarajevo, 2025

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INTRODUCTION

This book[1] presents interdisciplinary research that explores the discursive strategies used to represent veiled women in Kemalist discourse, with a particular emphasis on the manipulative use of language aimed at legitimizing discrimination against veiled female students in Turkey. The theoretical and analytical framework of this research is based on Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which also determines its interdisciplinary nature. In this regard, the book has three primary objectives:

a) To outline the foundational principles of CDA and establish its linguistic roots;
b) To situate Kemalist discourse within its socio-historical context and identify its fundamental discursive strategies;
c) To analyze the linguistic tools through which these strategies legitimize Kemalist hegemonic practices.

The issue of women's veiling in the public sphere has been a prominent topic in the Republic of Turkey for many years. As is well known, following the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, its founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, implemented radical societal changes and introduced a series of laws that fundamentally transformed the Turkish society. Among other measures, he abolished the caliphate, changed the alphabet, the calendar, and civil law, and legally mandated the wearing of hats, though he did not legally ban the veiling. Nevertheless, veiled women were not visibly present in Turkey's social life for many years. The issue of veiling in the

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1   The book is a partially revised version of the PhD dissertation entitled *The Issue of Veiling in Kemalist Discourse*, defended at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Sarajevo in 2020.

"public space" gained prominence in the early 1980s. Specifically, after the 1980 military coup, the government established by the military junta, led by Kenan Evren, introduced a Dress Code Regulation that prohibited the wearing of a headscarf in educational institutions. This marked the beginning of discrimination against veiled women in educational and other public institutions.

When it comes to educational institutions, the enforcement of this ban was not systematic at all times; the situation varied from university to university, and victims of discrimination frequently organized protests. The problem escalated in 1998, a year after another military coup. That year, the systematic enforcement of the ban on veiling in schools and universities began. The bans were accompanied by protests across the country. The issue was only resolved in 2013 when a democratic reform package was introduced, abolishing the discriminatory clause in the Dress Code Regulation. This democratic reform package eliminated discrimination in education, but the ideology that produced and legitimized this discrimination for years remains alive.

This complex social issue will be approached from the perspective of CDA. CDA represents a problem-oriented, interdisciplinary approach concerned with demystifying ideologies and power through the systematic analysis of semiotic data (Wodak, 2009: 2-3). CDA is a highly socially engaged methodological perspective, a discipline "with an attitude" (van Dijk, 2001: 96), and provides an excellent framework for analyzing sensitive social topics such as discrimination based on religious markers.

The subject of this analysis is newspaper articles, though other semiotic tools - such as photographs, cartoons, and newspaper page layouts - will also be considered as needed, as they combine with the text to form a multimodal whole. In the first and second part of this book, I will define the methodological framework for analysis by presenting the foundational theoretical premises and the most significant representatives of CDA, whose analytical tools I will employ in my analysis.

In the third part of the book, I will define the discursive strategies of Kemalist discourse based on the narrative present in textbooks used in schools and universities in the Republic of Turkey, particularly within the scope of the subject *Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılâp Tarihi* (Atatürk's Principles and History of the Revolution). These textbooks discuss the historical processes and events that led to the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, Atatürk's role in the War of Independence and the founding of the

Republic, as well as the reforms he implemented following the Republic's establishment, collectively referred to as *inkılâp* (revolution).

Some of these reforms - such as the law banning religious schools and dervish orders, the legal requirement for men to wear hats, and the mandate that the adhan be recited in Turkish instead of Arabic - provoked unrest and resistance among certain segments of the population. By examining the content of these textbooks, which represent one of the most effective channels for the production and imposition/adoption of Kemalist discourse, I aim to determine:

a) How they discursively shape and legitimize the radical reforms of the early Republican period, and;

b) How "the Other," in this case, opponents of the regime motivated by religious beliefs, is portrayed within Kemalist discourse?

Within the scope of the third chapter, I will also strive, drawing upon recent critical literature, to deconstruct some of the foundational elements of the Kemalist narrative that legitimizes the hegemony of Kemalist elites.

In the final chapter of the book, I will analyze how specific Turkish daily newspapers (*Cumhuriyet, Hürriyet, Radikal, Sabah*) reported on the aforementioned discrimination against veiled women and the protests they organized in 1998. That year, the government established after the military coup a year earlier intensified the enforcement of the Dress Code Regulation from the 1980s. Through this analysis, I aim to demonstrate the discursive tools these newspapers used to relativize or legitimize the discrimination against veiled female students. Where necessary, I will expand the analysis to other periods in which the production of this discourse was relevant. The analysis of the strategies used to represent social actors will, when required, include the examination of photographs and cartoons accompanying the news, utilizing theoretical concepts from multimodal analysis.

1
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CDA

1.1. Systemic Functional Linguistics

For much of the last century, linguistics had been under the constraints of formalism: linguistic research focused on abstract, idealized grammatical units, neglecting the communicative context, the study of meaning in interaction, and the dialectic between linguistic and social structures. In the Saussurean linguistic tradition, there was a strict insistence on the division between *langue*, as an abstract linguistic system that is relatively stable and governed by its own rules (and therefore should be the subject of research), and *parole*, as the realization of that abstract system, which eludes linguistic description.

In generative linguistics, founded on the ideas of Noam Chomsky, absolute priority was given to idealized linguistic competence, leaving aside concrete linguistic realizations as well as meanings and functions conditioned by communicative interaction. Only in the 1970s and 1980s, inspired by works in the philosophy of language and sociology, did linguists begin to shift their attention significantly toward the communicative context and the interconnectedness of linguistic and social structures.

The early impulses of an emerging critical awareness of the social dimension of language use can be found in the works of George Orwell. In CDA studies, a passage from his 1946 essay titled *Politics and the English Language* (as cited in Hodge, Fowler, 1979: 11) is often quoted, as it seems to represent a manifesto of CDA and encapsulates its subject of interest:

> In our time, political speech and writing are largely the defense of the indefensible. (...) Thus political language has to consist largely of euphemism, question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness. Defenceless villages are bombarded from the air, the inhabitants driven out into the countryside, the cattle machine-gunned, the huts set on fire with incendiary bullets: this is called pacification. Millions of peasants are robbed of their farms and sent trudging along the roads with no more than they can carry: this is called *transfer of population* or *rectification of frontiers*. People are imprisoned for years without trial, or shot in the back of the neck or sent to die of scurvy in Arctic lumber camps: this is called *elimination of unreliable elements*. Such phraseology is needed if one wants to name things without calling up mental pictures of them.

Although Orwell pointed out vivid examples of linguistic manipulation and even attempted to describe some mechanisms of manipulation using linguistic terminology in the continuation of the essay, he was not a linguist and did not theoretically shape his ideas. The later emergence of CDA was profoundly influenced by the development of Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL), primarily in the works of Michael Halliday (1978; 2004). SFL deviates from the tradition of abstracting grammatical structures from communicative and social contexts and emphasizes the dialectic between social context and the use of linguistic elements. One of the most important principles of SFL, with methodological implications for CDA, is that language is viewed as a reservoir or a set of resources available to speakers for encoding linguistic messages. Every use of language entails the selection of a particular linguistic form, the value of which lies in correlation with other potential choices, and the choice itself is conditioned by communicative and social contexts. Unlike the Chomskyan linguistic tradition, where linguistic structures are defined as natural, universal properties of the human mind, SFL posits that linguistic structures develop depending on communicative needs. In addition to emphasizing the socially conditioned choice of linguistic elements, SFL defines three metafunctions that are simultaneously present in every use of language:

1. Ideational function: The ideational function refers to the way language encodes messages to construct our experiences and convey our perception of the world.
2. Interpersonal function: The interpersonal function establishes and maintains relationships between participants in communi-

cation, as well as the speaker's attitude toward the content expressed through language.

3. Textual function: The textual function links linguistic content to the preceding and subsequent text, as well as to the broader context, thereby creating a coherent and cohesive whole.

An illustrative example of the correlation between linguistic forms and social context is offered by Halliday in his analysis of the development of scientific discourse in English (Halliday, 2004b; see also Schleppegrell, 2012: 34–42). Halliday examined scientific texts spanning from the 14th to the 20th century, and the examples he provided clearly demonstrate this development. According to Halliday, Isaac Newton's works represent the phase of the emergence of modern scientific discourse in the English language. Isaac Newton is well-known for conducting extensive experimental research, meticulously recording the results, and striving to systematize and theoretically shape these findings. In the introductory sections of his works and books, Newton used language typical of earlier scientific texts. For example, in these sections, he described his experiments in a direct manner, detailing what occurred, using formulations such as: "I held the prism (...) observed the length of its refracted image (...) it appears that (...)". After these introductory sections, Newton would systematize his findings theoretically, employing linguistic means characteristic of modern scientific literature. Halliday provides an example:

> The rate of crack growth depends not only on the chemical environment but also on the magnitude of the applied stress. The development of a complete model for the kinetics of fracture requires an understanding of how stress accelerates the bond-rupture reaction.

Halliday interprets the development of scientific discourse as follows: On the ideational level, this development is marked by an increasing use of nominalization instead of finite verb forms. For instance, the process *cracking slowly/quickly* is repackaged into the nominal group *the rate of crack growth*, and the process *applying much/little stress* becomes *the magnitude of the applied stress*. Although these nominal groups express processes involving the scientist, they are not presented as Newton would have, e.g., *how quickly the [glass] cracks depends on how much stress [I] apply*. Halliday argues that expressing processes through verbs and objects through nouns represents a congruent way of expression

- one that is first acquired during primary socialization and inherent to everyday communication. Expressing processes through nouns, i.e., through nominalization, as in the example above, represents an incongruent mode of expression, which Halliday refers to as *grammatical metaphor* (Halliday, 2004: 593, 639; 2003: 20–22).

How does Halliday explain this change in linguistic form? According to him, the use of grammatical metaphors in scientific discourse aligns with the demands of new social circumstances in which this discourse needs to evolve in a way that accelerates the presentation of new knowledge. On the other hand, on the interpersonal level, these linguistic means indicate that scientific discourse increasingly relies on distanced interpersonal relationships. From the perspective of the textual function, grammatical metaphors facilitate the linking of processes into a chain of argumentation, making the text more compact. Due to the importance of such metaphorical strategies in constructing scientific theory, Halliday argues that grammatical metaphor is foundational to "the entire body of scientific thought" (Halliday, 2003: 22).

Based on Halliday's work, SFL took the first step toward a critical approach to language analysis by directly linking the choice of linguistic forms to social context. For Halliday, "meaning is socially constructed" (Halliday, 2003: 2), and language "is not a passive reflex of material reality; it is an active partner in the constitution of reality" (Ibid: 3-4). Furthermore, he emphasizes that through the ideational function, language constructs our experiences by "theorizing them in terms of categories and their relations" (Ibid: 21). These statements encapsulate two key premises that paved the way for the development of CDA:

a) Meaning is socially constructed.
b) Language actively participates in shaping our experiences and perceptions of reality.

Thus, the focus is on the mutual conditioning or dialectical relationship between linguistic and social structures. For this reason, this theoretical approach is also defined as social semiotics. However, SFL does not aim to critically examine whether, in the processes of meaning construction - or shaping our view of (primarily social) reality - manipulation occurs that (re)produces unequal power relations in society. Using the example of noun phrases, or nominalization, instead of finite verb forms in scientific

discourse - which Halliday refers to as grammatical metaphor - we can observe how SFL views the social conditioning of linguistic form: the use of nominalization in this example does not carry a negative connotation; rather, it serves, quite understandably and justifiably, to construct the experience of engaging with science in a more practical way and to systematize the results of scientific work. CDA, however, identifies in grammatical metaphor the potential for ideological manipulation of language. Research in CDA has shown that the choice of nominal forms is often an indicator of attempts to obscure or suppress social agents in ideologically contentious contexts. The task of investigating such examples of linguistic manipulation was first undertaken by Critical Linguistics, and later by CDA.

1.2. Critical Linguistics

In the late 1970s, the first significant attempt to theoretically shape a critical approach to language emerged. A group of linguists and literary critics at the University of East Anglia published the seminal book *Language and Control* (Fowler et al. 1979), aiming to offer a systematic model of linguistic analysis that, as they hoped, would contribute to the development of an "original, critical and practical theory of language in society" (Ibid: 4). They defined their approach with the term Critical Linguistics, and the results of their research provided a solid foundation for the further development of CDA. Several conclusions they reached paved the way for a critical approach to language:

a. The choice of linguistic form from the total inventory of forms, as Halliday described, is "principled and systematic," whether or not the speaker is conscious of it (Fowler, Kress 1979b: 188).

b. Within "coherent discourse," the selection of linguistic forms has a systematic character, and its cumulative effect is the process of meaning creation. Linguistic elements gain different meanings when used in discourse compared to isolation. The relationship between form and content is not arbitrary or conventional but significant. Hence, these authors advocate rejecting the dichotomy between meaning and form, which had prevailed in linguistics until then, and instead focus on analyzing real texts and their relationship to context (Ibid: 186).

c. A person's worldview is conditioned by their relationship with institutions and the socio-economic structures of society. This worldview is most quickly and firmly adopted through language use, which carries the ideological imprint of society. The ideological character of discourse is reflected in the systematic organization of relevant linguistic elements, particularly in the classification of processes and their participants, as well as in the representation of agency and interaction (Trew 1979b: 154). Since language is inseparable from ideology, linguistic analysis can serve as an effective tool for analyzing ideological processes. As social meanings are often implicit, linguistic analysis must necessarily be interpretive, aiming to demystify ideological processes (Fowler, Kress 1979b: 196).

d. The relationship between social and linguistic structures is not one-directional, as described in sociolinguistic studies. Sociolinguistics views linguistic varieties as an "index" of social structure (Fowler, Kress 1979a: 26), thereby adopting a normative stance. Linguistic form is not merely a consequence but also an integral part of social processes. When social processes and structures find expression in language, they are affirmed and consolidated. The most prominent social structure influencing linguistic structure is the disparity in power (Fowler, Kress 1979b: 195).

To support their key conclusion that language is an integral part of social processes, Fowler and Kress (1979b: 191) cite the work of Brown and Gilman titled "The Pronouns of Power and Solidarity." This work examines the use of second-person pronouns *ti* and *Vi* in South Slavic languages. Brown and Gilman describe the correlation between pronoun choice and social context in terms of "the semantics of power" and "the semantics of solidarity": someone in a position of superior social status is addressed with the formal pronoun *Vi*, which Brown and Gilman label as "the semantics of power", conversely, the informal pronoun *ti* is reserved for intimate contexts or addressing individuals in subordinate social positions, which they describe as "the semantics of solidarity." Fowler and Kress praise Brown and Gilman for having the courage to characterize power and solidarity as a "semantic" dimension, "suggesting that social facts directly determine the categories of linguistic structure" (Ibid: 191).

However, Fowler and Kress critique this sociolinguistic approach for being normative rather than critical. Unlike sociolinguistics, which tends to view correlations between social identity and linguistic features as arbitrary or conventional, Critical Linguistics emphasizes their ideological conditioning. Their conclusion can be summarized as follows: Language not only reflects social reality but also sustains and reproduces it.

In his later reflections on their work presented in the *Language and Control*, Fowler (1996) notes that their goal was to offer a practical framework for researchers to use in their studies as a form of standard procedure. However, he acknowledges that their analysis remained fragmentary. Fowler points out that simply being familiar with linguistic descriptive tools is insufficient, particularly for younger researchers, to critically analyze a social phenomenon through a text. He concludes that a text can only be understood by situating it within its relevant discourse:

> Linguistic description comes at a later stage, as a means of getting some purchase on the significances that one has heuristically assigned to the text. (…) When teaching, it is necessary to be quite open about the fact that linguistics is not a discovery procedure, and also to specify context in some detail, indicating relevant historical, economic and institutional circumstances (Fowler, 1996: 9–10).

Although Fowler and his colleagues were preoccupied with the idea of presenting a theory of language as social practice (Ibid: 3), their focus remained at the level of textual analysis. Only after the notion of discourse came into focus following the Foucault theory, which defines discourse as institutionally produced 'knowledge' (Kress, 2012: 35), did a CDA emerge. One of the first scholars to use the term Critical Discourse Analysis and to develop a comprehensive theory of it was Norman Fairclough (1989; 1995a; 1995b; 2003). His theory also serves as the framework for this study. Therefore, in the following sections, I will outline his analytical approach while complementing it with findings from other authors.

2
CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS (CDA)

As I emphasized in the previous section, SFL took the first step towards a critical approach to language analysis by establishing a direct link between the choice of linguistic form and social context, thereby highlighting the social character of language. Inspired by the theoretical postulates of SFL, the authors of Critical Linguistics will adopt a critical stance and emphasize that linguistic form is not only a consequence but also an integral part of social processes, because when social processes and structures find expression in language, their affirmation and consolidation occur. CDA developed precisely on these theoretical foundations, further elaborating the nature of the dialectical relationship between linguistic and social structures. Critical linguistics concludes that language can contribute to the affirmation of unequal power relations, while CDA goes further and defines language as a form of social practice that can not only affirm but also constitute social 'reality' based on unequal power relations. In this sense, language is referred to as discourse:

> CDA sees discourse – language use in speech and writing – as a form of "social practice". Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s), and social structure(s) which frame it: the discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them. That is, discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned; it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it. As discourse is so socially consequential, it

gives rise to important issues of power. Discursive practices may have major ideological effects; that is, they can help produce and reproduce unequal power relations between, for instance, social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in which they represent things and position people (Fairclough, Wodak, 1997:258).

This constitutive character of discourse will be further emphasized in Fairclough's later works, where he defines discourse as a semiotic way of constructing reality: "Discourses are semiotic ways of construing aspects of the world (physical, social or mental) that can generally be identified with different positions or perspectives of different groups of social actors" (Fairclough, 2012: 11). CDA, therefore, adopts from SFL the proposition of the dialectical relationship between linguistic and social systems and the active role that language plays within the ideational function in constructing our experience and perception of the world, and from Critical Linguistics, it adopts an interest in demystifying the ideological processes reflected in linguistic structure, with the distinction that, unlike Critical Linguistics, CDA places the concept of discourse at the center of its interest. If we were to summarize this development in the approach to language as a social phenomenon or social practice, or discourse, we could formulate it as follows:

Language/discourse reflects

↓

maintains/affirms/reproduces

↓

produces/constitutes/constructs social 'reality.'

These characteristics or functions of discourse should not be seen as exclusive or dominant categories but rather as, to a greater or lesser extent, a simultaneous presence of all functions. An important question is also which theory underpins the idea of the constructive character of discourse. Although Halliday also mentions that language "is not a passive reflex of material reality; it is an active partner in the constitution of reality" (2003: 4) in a way that it theorizes it "in terms of categories and

their relations" (Ibid: 21), Halliday does not develop a critical approach to this issue.

CDA is inspired in its critical approach by the post-structuralist critique of authors such as, above all, Derrida and Foucault. The entire post-structuralist critique has grown from the concept of difference, or the concept of binary oppositions, which are key concepts in Saussure's work. Derrida develops the proposition that meaning is differential, not referential, in the following manner: "How do we define nature? Not by reference to flowers or trees, since they can also be found cultivated in a park, but as wilderness, as absence of culture. In a word, by reference to a term that is excluded from nature itself and which nature itself excludes. And yet, only from culture can we identify nature at all. One term cannot be excluded from the meaning of another. Meaning depends on difference" (cited in Belsey, 2003: 85). By using language, we create conceptual oppositions through which we organize our world, such as speech versus writing, soul versus world, literal versus metaphorical, natural versus cultural, male versus female. Such binary oppositions create a multitude of false or rigidly fixed foundational relationships, and we usually assume one member of this opposition over the other. Post-structuralism bases this theory on "Freudian thinking that apparent oppositions indeed need and always imply each other. According to this view, I can only understand myself as a rational, justice-seeking imperialist (like Forster's Ronnie Fielding) if I simultaneously perceive you as a cunning, elusive, chaotic Oriental (like Forster's Aziz)" (Butler, 2007: 22).

On that basis, post-structuralism questions the relationship between language and reality: "If language is differential rather than referential, if our concepts of things owe their existence to differences, which are primarily the effect of language, then we can never be certain that what we say about the world through language or any other semiotic system is true. In other words, if semiotic practice is the cause of our perception of differences rather than the things in the world themselves, there are no guarantees that what we say about the world correctly organizes the world of things" (Belsey, 2003: 72). Since our conceptual systems are constructed in this way, it can be concluded that "the world, its social systems, and even human identity are not givens guaranteed by language that corresponds to reality, but that we construct them (emphasis in the original) in language" (Butler, 2007: 23).

Although post-structuralist mistrust of language and grand narratives sometimes ends in complete skepticism and lack of perspective, this theory has had a significant influence on social sciences, resulting in a well-founded critique of social phenomena such as totalitarianism, nationalism, chauvinism, orientalism, and more. "The innovative aspect of this kind of deconstruction of opposition, which leads to emancipation, works like this: when we examine some particular systems whose purpose is to describe the world correctly, we realize that the concepts they 'privilege' or prioritize, and the hierarchies they establish, are not at all in the 'correct' order." (Ibid: 22).

One of the most significant theoretically emancipatory frameworks is undoubtedly CDA. This position is explicitly expressed in works on CDA: "Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social-power abuse and inequality are enacted, reproduced, legitimated, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context. With such *dissident research*, critical discourse analysts take an explicit position and thus want to understand, expose, and ultimately challenge social inequality" (Van Dijk, 2015: 466). Fairclough also emphasizes that CDA "has emancipatory objectives, and is focused upon the problems confronting what we can loosely refer to as 'losers' within particular forms of social life - the poor, the socially excluded, those subject to oppressive gender or racial relations, and so forth" (Fairclough, 2001: 125). In the following section, I will present Fairclough's model of CDA.

2.1. Fairclough's CDA model

In his now-classic work *Language and Power* (1989), Fairclough positions his perspective on language in relation to Saussure. He rejects Saussure's insistence on *langue* as opposed to language in use, and he dismisses the individualistic character of language in use conceptualized as *parole*. According to Fairclough, the emphasis should be on language in use, but on socially determined language in use, which he terms discourse (1989: 22). The social determination of language is reflected in the fact that language, due to its ideological characteristics, is involved in the struggle for power.

What are these ideological characteristics of language involved in the struggle for power? Fairclough identifies these ideological

characteristics in the "'common-sense' assumptions which are implicit in the conventions according to which people interact linguistically, and of which people are generally not consciously aware" (1989: 2). The fundamental ideological mechanism here is naturalization. Through the naturalization of the meanings of words, the content of discourse is restricted, and consequently, so are knowledge and beliefs. Through the naturalization of interactional patterns, social relations expressed in discourse are limited; through the naturalization of subject positions, the subject is constrained, which in the long term leads to restricting the number of possible social identities in a given institution or society (1989: 105-106).

In this study, the author cites numerous examples of ideological manipulation of 'common-sense' assumptions articulated in language. One such example is the then-current use of the phrase *the Soviet threat* (1989: 154). The use of the definite article *the* in this phrase implied a certain and undeniable threat, which 'common sense' could not question. Such use of the definite article is not merely a matter of grammar; the cumulative effect of using this phrase in the media led to the naturalization of the contested proposition - that the Soviet Union indeed posed a threat to the West. Time has shown that this was a construct serving the maintenance of power.

There were many such constructs later on, but one of the most destructive was undoubtedly the construct about weapons of mass destruction allegedly possessed by Saddam Hussein. Millions of lives in Iraq, as well as in other parts of the Middle East, were destroyed in a bloody scenario that was naturalized through language with the help of the media. Numerous studies within CDA analyze the discourse of the powerful figures who orchestrated this destruction, primarily U.S. President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair. An illustrative example of linguistic manipulation within the campaign to prepare for the Iraq invasion in England is cited by John E. Richardson (2007: 62).[2]

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2   This is a well-known case of spin through, a report published by Prime Minister Tony Blair's office. After it turned out that the report was created by plagiarizing and editing parts of Ibrahim Al-Marashi's doctoral thesis, the case became known to the public as the *dodgy dossier*. In the context of ideological manipulation with modal words, Richardson cites an example of how the sentence "Iraq *may* be able to deploy..." in the report was changed to "The Iraqi military *are* able to deploy...". The painful fact is that this report served to prepare the public for war. See also the author's text by Ibrahim Al-Marashi at http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/tony-blair-rat-u-iraku-i-ja.

Unlike authors from Critical Linguistics, who did not clearly distinguish the concept of text from discourse, Fairclough, along with other critical discourse analysts, emphasizes in his works that the text is only a part of the overall process of social interaction called discourse (1989: 24). All other aspects of discourse can be referred to with the general term context. The complexity of the concept of discourse arises precisely from the dynamic relationship between text and context.

Fairclough (1995a: 57) develops an analytical approach that places the fluid concept of context within the triadic structure of discourse, which consists of:

- Text (written or spoken)
- Discursive practice
- Sociocultural practice.

Beyond the broader, abstract meaning of the term discourse, Fairclough uses the term in a more specific sense to distinguish between two discursive types: discourses and genres (1995a: 56). In this more concrete sense, discourse refers to the language or linguistic inventory used to represent a particular social practice from a specific perspective. Different discourses will represent the same aspect of reality in different ways, reflecting different perspectives. For example, a social issue might be represented differently in liberal, socialist, or Marxist discourses. One such discourse is the Kemalist discourse, which is the focus of this study. More on Kemalist discourse will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

On the other hand, genres refer to the use of language that shapes a particular social practice; they represent the discursive aspects of social interactions within specific contexts, such as narration, argumentation, reporting, description, conversation, etc. (1995a: 56; 2003: 65). When analyzing journalistic texts, it is essential to take genre characteristics into account, as many aspects of the text are shaped and conditioned by its genre.

2.2. Text

At the textual level, which represents the first component of Fairclough's triadic structure for discourse analysis, the constructive character of discourse is most evident in the strategies used to represent social actors,

processes, and the circumstances in which these processes occur, as well as in how propositions are combined within the text. This segment of analysis relates to the ideational and textual functions of language within the text (Fairclough, 1995a: 102–103).

2.2.1. Representation of Social Actors

Since the linguistic form is not merely a reflection of social reality but also shapes how aspects of that reality are represented or constructed, the simplest linguistic analysis in CDA involves examining the lexical resources used to represent social actors. CDA research emphasizes the fact that there is no innocent or neutral use of language; language carries the imprint of social processes and is involved in the struggle for power. Thus, lexical choices in the representation of social actors inevitably reflect an ideological perspective.

Even the lexical meanings of words are shaped depending on the ideological perspective that determines lexical choices. The same social actors can be described as terrorists or as freedom fighters depending on the ideological position from which they are being described (Trew, 1979b: 117; Bloor, Bloor, 2007: 129). A local example is the differing representations of Gavrilo Princip: in Serbian historiography, he is depicted as a freedom fighter and hero, while others describe his act as a terrorist attack in which he assassinated the Austro-Hungarian heir to the throne and his pregnant wife.

Van Dijk (1995: 260) highlights that terms such as terrorist, extremist, and fanatic are predominantly used in Western media to describe Arabs and Muslims, particularly in representations of Palestinians who use violence in their resistance to Israel's occupation of their land. In such contexts, Israel's actions are not described as fanatical or terrorist, nor even as violations of international law. Even when criticism of Israel is expressed, as in the example Van Dijk analyzes, it is measured, akin to the kind of critique a friend might direct at another friend, but Israel's actions are never framed as state terrorism.

The varied ways in which social actors are represented stem from the fact that every individual simultaneously possesses multiple identities. Through lexical choices, people are positioned in social contexts, with particular aspects of their identity emphasized to align with certain types of discourse (Machin, Mayr, 2012: 77). When discussing

how actors are represented, CDA research uses the term strategies of representation due to the systematic nature of discourses. As Riggins (1997: 2) states, discourse is "a systematic, internally consistent body of representations." Below, I will outline some of the most common strategies of representation.

2.2.1.1. Exclusion and Emphasis

Fairclough emphasizes that before analyzing lexical choices, a critical discourse analyst should determine which social actors are represented in the text and what the ideological significance of excluding other actors might be. Furthermore, certain actors may be emphasized, others downplayed, or merely implied. He suggests establishing a scale of presence in the text as follows: absent – presupposed – backgrounded – foregrounded (Fairclough, 1995a: 106). How significant the omission or silence regarding social actors can be is illustrated by an example cited by Eržebet Barat (2010) in her analysis of the *Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Collaboration of Men and Women in the Church and in the World*. The letter was authored in 2004 by then-Cardinal, later Pope, Ratzinger. Its opening sentences read:

> The Church, an authority on matters of human relationships, has always dealt with the question of relations between men and women. In recent times, much attention has been paid to issues of women's dignity and women's rights and duties in various areas of civil society and the Church (Ibid: 233).

According to Barat, while the letter aims to "marginalize and discredit feminist perspectives" (Ibid: 231), accompanied by the stigmatization of feminism, the term feminism itself is never explicitly mentioned in the introduction or throughout the text. Instead, it is "shaped through silence; it is only indirectly hinted at through the logic of a syllogism, as an implicit bearer of the predicate 'much attention has been paid to,' as well as the object, the subject of this attention, that is, women's rights." Barat concludes that "this silence is very telling" (Ibid: 233). In the text, social actors are most commonly excluded through the use of passive constructions, as in the above example, and through nominalization. Passive voice and nominalization will be discussed in greater detail in the section on the representation of social processes.

At the other end of the spectrum in the representation of social actors is the emphasis on certain actors through the accumulation of near-synonymous lexemes, for which CDA adopts the term *overlexicalization*, borrowed from Halliday. For instance, in analyzing an editorial about riots involving police use of force, Trew (1979b) observes that the participants in the riots were represented through an overabundance of highly negative terms such as *lout, thug, yob, and hooligan*. The author argues that this lexical strategy aims to draw attention to the need for greater control and the use of force in addressing such societal issues, while avoiding questions about the root causes of these problems. This piling up of near-synonymous lexemes in a short text to delegitimize social actors is comparable to "the utterance of magic words in incantations, creating a kind of axiomatic, tautological effect that precludes any other discourse" (Ibid: 136).

Machin and Mayr (2012: 87-88) reach a similar conclusion in their analysis of a newspaper article discussing how prisoners complained about living conditions in a prison. The text, rather than examining the quality of prison conditions, employed a strategy of emphasizing that the complaining prisoners were Muslim. Unlike other prisoners, who were not identified by religion or described through the nature of their crimes, the Muslim prisoners were specifically presented this way. For example, the generic category Muslim appeared nine times in phrases like *Muslim prisoners, Muslim inmates,* and one *Muslim inmate*. This strategy of emphasizing the religious identity of the prisoners, portraying them as an alien presence in British society, implies "outrage that such individuals even dare to demand that British society cater to their whims" (Ibid: 87). Such an accumulation of lexemes can signal *overpersuasion*, which is typically an indicator of a problematic or ideological claim (Ibid: 88).

2.2.1.2. Structural Oppositions

CDA finds the theoretical foundation for analyzing lexical choices in the representation of social actors in Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL). In his works (1978, 2004), Halliday demonstrates that a word does not derive its meaning in isolation but as part of a network of meanings. This means that meanings are generated within discourse. Within discourse, structural oppositions are often created, reflecting an ideologically conditioned classification of reality.

This strategy is particularly prominent in journalistic discourse, which often serves as people's primary source of information about the external world and is frequently (naively) believed to merely relay information. Critical analysts of newspaper discourse provide numerous examples showing how "news accounts encourage us to accept as *natural*, *obvious*, or *commonsensical* certain preferred ways of classifying reality, and that these classifications have far-reaching implications for the cultural reproduction of power relations across society" (Allan, 2004: 98). An illustrative example is presented by Allan (Ibid: 202–203) from a text published in *The Guardian Weekly*, analyzing the words used during reporting on the Gulf War against Iraq in 1991. The following examples demonstrate the structural oppositions:

They have	**We have**
A war machine	*Army, Navy, and Air Force*
Censorship	*Reporting guidelines*
Propaganda	*Press briefings*

Their men are	**Our men are**
Troops	*Boys*
Hordes	*Lads*

They are	**Our boys are**
Brainwashed	*Professional*
Paper tigers	*Lionhearted*
Cowardly	*Cautious*
Desperate	*Confident*
Cornered	*Heroes*
Cannon fodder	*Daredevils*
Bastards of Baghdad	*Young knights of the skies*
Blindly obedient	*Loyal*
Mad dogs	*Desert rats*
Ruthless	*Resolute*
Fanatical	*Brave*

Saddam Hussein is	**George Bush is**
Defiant	*Resolute*
An evil tyrant	*Statesmanlike*
A crackpot monster	*Assured*

Based on these examples, it is evident that social actors are defined not only by the lexemes used to describe them but also by the lexemes used to describe other actors within the discourse. The choice of lexical units that build a network of structural oppositions is a dominant discursive practice that categorizes actors into binary oppositions. „The logic of binary relations implies not only an absolute distinction with no overlap between the features of the members of the binary opposition but also a hierarchy between the two constitutive elements of the same level of distinction. The other element is excluded from the domain of value or is at least rendered less valuable compared to the 'unique' one, which enjoys the privilege of being the reference point for comparison" (Barat, 2010: 241).

The creation of structural oppositions opens wide avenues for manipulation within discourse. Van Dijk (2006b: 356–357) elaborates on the principle of creating binary oppositions in discourse through the concept of the *ideological square*, which consists of four moves:

1. Express/emphasize information that is positive about Us.
2. Express/emphasize information that is negative about Them.
3. Suppress/de-emphasize information that is positive about Them.
4. Suppress/de-emphasize information that is negative about Us.

These moves serve to create a positive image of us and a negative image of them. This does not necessarily require direct qualifications of who is good and who is bad, or why. Instead, evaluation is achieved through the creation of binary oppositions. An example of how this is realized in a single news report is provided by David Machin and Andrea Mayr (2012: 40–41) in their analysis of a news story published in *The Sun* on December 31, 2007.

Our Boys blitz Taliban bash

BRITISH commandos launched a devastating blitz on the Taliban – as the evil terrorists held a party to celebrate Benazir Bhutto's murder. The dawn raid was staged after messages were intercepted about the sick knees-up in Afghanistan's Helmand province. Royal Marines crept into position as the fanatics partied the night away just hours after Ms Bhutto was killed in Pakistan. The bash was being held in ruined compounds a few hundred yards from Our Boys' remote base in Kajaki. Ragtag Taliban sentries tried to hit back with machine gun fire – but stood no chance against the heroes of 40 Commando's Charlie Company.

Bloodthirsty

The terrorists were pounded with mortars, rockets and heavy machine guns. Two bloodthirsty revellers trying to creep towards Our Boys in a trench were spotted by thermal-imaging equipment – and targeted with a Javelin heat-seeking missile. The £65,000 rocket – designed to stop Soviet tanks – locked on to their body heat and tore more than a kilometer across the desert in seconds. Troop Sergeant Dominic Conway, 32 – who directed mortar rounds – grinned: "It must have had quite a detrimental effect on their morale." Sgt Conway, from Whitley Bay, Tyneside, said of the Taliban lair: "It used to be their backyard and now we've made it ours."

Machin and Mayr's analysis demonstrates that the strategy for representing social actors in news reporting often relies on structural oppositions or the ideological square, which implicitly suggests how actors should be evaluated. In one example, British soldiers and the Taliban are represented with contrasting vocabularies:

British Soldiers	**Taliban**
British commandos	*Taliban*
Royal Marines	*Evil terrorists*
Unit sergeant	*Fanatics*
Heroes of Charlie Company, 40 Commando	*Guards of Taliban scum*
Our boys (used three times)	*Bloodthirsty party animals*

British soldiers are represented using terms that emphasize professionalism, organization, and pride, such as *our boys* and *heroes*. In contrast, the Taliban are described with lexemes implying disorganization and irrationality, such as *scum*, *party animals*, and *fanatics*. The authors conclude: "What often lies behind such stories are local people who oppose the occupation of what they perceive as their territory. Western armies are often present in part to protect economic and strategic interests of Western governments. Yet here we are provided with no political or social context, only good and bad participants" (2012: 41).

Different segments of the identities of social actors can also be emphasized as a representation strategy. Clark, in his analysis of news content published in the *Sun* tabloid, which dealt with rape and other forms of sexual violence against women, observed systematic patterns in how male and female actors were represented (Clark, 1992; cited in

Richardson, 2007: 51). In cases where the Sun decided to accuse a man of the attack, the following representation strategy was used:

Man	Woman
Maniac	Bride
Monster	School girl
Fiend	Mother of three
Beast	Daughter

However, when the blame for the attack was shifted toward the woman, actors were represented differently:

Man	Woman
Family man	Unmarried mum
Hubby	Divorcee

In the first case, the structural opposition highlights the depravity and animalistic tendencies of the man and the innocence of the woman. In the second, the man is portrayed as pure and innocent, while the woman is cast as a potential culprit. Women are also represented as culpable through the use of adjectives emphasizing physical appearance, such as *busty*, *shapely* or *blonde*.

2.2.1.3. Individualization and Collectivization

The representation of social actors as individuals, with names, families, and personal stories, can evoke empathy in readers. Conversely, collectivization dehumanizes these actors by portraying them as part of an indistinct group. Machin and Mayr (2012: 80) illustrate the effectiveness of this strategy with the following examples:

> *Two soldiers, privates John Smith and Jim Jones, were killed today by a car bomb.*

> *Militants were killed today in by a car bomb.*

Unlike militants, who are presented as part of an amorphous mass and thus dehumanized, soldiers are represented as individuals with names

and lives worthy of attention. This personal perspective can be further amplified through additional referential strategies that elicit empathy:

Two soldiers, privates John Smith and Jim Jones, both fathers of two daughters, were killed today by a car bomb.

The emotional impact is evident in the confusion that would arise if such a strategy were applied to dehumanized social actors:

Terror suspects, both fathers of two daughters, were killed today by a car bomb.

Van Leeuwen (2008: 36–37) provides an example of how representation strategies can reflect the ideological orientation of newspapers. In middle-class-oriented newspapers, government officials and experts are typically individualized, while "ordinary people" are not mentioned as individuals. This strategy portrays a world of those who govern rather than those who are governed. Conversely, working-class-oriented newspapers often emphasize "ordinary people" as individuals.

2.2.1.4. Specification and Generalization

Unlike the previous dichotomy, where collectivization, as the negative pole of the strategy, is used to dehumanize social actors, this strategy opens space for ideological manipulation by presenting an actor as a generic type within a group. Machin and Mayr (2012: 81) illustrate how this dichotomy functions with two alternative ways of representing an actor:

A man, Mazar Hussein, challenged police today.

A Muslim man challenged police today.

In the second example, the generic category "Muslim" is used, which can imply a context where Muslims are portrayed as a problem for modern English society, either due to extremism or cultural and religious differences. This implication persists even if the man in question does not practice the faith.

2.2.1.5. Personalization and Impersonalization

In the previous two strategies, the social agent is impersonalized by being presented as part of a collective or as a generic type, i.e., as a group representative. Beyond this, actors can also be impersonalized through the use of abstract nouns or nouns that lack the semantic component [+ human]. Van Leeuwen (2008: 46) identifies two types of impersonalization: *abstraction* and *objectivization*.

In *abstraction*, actors are represented through a property attributed to them. For example, in the sentence *Australia is in danger of becoming overburdened with many unwanted problems*, the noun *problems* is used to avoid directly referring to actors who could be identified as "poor, unskilled, Muslim, or illegal" immigrants. Such abstraction or attribution serves to interpret and evaluate social actors in a way that aligns with the ideological position of the text's author.

In *objectivization*, social actors are represented through references to a place or an object closely associated with them, i.e., they are represented metonymically. Van Leeuwen (Ibid) provides an interesting example: *A 120mm mortar shell hit a Sarajevo market*. Here, the social actors - in this case, Serbian forces besieging Sarajevo - are obscured and backgrounded. By using metonymic reference, the uncomfortable, direct mention of Serbian soldiers who killed 68 civilians at the Markale marketplace with a mortar shell is avoided.

In addition to these two effects – interpreting and evaluating actors through an abstracted or attributed characteristic, and relegating actors as agents of action to the background – impersonalization can have the effect of dehumanizing social actors, as is the case with collectivization. Fairclough (2003: 148-150) identifies such a strategy in a text discussing the dismissal of workers, where workers are referred to as *the bottom end* or *workforce*. According to Fairclough, the workers are dehumanized because the focus is not on them as individuals but as structural parts of organizational systems and processes.

The representation strategies outlined above are some of the most significant discussed in the literature. The representation of social actors is directly tied to the representation of action, which is analyzed in CDA through Halliday's transitivity model. In the following section, I will present this model.

2.2.2. Representation of Processes / Transitivity

The concept of transitivity in Halliday's model (2004a) does not refer to the syntactic category of transitivity as commonly used in linguistics. Instead, it represents an analytical framework that classifies verb processes according to functional and semantic criteria. In this model, verbal actions are referred to as processes.

Halliday's transitivity model is based on the premise that every use of language involves a selection from a range of possible options; by choosing one form, the speaker highlights one meaning while suppressing another potential meaning. Transitivity forms the basis of the ideational function of language because it is through the representation of processes that mental images of reality are most directly shaped. Although Halliday developed this model, CDA typically employs simplified versions of it due to the high level of complexity in Halliday's original framework. Here, I will present the version offered by Paul Simpson (1993: 82-88).

The key elements in analyzing transitivity are the relationships among three components of the transitive process:

a) The process itself, expressed by the verb in the sentence.
b) Participants involved in the process.
c) Circumstances associated with the process.

Processes are categorized into four main types: material processes, verbal processes, mental processes, and relational processes.

I. Material Processes

Material processes express an action or activity. They involve up to two participants: The first participant, which is mandatory, is called the ACTOR - the one performing the action. The second participant, which is optional, is called the GOAL - the person or entity affected by the process. This corresponds to the concept of the object in traditional grammar. For example:

ACTOR	PROCESS	GOAL
John	*kicked*	*the ball.*

Material processes can be further divided into: a) *action* processes performed by living entities and b) *event* processes involving non-living entities. Action processes can also be categorized as: *intentional* actions, where the actor performs the action voluntarily, and *non-intentional actions*, where the action happens to the actor accidentally or without deliberate intent.

Material processes can be illustrated as follows:

In addition to the semantic criteria outlined earlier, the representation of material processes can also be analyzed based on syntactic criteria. Specifically, material processes can be divided into transitive and intransitive verbs:

II. Verbal Processes

Verbal processes are those expressed through the verb *to say* and its synonyms. These processes involve communication or speech acts and include three participants: SAYER - a person or entity performing the speech act, TARGET - an addressee to whom the speech act is directed, VERBIAGE - a content of what is said. For example:

SAYER	PROCESS	TARGET	VERBIAGE
John	*told*	*Mary*	*his life story.*

Verbal processes are significant in analyzing how messages are delivered and who is positioned as the authority or source of information. They also reveal whether the content (VERBIAGE) is framed as factual, subjective, or contested.

III. Mental Processes

Mental processes differ from material and verbal processes in that they relate to internal phenomena occurring in the mind of a participant. These processes operate in the internal world of an individual and involve two key participants: SENSER - an individual experiencing the mental process, and PHENOMENON - an entity being sensed, perceived, or thought about. Mental processes can be further divided into three types:

MENTAL PROCESSES		
PERCEPTIVE	REACTIVE	COGNITIVE
1. *John saw Mary.*	1. *She likes John.*	1. *She considered the question.*
2. *She heard the concert.*	2. *He hates wine.*	2. *I thought hard.*

Mental processes are crucial in understanding how subjective experiences and perspectives are constructed in discourse. They reveal who is portrayed as an active perceiver, thinker, or feeler and how the discourse positions various actors in terms of internal states.

IV. Relational Processes

Relational processes express being or existence. These processes often denote a relationship between two participants without implying that one participant affects the other in any way. Relational processes establish a connection or attribute between two elements. The first participant is called the CARRIER, which is typically the subject or theme of the sentence. The second participant is the ATTRIBUTE, which provides a description, identification, or commentary about the CARRIER.

Relational processes can be divided into three types:

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                        ┌─────────────────┐
                        │   RELATIONAL    │
                        │    PROCESSES    │
                        └─────────────────┘
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INTENSIVE	POSSESSIVE	CIRCUMSTANTIAL
1. *Mary is wise.*	1. *Gill has a guitar.*	1. *Bill is at home.*
2. *Tom looks foolish.*	2. *John owns a piano.*	2. *The queen is in the salon.*

2.2.2.1. Standard and Ergative Analysis

Simpson (1993: 86-87) suggests that, alongside the standard analysis of transitivity, which can account for most verb forms, an ergative analysis should also be used to incorporate the relationship between process, *agency*, and *causation*. Simpson illustrates this using the standard analysis of the following two sentences, which can be viewed as two options for expressing the same extralinguistic situation:

ACTOR	PROCESS	GOAL
I	*broke*	*the vase.*
The vase	*broke.*	

In such cases, the standard analysis becomes problematic because the GOAL in the first sentence becomes the ACTOR in the second sentence, even though it is affected by the process in both sentences. Since the second sentence does not express agency and thus cannot be classified as either active or passive, the analysis introduces a participant called the MEDIUM, which corresponds to the ACTOR in sentences with intransitive verbs and the GOAL in sentences with transitive verbs. It is named the MEDIUM because it represents the medium through which the process occurs. In ergative analysis, alongside the MEDIUM, space is created for a participant that functions as the external cause or initiator of the process, referred to as the AGENT. The AGENT is equivalent to the ACTOR in sentences with transitive verbs. According to ergative analysis, the two sentences above would appear as follows:

AGENT	PROCESS	GOAL
I	*broke*	*the vase.*

MEDIUM   PROCESS

The vase   *broke.*

In addition to ergative verbs, the distinction between the AGENT and the ACTOR is also relevant in causal types of material processes, where the AGENT causes the ACTOR to perform the action (Lukšić, 2017: 164).

2.2.2.2. The Transitivity Model in SFL and CDA

The transitivity model in SFL forms the basis of the ideational function of language, which involves the role of language in constructing (views of) reality, serving as an indicator of the speaker's worldview. Although the linguistic theory developed by Halliday and other SFL authors is defined as social semiotics - establishing a direct connection between social and linguistic structures - it lacks the critical impetus and imperative of engagement found in CDA.

To illustrate this difference, I will provide an example of analysis within the transitivity model in Halliday's work, followed by examples from CDA. For instance, Halliday (2004a) applies the transitivity model to analyze a children's story titled *Noah's Ark*. After examining which actors are in the role of ACTOR and which are in the role of GOAL, as well as identifying which actors appear with transitive and intransitive verbs, Halliday concludes:

> The transitivity grammar of this text thus construes a particular 'world view': this is a world where God can act on humans and on natural phenomena, where natural forces can act destructively on the world under God's control, where humans in turn can act on animals, artefacts and plants but where plants do not act. This world view is, of course, specific to this particular text; but at the same time it is representative of the world view embodied in the traditional commonsense theory of everyday grammar (Ibid: 283).

This example demonstrates that SFL focuses on describing how relationships in the external world are constructed from a particular perspective by describing and interpreting the position and function of social actors in linguistic structures. However, SFL lacks a critical impulse to demystify the ideologically conditioned use of language that seeks to

obscure unequal power relations in society or construct a vision of reality where agency and causation serve to legitimize questionable social practices.

CDA, by contrast, emphasizes precisely these goals, and the transitivity model has proven to be an effective analytical tool. For instance, Van Leeuwen (2008) analyzes a text titled *Race Odyssey*, which addresses the issue of illegal immigrants in Australia and how both Australian society and societies in other countries facing the issue of illegal immigration respond to it. Van Leeuwen categorizes all processes into *actions* and *reactions*. *Reactions* largely correspond to mental processes, while other processes can be defined as *actions*. In the text he analyzes, there are 155 processes, of which 113 are *action* processes (73%) and 42 are *reaction* processes (27%). A large proportion of *reactions* are attributed to Australian residents (52%), their government (21%), and those in other countries who are "concerned" and "angry" about immigrants (19%), while *reactions* from immigrants themselves are not represented. Van Leeuwen interprets these results as follows: "Immigrants only *provoke* (emphasis in the original, M.T.) reactions. Their thoughts and feelings and observations are not considered relevant. The text is squarely written from the point of view of those who have, or aspire to have, the power to regulate the 'intake' of migrants, to 'cut' it, 'halve' it, and so on - even though the text also tells us that 40 percent of Australians were either born overseas or have at least one parent who was" (Ibid: 59). Moreover, while anti-immigrant reactions in other countries are primarily affective, emotional, and irrational, anti-immigrant reactions in Australia are predominantly cognitive, such as "believe," "consider," "think," etc.

A similar strategy for representing processes is found in the advertising industry: consumer behavior is often portrayed as motivated by affective *reactions* such as desires, wants, and needs, while advertisers' *reactions* are framed as cognitive and rational. In this context, Van Leeuwen concludes: "[T]he greater the power of social actors, the more likely it is that cognitive, rather than affective, reactions will be attributed to them" (Ibid: 58).

In addition to potentially signaling an effort to portray the actions of certain social actors as reactions triggered by processes initiated by, or for which responsibility lies with, other actors, mental processes can also construct 'focalizers' or 'reflectors' of social processes. Machin and Mayr (2012: 107) provide the following example:

The mother had worried since her son's regiment had moved into the region.

By presenting the inner world of social actors in this way, news-paper readers may be encouraged to feel empathy for the soldier, who is depicted as an ordinary young man from an ordinary family. Such a strategy can be part of anti-war discourse, but it can also serve to divert attention from the fact that this young man is a soldier in an occupying force. In such cases, there will be no details about the mental processes of participants representing the opposing side in the conflict.

When it comes to material processes, a significant aspect of the analysis is the distribution of transitive and intransitive verbs. This distinction in CDA is not merely a neutral, grammatical difference but implies the existence of processes where ACTORS can act upon, affect, or influence others, and processes that do not have such an effect. In his analysis, Van Leeuwen (2008: 60-62) found that 94% of processes describing immigrants are material processes, most of which (86%) are intransitive. This means that, although immigrants, as mentioned, *provoke* reactions from Australians, they are not depicted in a way that suggests they directly affect Australians, as such direct influence "[R]equires a certain power, and the greater that power, the greater the range of "goals" that may be affected by an actor's actions" (Ibid: 60). Van Leeuwen identifies in this a strategy of *abstraction* aimed at softening or obscuring the anti-immigrant discourse by abstracting interaction or confrontation between social actors: "[W]hat affects these 'concerned citizens' is not the migrants themselves, as identifiable and specific actors, but 'migration,' a vague and intangible 'phenomenon'" (Ibid: 62).

This conclusion aligns with Carter's (1997: 13) assertion that women's actions are predominantly represented with intransitive verbs. In his analysis of the women's magazine *My Weekly*, Carter observed that transitive verbs are associated with male actors, whereas intransitive verbs are linked to female actors. Events simply happen to women; they are in a passive role. Carter concludes that these syntactic choices encode the conventional gender positioning of men and women in romances and similar genres.

In the previous two examples, the use of transitive verbs was interpreted as a characteristic of actors attributed with the power to act, initiate processes, and influence others. However, the frequency of the agent position of transitive verbs is not always proportional to the power

of social actors. Emphasizing someone's agency can sometimes aim to portray certain social actors as initiators of negative social processes, thereby legitimizing the use of force and diverting attention from the true causes of the problem. An illustrative example of such an analysis is found in Trew's (1979b) work in the *Language and Control*, in which he compares how the newspapers *The Sun* and *Morning Star* reported on the riots involving confrontations between the police and participants of the 1977 Notting Hill Carnival. In this study, Trew aims to develop a more systematic approach to isolating ideology in discourse, emphasizing that "linguistic analysis aimed at presenting the ideological character of discourse must be based on a linguistic theory in which categories of process and causation are central" (Ibid: 154).

In the first part of his study, Trew presents a table listing all processes represented in the analyzed texts and all participants in these processes. He then creates matrices to illustrate these processes and their participants more clearly, demonstrating the differences in how the two newspapers shaped their views of the events. The matrices reveal that in *The Sun*'s reports, transitive processes dominate, where the agents are primarily carnival participants. In contrast, *Morning Star* features a greater number of intransitive processes. Trew interprets this difference as *The Sun*'s effort to portray the processes as interactions between participants, with the carnival participants primarily depicted as initiators rather than the police. Through such syntactic positioning, as well as the proliferation of negatively connoted lexemes used to describe the carnival participants - such as *mob of black youths*, *gang of youths*, and *thug* - the carnival participants are framed as the source of violence and a threat to social order, thereby positioning police action as necessary and legitimate (Ibid: 148).

On the other hand, in *Morning Star*, the focus is on the processes themselves, which are less interactive than those in *The Sun*, while participants are almost invisible, except for the police, which appears as an active participant and initiator of action (Ibid: 131). Through this analysis, Trew demonstrates how the distribution of agency and the interaction between participants in social processes can be interpreted as a strategy for representing actors and the social processes in which they participate.

2.2.3. Exclusion of Social Actors from Processes

In addition to the question of the distribution of agency in processes and the choice of process types through which social actors are represented, a critical discourse analyst must also address which participants in processes are included and which are excluded, obscured, or relegated to the background. Below, I will present some strategies through which this ideological mechanism of discourse is achieved.

2.2.3.1. Passive Voice

The use of the passive voice instead of the active can serve as a strong indicator of ideologically motivated language use. In such cases, the passive voice is used to exclude social actors from processes, especially when their presence in discourse would have a subversive character and raise questions of accountability. Numerous examples in CDA studies confirm the potential of this segment of analysis. For instance, Fairclough (2003: 136-137) analyzes an advertisement for a well-known tobacco industry brand, Hamlet. The author examines the text from a box of these cigars:

> Finest grade cigar tobaccos from around the world are selected for Hamlet. Choice leaves, harvested by hand, are dried, fermented and carefully conditioned. Then the artistry of our blenders creates this unique mild, cool, smooth smoking cigar. Hamlet: Fine cigars.

In this short text, several processes are mentioned, such as *selecting*, *harvesting*, *drying tobacco leaves*, and so on, along with several objects of these activities, such as *tobacco*, *leaves*, and *cigars*, while the only social actors explicitly mentioned are *our blenders*. This means that individuals who select, harvest, dry, ferment, and condition the tobacco leaves are excluded from the text and, thus, from the processes themselves. Such a strategy of excluding agents of action can be justified by the intention to concisely highlight the product's quality, which results from a series of delicate processes. However, Fairclough interprets this omission as significant and directly tied to one of the most controversial features of modern capitalism: the production of goods for wealthy countries is predominantly carried out in poorer countries under extremely poor

working conditions and for very low wages. Advertising, in this context, plays a role in promoting consumerism and obscuring the relationships and conditions of the production process (Ibid: 137).

In addition to its function in completely or partially excluding social actors, the use of the passive voice is also interpreted as a strategy for shifting focus from certain social actors to others. Such strategic use of the passive voice was first analyzed by Tony Trew in his work *Theory and Ideology at Work* (1979a). This study had a significant impact on the development of a critical approach to language and serves as a prototype for critical discourse analysis. Below, I will provide a detailed presentation of a part of the study where strategies for representing processes are analyzed.

In this study, Trew analyzes how *The Times* and *The Guardian* reported on an event that occurred on June 2, 1975, in Harare, the capital of present-day Zimbabwe. At that time, the internationally unrecognized state of Rhodesia existed in the region, ruled by a white minority, similar to apartheid in South Africa, and its capital was named Salisbury. The black majority only succeeded in gaining power, independence, and international recognition in 1980. On that day, after a meeting of the African National Council (ANC), the police fired directly into an unarmed crowd, killing five people and, later that day, an additional six individuals. The following day, the aforementioned newspapers reported on these events. This was the headline and the first sentence of the news:

The Times: RIOTING BLACKS SHOT DEAD BY POLICE AS ANC LEADERS MEET

Eleven Africans were shot dead and 15 wounded when Rhodesian Police opened fire on a rioting crowd of about 2,000.

Guardian: POLICE SHOOT 11 DEAD IN SALISBURY RIOT

Riot police shot and killed 11 African demonstrators and wounded 15 others.

The first obvious difference between the two newspapers' reports is that *The Times* uses the passive voice, while *The Guardian* employs the active voice, even though the content of the news is very similar. By using the passive voice in its headline, *The Times* places the object of the action in the focal position, relegating the police, as the agents of the action, to a less prominent position. This strategy is further deepened in the first sentence of the report, where the direct reference to the perpetrators

of the action is eliminated, leaving them only implicitly indicated by the temporal clause *when Rhodesian Police opened fire on a rioting crowd of about 2,000*.

In both newspapers, this event is characterized as *a riot*, but *The Times* puts this term in the focal position, thereby framing the event as a disturbance of public order. According to Trew, such positioning of the killed individuals provides a context and partial justification for the action, which is the first step toward legitimizing the use of firearms, i.e., the killing of demonstrators (Ibid: 99). The fact that this shift in focus from the shooters to the victims is not insignificant but rather a strategic manipulation of language was confirmed by the subsequent reports published by these newspapers about the same event, as well as by the judicial outcome that followed. The next day, *The Times* published another report with the following headline and opening sentence:

SPLIT THREATENS ANC AFTER SALISBURY'S RIOTS

After Sunday's riots in which 13 Africans were killed and 28 injured, a serious rift in the ranks of the African National Council became apparent today.

In addition to the fact that on the second day in *The Times* the focus shifted from the killing of protesters to the differences that exist within the African National Council, the causal link between the killing and the perpetrator of the act was further weakened. By using the passive voice, the agents of the action are completely erased, and the process itself is no longer represented by the verb *to shoot dead* but instead by the verb *to kill*, which does not imply any circumstances or means of action. *The Guardian* also followed a strategy of shifting focus away from the killing of demonstrators in its subsequent report:

FACADE OF AFRICA'S UNITY COLLAPSES IN THE RHODESIA RIOTS

The divisions within the African Nationalist movement deepened today as police announced that the number of dead in yesterday's riots in townships on the outskirts of Salisbury had risen to 13.

This report further obscures agency and, consequently, the causality of the event. Not only is there no reference to the agents of the action or the means by which the demonstrators were killed, but the process itself is transformed into the phrase *number of dead*, thereby neutralizing the

possibility of understanding the true cause of their 'deaths'. The only circumstance suggesting the cause of death is the adverbial phrase *in yesterday's riots*. A subsequent report from *The Times* completed the process of shifting focus and reinterpreting the event:

THE RIOTS IN SALISBURY

The rioting and sad loss of life in Salisbury are warning that tension in that country is raising as decisive moves about its future seem to be in the offing.

In this news report, the focus has been completely shifted from the original event - the shooting and killing with firearms - to the context of the events. What was initially the context has now become the topic and focus of the news. The most interesting twist lies in the representation of the initial process. There is no longer any reference to the police shooting with firearms and killing of 13 demonstrators. Instead, this is now represented by the noun phrase *loss of life*, which more likely suggests deaths caused by a natural disaster or negligence rather than deliberate killing.

For clarity in understanding this transformation process - which began by mentioning agents or causes and ended by neutralizing causality through the selection or abstraction of the process's effects and shifting the focus from the process to the context - here is the lexical material used to represent the process:[3]

Police shoot dead 11 Africans in riots.	Agent expressed by a transitive verb.
Rioting blacks were shot dead by police.	Although the agent is expressed, by using the passive, the focus is shifted to the victims who disturb the public order.
11 Africans were shot dead when police opened fire.	Agent implied by the temporal determiner.
11 Africans were killed in riots...	Agent deleted; the verb does not imply the circumstances of the murder.

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3   Trew presented these transformations through two similar, but somewhat more complex, tables (Ibid: 104; 109).

number of dead	There is no implication about the type of process.
sad loss of life	A process transformed into an accident.

This strategy of presenting the process was part of the discourse that legitimized white rule on the African continent (Ibid: 105). The social consequences of this discourse are also shown by the fact that the following year more than 20,000 people were prosecuted, most of whom were convicted, for their participation in the riots that followed this event, while none of the police officers were prosecuted (Ibid: 114).

2.2.3.2. Grammatical Metaphor

One of the key premises of SFL, which provided the theoretical foundation for CDA, is the primacy of the paradigmatic dimension of language over the syntagmatic dimension. Halliday argues that linguistics has traditionally reduced language to its syntagmatic dimension. The shift Halliday introduces is summarized as follows: "But meaning is choice: selecting among options that arise in the environment of other options; and the power of a language resides in its organization as a huge network of interrelated choices" (Halliday, 2003: 8). This distinction is further reflected in the methodological approach used in SFL: "Since language is a semiotic potential, the description of language is a description of choice" (Ibid: 193).

Halliday identifies typical, primary, inherent, or congruent choices and non-congruent choices, which he terms grammatical metaphor. Halliday sees the primacy of certain choices in the fact that they appear in earlier stages of language development or are acquired by children at an earlier age. The most potent linguistic tool for creating grammatical metaphor is nominalization, which, according to Halliday, likely developed within the scientific and technical register and is not acquired by children through spontaneous conversation within the family or immediate environment but rather through formal education in the later years of primary school (2004a: 636-657). Halliday argues that nominalization in scientific discourse serves a dual purpose: enabling the construction of a hierarchy of technical terms and facilitating the elaboration of arguments by using

complex units 'packaged' in nominal form as the theme of a sentence. In most varieties of adult discourse, where nominalization has continued to develop, it has lost its primary purpose and tends to serve merely as a 'marker of prestige and power.' For example, in the nominalization *alcohol impairment*, the semantic relationship between the two constituents is unclear; it could be interpreted as *alcohol impairs* but also as *alcohol is impaired*. The author of such a nominal phrase likely knows the intended relationship, while the reader may not. Halliday concludes that this type of highly metaphorical discourse tends to signify and differentiate experts from those unfamiliar with a particular field (Ibid: 657).

Starting from these theoretical premises of SFL, CDA recognizes nominalization as a particularly powerful tool for the manipulative use of language. Unlike passivization, where the ACTOR may be implied even if it is backgrounded, in nominalization the process is generally fully abstracted. Machin and Mayr (2012: 140-144) identify eight effects achieved through nominalization. The most significant of these effects are the following:

a) Social actors are removed, along with responsibility for actions:

The student lost his coursework and was rather upset.

The student was upset about the loss of his coursework.

In the second sentence, the process *The student lost his coursework* is transformed into the entity through nominalization *the loss of his coursework*. This removes the information that it was the student who lost the coursework, leaving his responsibility unexpressed.

b) Nominalization can eliminate any sense of time:

The Prime Minister rejected a call to carry out an inquiry into allegations of corruption. He announced that the tightening of sanctions was a decision that had been made through all the legal channels.

In this example, a sequence of actions is stripped of any temporal markers. Questions arise: When was someone called to conduct the inquiry?

When were allegations of corruption made, and when were sanctions tightened? When was the decision made through legal channels? If temporal markers and the identities of individuals involved in the processes were specified in this example, the Prime Minister's statement might seem less convincing.

    c)   Nouns created through nominalization represent stable entities that become part of common usage:

Globalization should be seen as an opportunity for all of us.

The concept of globalization is one of the foundational terms in the discourse of proponents of economic liberalism. Through nominalization, it is naturalized as a complex process presented as a natural phenomenon, a spontaneous occurrence, or a stable entity. In reality, this mystifies and conceals the process, which is primarily driven by multinational corporations.

2.3. Discursive Practice

Discursive practice, as the second component of the triadic structure of critical discourse analysis used by Fairclough, reflects the methodological shift that CDA makes in relation to Critical Linguistics. Critical linguistics focuses on the critical analysis of text, aiming to demystify ideologically motivated uses of language through that analysis. In contrast, CDA incorporates contextual parameters that influence the production of texts into the analysis. Fairclough emphasizes that text analysis should not be separated from the analysis of institutional and discursive practices, i.e., organizational routines that influence the production and consumption of texts (1995a: 16; 1995b: 9).

Discursive practices or structural patterns are particularly important in the production of news discourse, as news reports are generally defined as a specific narrative form. As with any other narrative form, structural principles can be identified in news reports, which should be considered during their analysis. A significant contribution to this aspect of news analysis from the perspective of CDA was made by Van Dijk (1998a; 1998b). Van Dijk developed an analytical framework based on the concepts of thematic and schematic structure. The analytical process begins with

defining the concept of a *theme* (*topic*) (1998b: 31-48). A theme is an analytical construct at the macro level of discourse description, involving the determination of a text's topic and summarizing it into a proposition called a macroproposition. Longer texts have multiple macropropositions that together constitute the text's macrostructure. The macrostructure of a text defines not only its thematic organization but also its coherence (Ibid: 33).

The macrostructure of a text is not a simple list of topics but rather a hierarchical structure. In news reports, themes are not structured according to internal logic or chronological order but according to the principle of relevance (Ibid: 41). This means that news is organized so that the most important information is placed in the most prominent position, either at the level of the entire text or the sentence level. Naturally, the selection of the most important information opens up the possibility for manipulative use of news, as this selection is based on the mental models of the text's author. The pressure to place certain social actors in the most prominent position according to ideologically conditioned selection can also affect the syntax of sentences. Allan Bell's analysis shows that journalism often uses passivization to bring certain social actors into the focal position at the beginning of a sentence, even though the principle of clarity and simplicity in journalism dictates that verbs should be in the active voice (Bell, 2007: 66). A macrostructure organized according to the principle of relevance, which entails moving from general to specific, means that less important information is left for the end, allowing editors to sometimes delete the final paragraph without losing the main information and the text's coherence (Van Dijk, 1998b: 44). Thematic structure generally has a cyclical character, meaning that social actors and processes deemed most relevant appear at the beginning, and the main information is repeated cyclically with new details about the main or secondary actors (Ibid: 48).

In addition to these principles of thematic organization, the macrostructure of a text also involves defining possible forms in which themes are included and arranged in the text. Van Dijk calls this text structure a schematic superstructure and divides it into the following parts (Ibid: 49-56):

1. Summary: Headline and lead
2. Episode: Main event, context, and background

3. Consequences
4. Verbal reactions
5. Comment

Van Dijk highlights that not all elements of this schema are necessarily present in all news reports. The basic elements, without which a news story cannot be constructed, are *headline* and *main event* (Ibid: 56). The theme of a news article is usually expressed in *headline*, which, together with *lead*, serves as a prominent summary of the entire news story (Fairclough, 1995a: 82). All news stories have a *headline*, and most also have a *lead*. The manipulative nature of news discourse is reflected in the frequent violation of the principle of relevance, where insignificant details, due to their ideological connotations, are emphasized in *headline* and *lead*. *Headline* is usually derived from *lead*, but the proposition cautiously expressed in *lead* - often using modal hedging - is typically transformed in *headline* into a categorical description of an action (Bell, 2007: 72).

Due to the cyclical nature of how the theme of news stories is presented, *main event* can be expressed in several places within a single report. *Main event* is often situated in a closer context, signaled by words like *while* or *during* and thematized in other or previous news articles. News stories frequently include background information, which involves a more general, structural description of the situation (Van Dijk, 1998b: 54).

Consequences of the thematized event are a category frequently found in news discourse. The significance of a social or political event for news discourse is directly correlated with the seriousness of the potential consequences arising from that event. This emphasis on causal connections can also affect the thematic structure of the text. In some cases, *consequences* can be elevated to the same hierarchical level as the theme of the main event or even be expressed in the *headline* and *lead*, the highest level of thematic structure (Ibid: 54).

Verbal reactions involve quoting the statements of participants or commentators on specific events. This practice is widely used in journalism, both in print and electronic media, as it allows the journalist to create an illusion of objectivity by including statements from all sides involved in an event. Fairclough devotes significant attention to analyzing the strategies of reporting others' speech in news stories precisely because this practice opens up space for the manipulative use of lan-

guage. He examines this aspect of discursive practice within the broader concept of intertextuality. Alongside the concepts of direct and indirect speech, he also uses the term *discourse representation* for two reasons:

a) because news may present not only someone's spoken words but also written texts, and

b) because it is never merely about the reproduction of what was said or written, but always involves a decision to represent or interpret it in a certain way (Fairclough, 1995b: 54).

In analyzing discourse representation, it is essential to pay attention to the degree to which the *representing discourse* (i.e., the journalist's voice) is distinguished from the *represented discourse* (i.e., the voice of the person being reported on). In other words, where does the journalist's voice end, and where does the voice of the individual being reported on begin? Fairclough, through an analysis of a news report broadcast on BBC's *Today* program on September 30, 1993, demonstrates how, behind the appearance of balance in reporting the speech of social actors - creating an impression of objectivity - it is often possible to discern the voices of protagonists and antagonists (Fairclough, 1995a: 79-84; 2003: 52-55). Below is the text of the report that he analyzed:

> *'HEADLINES': NEWSREADER: Libya has now told the United Nations that it is willing to see the two men accused of the Lockerbie bombing stand trial in Scotland, but it cannot meet the deadline to hand them over.*

> *NEWSREADER: Libya has told the United Nations that it's willing to let the two men accused of the Lockerbie bombing come to Scotland to stand trial. The position was spelt out in New York last night by the Foreign Minister, Omar AlMuntasir, when he emerged from a meeting with the Secretary-General, Dr Boutros-Ghali.*

> *OMAR AL-MUNTASIR: The answers we have received from the UK and the US through the Secretary-General are very acceptable to us and we see them as a 54 positive answer and enough guarantees to secure a fair trial for these two suspects once they submit themselves to such jurisdiction.*

> *NEWSREADER: Libyan officials at the UN, faced by the threat of more sanctions, said they wanted more time to sort out the details of the handover. Relatives of the 270 people who died on Flight 103 in December 1988 are treating the statement with caution. From the UN, our correspondent John Nian.*

> *CORRESPONDENT: Western diplomats still believe Libya is playing for time. However on the face of it Libya does appear to be inching closer to handing over the two suspects. If this initiative is only a delaying tactic, its aim would be to persuade the waverers on the Security Council not to vote for the new sanctions, in what is likely to be a close vote. However the UN Secretary-General is reported to have been taking a tough line with Libya, demanding that it specify exactly when the two suspects would be handed over. The Libyan Foreign Minister has promised a reply on that point later today, but he's asked for more time to arrange the handover. Meanwhile the West has maintained the pressure on Libya. The Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, and the American Secretary of State Warren Christopher, have both reiterated the threat of sanctions. Western diplomats say that unless the two suspects are handed over immediately, a new resolution will be tabled tomorrow (Fairclough, 2003: 52).*

A superficial reading of the text might suggest that the voices of both sides are presented evenly. The first part of the text presents the statements and positions of the Libyan side, embodied in the foreign minister and other unnamed officials, while the second part features reactions from the West, represented by officials from the UK, the USA, and the UN. By quoting statements and views from both sides, the text can create an illusion of balance in journalistic reporting. However, closer reading reveals strategies that portray some social actors as protagonists and others as antagonists.

One key strategy involves using indirect speech to convey the propositional content accurately but without retaining the original lexicon. Fairclough illustrates this with lexemes referring to the extradition process, specifically the process of transferring two Libyan suspects to Scotland for trial. In the Libyan foreign minister's statement, reported in direct speech, the process is described as *once they submit themselves to such jurisdiction*. However, in the introductory section of the news story - highlighted and functioning as the news headline - the Libyan side's statement is presented in indirect speech, where the same process is referred to as *to come to Scotland to stand trial* in one instance and *the handover* in another. Throughout the text, the process is described as *the handover* a total of six times, which is part of a strategy to portray Libya negatively. This is because countries extradite fugitives or prisoners, not citizens, and extradition implies coercion rather than fulfilling legal obligations.

Beyond the potential for manipulation through indirect speech and lexical changes, a common strategy in discourse representation is

framing or contextualizing what has been said. For example, the Libyan officials' statement *that they needed more time to sort out the details of the handover* is framed with the implication that they made this statement only because they were *faced by the threat of more sanctions*. This framing implies that the Libyan officials' statement represents mere procrastination or a *delaying tactic*, as the correspondent phrases it in the final paragraph. The negative portrayal of Libya is further reinforced by the decision to describe the UN Secretary-General's statement as a speech act of *demanding*, which is likely inaccurate, and to frame it by stating *UN Secretary-General is reported to have been taking a tough line with Libya*. Despite the inclusion of Libyan statements in the first part of the report, such discursive practices create an interpretative frame that is highly unfavorable to Libya (Fairclough, 2003: 53).

Transformations of the source text can also take on more radical forms. Fairclough demonstrates this with an example of how a report from the committee combating drug smuggling was transformed into a news story published in *The Sun* (Fairclough, 1995a: 69-71). Below is excerpt from that report, as cited by Fairclough:

> *The Government should consider the use of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force for radar, airborne or ship surveilance duties. We recommend, therefore, that there should be intensified law enforcement against drug traffickers by H.M.Customs, the police, the security services and possibly the armed forces.*

In a news story published in the Sun newspaper, this text of the report, which represents the official discourse on drug trafficking and law enforcement, was transformed into colloquial discourse:

> *CALL UP FORCES IN DRUG BATLLE!*
>
> *The armed forces should be called up to fight off a massive invasion by drug pushers, MPs demanded yesterday.*

The official discourse was transformed into colloquial discourse primarily by changing the cautiously worded recommendation in the report, *The Government should consider the use of*, into a demand through the use of a categorical imperative in the headline *Call up!*. This transformation allows the newspaper to assume the prerogatives of the parliamentary commission. In addition, the news article employs vocabulary and metaphors characteristic of colloquial discourse, which are absent

from the report: *call up*, *battle*, *fight off*, *massive* and *pushers*. According to Fairclough, the use of such colloquial vocabulary serves both an ideational and an interpersonal function. From an ideational perspective, this vocabulary offers a specific representation of social reality. From an interpersonal perspective, it aims to establish group identification and solidarity between the newspaper and its readership (Ibid: 71).

An indicative aspect of framing or representing someone's discourse is the use of verbs of speech. An illustrative example of the significance of speech verbs in portraying social actors is provided by Machin and Mayr (2012: 62):

> **'You're a liar and murderer': Blair booed after telling Iraq inquiry he has no regrets**
>
> *Tony Blair was heckled today as he refused to express any regret for the Iraq war and insisted Britain would ultimately be able to look back on the conflict with 'immense pride'. There were cries of consternation from witnesses watching the official inquiry into the conflict as the former prime minister rejected the chance to note his sorrow at the loss of British lives. Chairman Sir John Chilcot had to tell audience members to be quiet during Mr Blair's closing comments, in which he insisted he stood by his actions in the run-up to the 2003 war, despite the 179 British troops killed in the conflict. 'It was divisive and I'm sorry about that,' he conceded but continued: 'If I'm asked whether I believe we're safer, more secure with Saddam and his sons out of power, I believe that we are.' Asked if he had any regrets at all, he replied: 'Responsibility but not a regret,' prompting the audience to erupt and cry: 'What, no regrets? Come on'. When the cameras cut off and Mr Blair readied to leave, he was booed and one audience member shouted 'you're a liar' before another chimed in 'and a murderer'.*

This news article was written with the intent to imply the guilt of former British Prime Minister Tony Blair for the UK's involvement in the Iraq War. This implicit stance is conveyed through the use of metapropositional verbs framing his direct or indirect speech, such as *refused to express, rejected,* and *conceded*. These verbs imply that Tony Blair should have expressed regret, thereby suggesting his guilt. Journalists often employ this strategy because making an explicit claim might expose them to legal repercussions (Ibid: 63). On the other hand, the audience is primarily portrayed using prosodic verbs such as *shouted, erupted and cried,* and *booed*, which emphasize collective anger and emotional reactions. The only verb used in a neutral structuring manner

is *tell*, describing the actions of the chair of the commission, presenting him as a neutral party (Ibid: 65). This careful selection of verbs illustrates how language choices can subtly manipulate perceptions of the audience.

3
DISCURSIVE STRATEGIES OF
KEMALIST DISCOURSE

The third component of Fairclough's triadic structure for discourse analysis is sociocultural practice. This segment of analysis involves identifying the historical background of a discourse, as every discourse is inevitably positioned in relation to historical heritage, selectively reproducing or transforming it (Fairclough, 1995b: 11).

Kemalism builds its legitimacy on the critique and negation of the Ottoman State's historical legacy. Narratives about the causes of the Ottoman State's decline and collapse, the circumstances surrounding the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, and the radical changes implemented by the Kemalist elite[4], led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, remain an inexhaustible source for the reproduction of Kemalist discourse. The Kemalist discourse has primarily been shaped and transmitted to new generations through education. In the Turkish education system, there is a subject titled *Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılâp Tarihi* (Atatürk's Principles and History of the Revolution), which is taught as a mandatory subject

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4   The concept of the Kemalist elite is connected to the nature of the modernization project in Turkey, which, according to Aksoy (2005: 125-126), is characterized by a rigidly statist understanding of politics and a lack of social legitimacy. In the process of reshaping society and the individual, a social class - namely, the Kemalist elite - was created, tasked with transmitting and safeguarding the new way of life. During the one-party rule (1923–1950), this elite consisted of the entire state bureaucratic apparatus, while in the subsequent period, this role was primarily assigned to the secular military and legal authorities (Özyürek, 2006: 163), who defended Kemalist hegemony through military coups and imposed constitutional solutions. Naturally, the Kemalist discourse has remained present in the official curriculum, as well as in the media and non-governmental organizations, which are tasked with legitimizing Kemalist hegemonic practices.

at all levels of education for one academic year. Before 1991, this subject was taught for either four or two years. The decision to introduce the subject at universities was made as early as 1933. The first lecture on this subject was delivered in 1934 at Istanbul University by the then-Minister of Education, Prof. Yusuf Hikmet Bayar, while the first lecture at the Law School in Ankara (*Ankara Hukuk Mektebi*) was given by the then-Prime Minister İsmet İnönü. This detail underscores how significant this subject was for the young Republic.

In order to define the discursive practices that legitimized the long-standing Kemalist hegemonic practice - the victims of which were, among others, veiled female students - I analyzed several textbooks used in the aforementioned subject (Doğan, 2013; Kılı, 1982; Komisyon, 2013; Mumcu, 1994a; Mumcu, 1994b; Mumcu, 1998). Understanding the Kemalist discourse requires familiarity with the narratives found in these textbooks regarding the following issues:

- Whether the Republic of Turkey represents an entirely new state, built on the ruins of the Ottoman State, or if there is a state-building continuity?
- What was the nature of the reforms initiated by the Ottoman State?
- Whether Islam played a key role in the stagnation of the Ottoman State and whether Islam is an obstacle to societal development and modernization?
- Whether the population living in the territory of modern Turkey would have initiated the War of Independence (*İstiklal Savaşı*) against imperial forces without Mustafa Kemal Atatürk?
- Whether the reforms of the Kemalist regime aimed to transform or neutralize religion in social life?

By reviewing the content of these textbooks, I determined that the Kemalist discourse largely builds its legitimacy by delegitimizing the Ottoman State and rejecting its cultural and historical legacy. The overarching discursive strategy of Kemalist discourse concerning Islam, based on the narrative of the Ottoman State's decline, can be summarized as follows:

1. Since Islam is a cause of stagnation and an obstacle to progress, all its manifestations, including the veiling of women, should be removed from public life.

In addition to this overarching discursive strategy, which was predominantly used to legitimize the radical reforms of the early Republic period and remains vital today, the Kemalist discourse, depending on the context, employs the following discursive strategies:

2. Islam is good, but it must be protected from misuse for political purposes.
3. Religion, as an important factor of national identity, should have a national character.
4. Any conception or manifestation of religion contrary to the Kemalist framework is seen as a form of reactionism (*irtica*).

All these discursive strategies are rooted in the aforementioned Kemalist narrative, which is still present in the education system of the Republic of Turkey. Therefore, it is essential to consider its background in light of recent literature, which will be discussed further.

3.1. Critique of the Ottoman Period

The emergence of the Republic of Turkey is often described using the metaphor of rising from the ashes of the Ottoman State (Ahmad, 1993: ix). Consequently, Mustafa Kemal is presented as a *deus ex machina* who created Turkey out of nothing (Zürcher, 2004: 99). Recent literature has significantly revised this portrayal of the founding of the Republic of Turkey, which entirely overlooks or denies the role of Ottoman legacy in the process. This perspective is not only prevalent in Kemalist literature but is also common among Western authors.[5] The textbooks analyzed also minimize the importance of reforms carried out in the late Ottoman period, emphasizing that these were superficial changes imposed from above (Doğan, 2013:20; Komisyon, 2013:176). They argue that Ataturk's revolution was neither an extension nor a natural consequence of the reformist tendencies of the Ottoman period (Kili, 1982: 118-119).

The fundamental oversight of this depiction lies in the fact that Mustafa Kemal himself, as well as the entire cadre of officers gathered

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5   Mete Tunçay (2019) emphasizes that most of the literature on Ataturk in Turkey is written as "sheer hagiography", while Western authors generally take a paternalistic stance in the sense that Ataturk is "good enough for the East".

around him during the War of Independence (*İstiklal Savaşı*), were products of the Ottoman educational system, which had been modernized in the 19th century. Educated at the Military Academy (*Harp Akademisi*), Mustafa Kemal acquired a broad education, encompassing natural sciences, mathematics, and foreign languages, and was exposed to the ideas of positivism and vulgar materialism, which predominantly shaped the second generation of the Young Turks (Atalay, 2018: 137; Hanioğlu, 2011: 32). Although Mustafa Kemal was a skilled military strategist or a military genius, as Kemalist discourse describes him, the military success of the national movement in Anatolia was ultimately based on the strength of the remaining formations of the Ottoman army. While it is true that the Ottoman army suffered heavy losses during World War I, its formations remained compact, disciplined, and maintained a clear chain of command after the war. It was precisely this structure that enabled the officers around Mustafa Kemal to implement his strategy (Zürcher, 2004: 100).

The success of military operations also depended significantly on reliable and swift communication, which would not have been possible without the Ottoman telegraph network. Additionally, the modernized bureaucratic apparatus of the Ottoman state remained intact, enabling the national movement in Anatolia to recruit new soldiers and collect taxes, thus securing the manpower and material resources necessary to wage the War of Independence (Ibid: 101; see also Rustow, 2004: 170).

A significant factor in the triumph of the national movement during the War of Independence and the creation of modern Turkey was the self-perception and confidence that the Turkish people gained during World War I, owing to the successes of the Ottoman army in the Battle of Gallipoli and the Siege of Kut al-Amara, during which General Townshend surrendered along with approximately 13,000 soldiers. The Turks simply believed they had earned the right to live as a nation (Ahmad, 1993: 45-46). This self-awareness was evident immediately after the signing of the Armistice of Mudros. Although Kemalist historiography, based on the narrative shaped by Ataturk's work *Nutuk*, marks May 19, 1919 - the date when Ataturk arrived in Anatolia - as the beginning of the War of Independence[6], the Turkish people's struggle for liberation had

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6   As Andrew Mango (2017: 530) states, the first sentence of *Nutuk*, which reads: "On May 19, 1919, I arrived in Samsun.", is enough to see that the story of the emergence of modern Turkey will be presented as the success of one man who discovered and awakened the will of the people. (See also: Ünder, 2015: 143)

started much earlier. When they realized that Wilson's principles had been betrayed and that there was an intention to divide the remaining parts of the state, the Turks resisted, initially through protests and later through armed struggle against the occupiers. This resistance was accompanied by the organization of congresses throughout the country and the establishment of associations, most commonly referred to as the Associations for the Defense of National Rights (*Müdâfaa-ı Hukuk Cemiyeti*). Bülent Tanör, whose research on this period provides a serious critique of the Kemalist narrative, argues that the significance of these congresses and local resistance movements lay not only in buying time. He notes that excluding this period from the official narrative is understandable, given that the official account is based on Ataturk's *Nutuk* and the personality cult built around Ataturk (Tanör, 1992; cited in Turan, 2015: 595). Comparing the modernization process in Turkey under Ataturk and in Iran under Shah Reza Pahlavi, Atabaki and Zürcher (2004: 10) conclude that, unlike the Shah, who had to build a state, Ataturk merely transformed an existing one. This state already had a national army, a national monetary system, a national railway and telegraph network, a developed bureaucratic apparatus, and a legal system that was secular in almost all aspects except for family law.

Understanding why the Kemalist elite, particularly in the early period, completely rejected the Ottoman legacy and denied or ignored the continuity of state-building will help us properly analyze and define the Kemalist discourse. The Ottoman state underwent a crisis in the 18th and 19th centuries, prompting the state elites to seek solutions first through military reforms modeled after European nations, and later in other areas such as the educational and legal systems. The primary goal of these reforms was to preserve the state in the hostile 19th-century environment, where European powers were eagerly awaiting the opportunity to eliminate the "sick man of Europe" (Sayyid, 1997: 67). The crisis and decline of the Ottoman state relative to European powers were addressed not only by state elites but also by intellectual elites who sought solutions for overcoming the crisis.

One ideological group, whose ideas Mustafa Kemal later adopted and implemented when the opportunity arose, consisted of uncompromising proponents of the total acceptance of Western civilization, i.e., Westernization (*Garpçılar*). They believed that the only way out of the crisis was to modernize society by fully following Western

civilization as a model, from technological achievements to cultural practices. Their ideas were based on a significant ideological premise. According to Niyazi Berkes (2018: 382), one of the leading apologists for Kemalism, they firmly believed in the following:

> *Oriental civilization* is doomed to collapse not because of colonialism, the aggression, or hostility of European civilization, but because *it is inherently flawed and backward*. Western civilization is inherently good and superior. (Emphasis in the original, M.T.)

These words clearly reflect the Orientalist ontological framework, which views the world through a hierarchically structured binary opposition in which the West is inherently good, rational, progressive, and superior, while the Orient is conservative, archaic, barbaric, sensual, and passive. The Orient gravitates toward despotism and is not inherently pre-disposed to progress (Richardson, 2004: 5-6). Based on such an ideological foundation, Kemalism[7] equated modernization with Westernization. However, Westernization presupposes prior Orientalization: in order to position Westernization as a salvific remedy, the Kemalists first needed to Orientalize their society - i.e., to describe it in terms of its differences from Western society, articulated in the way the West defined those differences. Accordingly, the Kemalists "had to present Muslim societies as being oriental, as suffering from all the ills that the Orient had to suffer to make the West look healthy and whole. They had to speak about the retrogade influence of Islam on development of modernity within Muslim societies" (Sayyid, 1997: 69)[8]. For this reason, Kemalism rejected the entire Ottoman legacy and denied its significance.

Moreover, textbooks from the subject Atatürk's Principles and History of the Revolution (*Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılâp Tarihi*) also attribute the main cause of the downfall of the Ottoman state to its theocratic organization: Since the state was based on religion, the education system could not produce the necessary cadre to drive economic and cultural development, and as a result, "our society could not move forward for

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7   The ideas of the Dutch orientalist Reinhart Dozy had the most direct influence on Mustafa Kemal and his environment. Reinhart's controversial work *De Voornaameste Godsdiensten: Het Islamisme* was translated into Turkish by Abdullah Cevdet, a very productive and influential ideologue of the Young Turk movement. For details, see: Hanioğlu, 1997.

8   Sayyid considers the Kemalist regime in Turkey to be paradigmatic for other regimes in the Islamic world that had a similar conception of modernism and, therefore, speaks in the plural (1997: 70).

centuries" (Mumcu, 1988: 11). Laws, which were harmonized with European laws at the time, were merely "a secondary legal structure relative to the Sharia system, and the aspirations for a constitution were dispersed when confronted with the traditional structure and the same Sharia system" (Akın, 1976: 31-32; see also Kili, 1982: 123).

In this discourse, criticism of the Ottomans essentially equates to criticism of religion in its cultural and political dimensions (Arslan, 2015: 204). The Ottomans, and by extension Islam, are constructed as the Other (Atalay, 2018: 204) or as the "constitutive outside"[9] (Sayyid, 1997: 65; see also Perry, 2004: 257). Thus, opposition to the Ottomans and Islam became a source of legitimacy for Kemalism, and all the reforms carried out after the founding of the Republic of Turkey were justified as necessary to overcome this root cause of backwardness.

The antagonistic stance of Kemalism toward the Ottoman legacy was not always of the same intensity. It was most pronounced during the early period, up until the 1950s, when, in the process of shaping a secular national identity, there was a need to exclude the Ottomans from the modernization narrative and categorize them as the "Other." After the 1950s, the complete rejection of the Ottoman legacy subsided, with a more conciliatory attitude toward Tanzimat reforms emerging. However, the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876–1909) continued to be portrayed as a period of deviation from modernization, marked by Islamic reactionism (Özbek, 2004: 72–73)[10]. This ideological narrative, however, was discredited by historiography, especially the literature in the field of economic historiography that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, predominantly in the West (Özbek, 2004). The unrelenting nature of the non-ideological, technical discourse of economic historiography demonstrated clearly that during Sultan Abdulhamid II's reign, significant developmental strides were made in agriculture, education, and transportation. The infrastructural projects implemented during

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9   'Constitutive outside' is a Derridian term that denotes the entity responsible for the formation of a certain identity; according to Slavoj Žižek, "to form an identity (A) it is necessary ... to have a negation of that identity (anti-A) before the very construction of social antagonism" (Cvijanović, 2001: 208).

10   Özbek (2004: 72) notes that debates about the character of Sultan Abdulhamid II's reign have largely been abandoned in academic historiography, but are still present in popular historiography. When it comes to textbooks from the subject Atatürk's Principles and History of the Revolution, older textbooks emphasize the despotic character of his reign and deny any progress during that period, while newer textbooks avoid such categorization. Animosity towards the Ottoman legacy is still widespread in popular Kemalist discourse today.

this period played an important role in the War of Independence and the establishment of the Republic of Turkey (Ibid: 73–74). Recent literature on this period presents the Ottoman political elite as agents capable of determining their own destiny, akin to political elites in other parts of the world, rather than mere implementers of an idealized Western model (Ibid: 81). The most significant outcome of these studies has been the overcoming of the dichotomy between Islam and modernism (Azak, 2010: 4).

By the late 19th century, Ottoman reformers had managed to develop a specific form of modernism: they established a bureaucratic apparatus modeled after European countries, facilitated the creation of private companies, and witnessed the emergence of socialist movements, trade unions, materialist magazines, suffragettes, cinemas, theaters, art schools, and magazines advertising corsets, among other developments (Hanioğlu, 2011: 205). The legal system of that period, which was hybrid in nature as it combined Western legal principles with Islamic jurisprudence (Ibid: 204), best exemplifies the character of Ottoman modernism: It was a modernism characterized by an eclectic or even syncretic compromise, and compromise is the most crucial element of contemporary, liberal, democratic culture (Tunçay, 2015: 96).

Mustafa Kemal rejected even the possibility of non-Western modernism, despite having lived in and been a product of such an environment (Hanioğlu, 2011: 204; İnalcık, 2016: 57). He believed that modernization was only possible if the conditions that enabled modernization in Europe were recreated, asserting that the "European miracle could only be imitated, duplicated and doubled; it could not simply be as inspiration, but had to be a duplication" (Sayyid, 1997: 68). In this conception of modernism, there is no room for compromise - anything that deviates from the Western experience represents an obstacle to progress and must be eliminated.

When he had the opportunity, Mustafa Kemal acted on this belief. After Orientalizing society - describing it in terms of the negative pole of the Orientalist ontological framework - he initiated a process of de-Orientalization. In the context of a Muslim society, this process entailed de-Islamization; it meant that the influence of Islam had to be removed from society so that it would cease to be Oriental and could become authentically Western (Ibid: 69). This process, accompanied by a series of radical reforms (*inkılaplar*), can also be defined as the birth of a new Turkish state.

3.2. Revolution/reforms

Caught in the dichotomy between East and West, the Kemalist regime equated modernization with Westernization, considering secularism its fundamental prerequisite. Consequently, secularism was postulated as a modernist ideology within Kemalist discourse (Göle, 1997: 49). Mustafa Kemal envisioned the Republic of Turkey as a secular state modeled after European nations, with the Third French Republic (1870–1940) - characterized by militant anti-clericalism and combative secularism - serving as his archetype (Hanioğlu, 2011: 134).

To contextualize the reforms he enacted with this aim, it is necessary to address whether the Ottoman State, as a predominantly Muslim society, had any experience with secularism, or whether secularism was exclusively a European phenomenon. The Orientalist perspective on this issue is unequivocal. Bernard Lewis (2002: 103) frames it as follows:

> The reasons why Muslims developed no secularist movement of their own, and reacted sharply against attempts to introduce one from abroad, will thus be clear from the contrasts between Christian and Muslim history and experience. From the beginning, Christians were taught both by precept and practice to distinguish between God and Caesar and between the different duties owed to each of the two. Muslims received no such instruction.

However, this claim appears to be inaccurate, at least when it comes to the Ottoman State. While it is true that secularism was introduced from the West, it is also true that a secular intellectual tradition began to emerge in the Ottoman State during the 19th century. This development of modernism and secularism is often attributed to the Ottoman tradition known as *din-u-devlet* ("religion and state"), which was characterized by the dualism of political legitimacy, wherein both Islam and the state were sources of law (Azak, 2010: 2). This indicates that the Ottoman state was not a purely theocratic entity. The sultan was a secular authority who applied customary law and issued his own legal codes, known as *kanun-nâme* (Tanör, 1999: 189). While the process of secularization - in terms of separating religious and state affairs - began as early as the reigns of Sultan Selim III (1789–1808) and Sultan Mahmud II (1808–1839), with the establishment of modern schools teaching secular sciences, it was during the Tanzimat period that secular practices were institutionalized. The 1869 General Education Regulation

(*Nizamnâme-i Ma'arif-i Umûmîye*) divided schools administratively into two categories: state-run schools and religious schools under the jurisdiction of the *şeyhülislam* (Aksoy, 2005: 51). This dualism was also evident in the legal system, represented by the coexistence of two types of courts: *Şer'iye Mahkemeleri*, which ruled according to Sharia principles, and *Nizamiye Mahkemeleri*, which followed laws and decrees issued by the state (Yetkin, 2013: 67). The secularization process continued to evolve, weakening the institutional power of the *şeyhülislam* and limiting the role of religion in state functioning. By the late Ottoman period, during the rule of the Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihat ve Terakki*), this process culminated in the following outcomes:

a) The *şeyhülislam* ceased to be a member of the government,
b) Sharia courts were removed from the jurisdiction of the *şeyhülislam* and placed under the Ministry of Justice,
c) The Directorate of Religious Endowments was transferred from the *şeyhülislam* to the Ministry of Endowments,
d) All religious schools (*medrese*) were removed from the *şeyhülislam*'s authority and placed under the Ministry of Education (Aksoy, 2005: 93).

By the time the Ottoman State came to an end, its state structure had been largely secularized. The *şeyhülislam* was no longer part of the government, the sultan-caliph served a largely symbolic role (Zürcher, 2000: 253), the educational and legal systems were predominantly secular, and the role of Sharia was reduced almost exclusively to family law (Ibid: 272).

This trajectory of secularism, characterized by a conciliatory relationship with religion, took on a radical dimension after the founding of the Republic of Turkey. Mustafa Kemal implemented reforms with such radicalism that they far exceeded the expectations of even the most fervent advocates of Westernization (*Garpçılar*) (Hanioğlu, 2011: 61–62). All of his (radical) reforms were directly or indirectly related to the function of religion in society. To better understand this, his political actions regarding the role of religion in sociopolitical life can be divided into three phases:

a) Affirmation (1919–1923),
b) Transformation (1923–1933),
c) Negation (1933–1938).

3.2.1. Affirmation Phase

The first phase, conditionally corresponding to the period of the War of Independence (*İstiklal Savaşı*), was characterized by pragmatism and opportunism. In the proclamation establishing the National Assembly in Ankara, Mustafa Kemal stated that the goal of the national struggle was the liberation of the country and the honorable institutions of the sultan and caliph, who was the supreme spiritual authority for all Muslims. Since there was no awareness of national cohesion among the population, Mustafa Kemal leveraged Islamic solidarity to organize the national resistance (Tunçay, 2015: 92).

The opening ceremony of the National Assembly was steeped in Islamic symbolism. The Assembly was inaugurated on a Friday, following the Jumu'ah prayer performed at the central mosque. Before entering the building of the National Assembly, which contained a replica of the Prophet Muhammad's flag and a hair from his beard, imams completed the recitation of the entire Quran (*hatm*). As Şükrü Hanioğlu notes: "The Islamic character of these opening ceremonies outdid any comparable solemnity in Ottoman history and gave no inkling of the secular revolution that would follow in years to come" (Hanioğlu, 2011: 102). Islamic symbolism did not end with the opening ceremony. An imam was appointed to lead the five daily prayers in the Assembly building, religious references were frequently cited during Assembly sessions, and a banner displaying a Quranic verse - "Those who conduct their affairs by mutual consultation" (Ash-Shura, 38) - hung in the meeting hall. These elements made the National Assembly's sessions in Ankara resemble the consultative councils of the *şeyhülislam* (*meşveret*) more than the Ottoman Parliament of 1877 (Ibid: 102).

Although the Islamic character of the first convocation of the National Assembly in Ankara is interpreted in the analyzed textbooks as a necessary concession to the conservative ulema present in the Assembly (Kili, 1982: 55; Mumcu, 1988: 52), Mustafa Kemal himself used religious symbolism and rhetoric. For instance, during the Erzurum Congress at the beginning of the War of Independence, he concluded his speech with an ornate prayer for the Prophet (Mango, 2017: 503). Furthermore, during meetings with commanders at the frontlines of the war with Greece, he requested that passages from the Quran be recited (Ibid: 532). In a declaration issued on behalf of the National Assembly to the Islamic world, he included the following:

Following the fall of caliphates in Damascus, Cordoba, Cairo, and Baghdad, the last center of Muslim caliphate has fallen under the shadow of enemy weapons... Anatolia, the union and independence of which we are trying to defend, is a land of refuge for many Muslim communities driven out of their homelands... Hundreds of muftis and scholars have issued fatwâs to show the right direction to our nation and the Islamic world... Please hear this voice of sharī 'a. (Hanioğlu, 2011: 103).

This appeal aimed to ensure continued support from Muslims in Central Asia and India, then under British colonial rule, who recognized the Ottoman caliph as the supreme spiritual authority of all Muslims. The Khilafat Movement, a mass religious-political movement in India founded in 1919, sought to defend the caliphate. Since the caliphate's center was under Allied occupation, the movement supported the national struggle in Anatolia, which was fighting to liberate the caliph. *The Muslim League*, the strongest organization within the movement, collaborated with Hindus led by Mahatma Gandhi. At a time when the British government considered mobilizing Hindus and Muslims from India to suppress the national movement in Anatolia, the Khilafat Movement declared civil disobedience, preventing the national movement from having to face British forces in addition to the Greeks (İnalcık, 2016: 51–52).

Additionally, the movement established the Angora Fund (Ibid), raising a donation of 125,000 British pounds[11] for the national struggle (Hanioğlu, 2011: 104). During the Lausanne negotiations, when talks stalled, the movement's committee threatened the British government with a new civil disobedience campaign, a boycott of British goods, and disruption of grain exports if Britain initiated another war against Turkey. The movement even decided to form a military unit to fight on behalf of Ankara's government (Doğan, 2016: 140). Although this unit was not ultimately needed, as negotiations resumed and resulted in a peace treaty that secured international recognition for the Republic of Turkey, the Khilafat Movement's support was a significant factor in the success of the national struggle.

After the war against the Greek occupation forces ended with the magnificent victory of the Turkish army, there was a shift in the rhetoric and practices of Mustafa Kemal. He hinted at this shift when he suddenly

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11   After the war, Mustafa Kemal founded the *Türkiye İş Bankası* bank from the remaining part of that money (Mango, 2017: 475). His shares in that bank were inherited and still used by the CHP party, which he founded. See: https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-45897905

abolished the position of the imam in the National Assembly, telling him at the time: "You may perform them in a mosque. We did not win the war with prayers, but with the blood of our soldiers." (Hanioğlu, 2011: 145)

The event that shaped the contours of the following period was a khutbah (sermon) delivered by Mustafa Kemal on February 7, 1923, in a mosque in the city of Balıkesir. This event bore the characteristics of the initial period, as he delivered the sermon during his tour of Anatolia ahead of the elections, thus affirming the societal significance of this religious institution. On the other hand, the speech he gave on this occasion included some guidelines for his future actions. Among other things, he said the following:

> In the speech I delivered last year in the National Assembly, I stated: The pulpits (*minber*) have always been a source of spiritual joy and light for the minds of the people. For this to remain so, the words spoken from the pulpits must be understandable and in accordance with scientific truths. Esteemed preachers must keep up daily with the political and social situation. If they are not knowledgeable about this, they will misguide the people. Therefore, khutbahs must and will be entirely in Turkish and in accordance with the needs of the time. Gentlemen! Mosques were not built so that we could gather in them without looking each other in the face. Mosques were built not only for worship but also for reflecting on what needs to be done for religion and for this world, that is, for mutual consultation. (Cündioğlu, 1998: 48)

With this speech, Mustafa Kemal signaled that, in the upcoming period, he would begin a process of transforming religious institutions and, subsequently, the cultural and social life of Turkey in general, in line with his vision for the development of the Republic of Turkey. In this new Turkey, khutbahs (sermons) would indeed be delivered in Turkish, but mosques would not serve the social role that he defined and demonstrated in this speech.

3.2.2. Transformation Phase

By transformation, I mean the transformation of the state system and state institutions, as well as of the overall socio-cultural and religious life of the country. First, the transformation was realized at the

institutional level, then the transformation of socio-cultural life, after which religion itself became the subject of social engineering.

3.2.2.1 Institutional Transformation

Following the war, Mustafa Kemal was determined to use the charisma he had gained among the people - "because he saved our religion, flag, and honor" (İnalcık, 2016: 82) - to lead the country toward what he defined as the "civilized world." In his speeches from this period, he emphasized that Islam was not inherently incompatible with modern civilization: "Our religion, Islam, is the most logical and natural religion, and for this reason, it is the last religion. To be natural, it must be logical; it must conform to reason, wisdom, rational thought, logic, and science - and it does." (Tanör, 1999: 183) In his view, Islam itself was not a barrier to progress. The problem lay in the fact that true Islam had become intertwined with superstition over time, which needed to be purged (İnalcık, 2016: 63). In addition to superstition, he identified the exploitation of religion for political purposes as a significant burden on Islam:

> We are aware that we must elevate our religion, Islam, which we follow with satisfaction and joy, above being a political tool, as it has been for centuries... To ensure the happiness of our people in this world and the next, it is necessary to completely free our religion from politics, which is a stage for various interests and passions. (Ibid: 86)

This period saw the articulation of Kemalism's discursive strategy toward Islam, which can be summarized as follows: Islam is inherently good, but it must be protected from political exploitation. Through this strategy, Kemalism positioned itself as saving religion from human misuse. In practice, this meant that the influence of religion had to be completely removed from state institutions, that is, that the state had to be completely secularized. The most significant step toward the secularization of the state was the abolition of the caliphate.

The first move in this direction was the abolition of the sultanate, as the Ottoman sovereign combined the roles of sultan and caliph. The Ottoman government had effectively lost its legitimacy after the occupation of Istanbul on March 16, 1920. The decision to separate the

caliphate from the sultanate and abolish the sultanate on November 1, 1922, merely formalized this de facto reality. Although the Kemalist narrative, based on Mustafa Kemal's *Nutuk*, describes resistance to this decision in the National Assembly and claims that Mustafa Kemal, at one point, climbed onto a bench and, like a true revolutionary, threatened that "some heads will roll" if the decision was not made (Mumcu, 1988: 110; Kili, 1982: 149–150), the official transcripts of the session do not mention any debates. The decision was adopted with only one dissenting vote (Mango, 2017: 436). Since the decision preserved the institution of the caliphate, the abolition of the sultanate was uncontroversial, as the sultan had already lost his legitimacy due to accusations of collaboration with the occupiers.

When presenting the draft decision, Mustafa Kemal spoke like both an Islamic scholar and a national ideologue (Hanioğlu, 2011: 137–138). He referenced the Turks' illustrious past of over 1,500 years, their encounter with Islam, and the institution of the caliphate. He argued for the coexistence of secular authority and the caliphate, citing examples from Seljuk and Mamluk rulers who had kept Abbasid caliphs under their patronage, stripped of secular power. Mustafa Kemal described the caliphate as "the central spiritual and religious bond of the Islamic world" (Mango, 2017: 436).

After the abolition of the sultanate, the National Assembly appointed Abdulmecid, a cousin of the last Ottoman sultan, as the new caliph. Abdulmecid had shown favor toward the national movement during the war. The ulema of Al-Azhar recognized the new caliph, and Muslims in India, after initial skepticism, accepted the new reality. At a Khilafat Movement conference, they even bestowed titles upon Mustafa Kemal such as *Sayf al-Islām* (Sword of Islam) and *Mujaddid-i Khilāfat* (Restorer of the Caliphate) (Hanioğlu, 2011: 141–142). For Indian Muslims, Mustafa Kemal's victory represented a triumph for the entire Islamic world against Britain. They hoped he would convene the global Islamic community to discuss reforms within Islam (İnalcık, 2016: 54). However, Mustafa Kemal had no intention of turning to the Islamic world but to the West, and one of the main obstacles on his way was the caliphate, which, after separating from secular power, resembled the Vatican (Hanioğlu, 2011: 147). The caliphate certainly had enormous symbolic significance, from which the national movement itself benefited during the War of Independence (*İstiklal Savaşı*), so careful preparations had to be made for its abolition.

After the war and the abolition of the sultanate, the political land-scape in Ankara became increasingly turbulent. Members of the opposition bloc in the Assembly demanded that it retain the direct authority it wielded during the war, while Mustafa Kemal's wartime comrades expected to have a say in decision-making. However, Mustafa Kemal was determined to lead the country on his own terms. To achieve this, he began surrounding himself with individuals who were unconditionally loyal and shared his convictions. Believing that radical reforms were impossible with the current Assembly, he deemed it necessary to hold new elections. To prepare the public for this, he embarked on a tour through western Anatolia, delivering speeches emphasizing the need for elections and the continuation of the revolution. During a speech in Bursa, he declared:

> Revolutions made with blood are enduring; a bloodless revolution is short-lived. We shed as much blood as necessary for this revolution. Our blood was not only spilled on the battlefield but also in the interior of the country... There were many uprisings, and all were suppressed. Let us hope that this spilled blood will suffice and that no more blood will be spilled in the future. (Mango, 2017: 433)

However, blood was soon spilled again. Ali Şükrü Bey, an eloquent critic of Mustafa Kemal in the National Assembly, was murdered by Topal Osman, the head of Mustafa Kemal's personal security detail. Topal Osman was later killed in a clash with soldiers sent to arrest him. Before an official report on the incident could be released, Mustafa Kemal, with the support of loyal members of the Assembly, succeeded in dissolving the legislature and calling for new elections. Before that, he amended the electoral law in such a way that he was enabled to select candidates for the elections himself. After the elections, the new Assembly no longer included any opposition deputies from the first "wartime" Assembly. Only those who were completely loyal to Mustafa Kemal and a few independent leaders of the national resistance remained. The latter were too popular with the public to be removed at this point (Ibid: 444-449).

The Assembly then ratified the Treaty of Lausanne, proclaimed the Republic, and elected Mustafa Kemal as its first president. These developments laid the firm foundations of a secular order. The constitutional provision "Sovereignty unconditionally belongs to the

nation" (*Egemenlik kayıtsız şartsız milletindir*), included in the 1921 Constitution, gained its full meaning with the abolition of the sultanate and the proclamation of the Republic. The source of sovereignty was no longer God - whose "shadow on earth" was the sultan-caliph - but the people and their will. However, in practice, this principle was applied differently:

> Ataturk himself was to be the embodiment of the national will; hence whatever he decreed - as he was careful to adhere to formalism, this was always an act of legislation or a cabinet decision - was regarded as in accordance with the people's wishes (or rather, what they should wish). (Tunçay, 2019; see also Zürcher, 2004: 104)

From then on, the Assembly largely functioned as a body that formally legitimized Mustafa Kemal's decisions (Zürcher, 2004: 105). After the proclamation of the Republic, the Constitution included a provision declaring Islam the state religion. This was intended to create the illusion that the upcoming reforms aimed to transform, rather than eliminate, religion from public life. This provision remained in place until 1928.

The decision to proclaim the Republic and elect Mustafa Kemal as its first president was made when only 158 deputies out of 286 were present in the Assembly. None of the prominent leaders from the War of Independence were in Ankara that day (Doğan, 2016: 140). The rift between Mustafa Kemal and his former comrades deepened as they began openly expressing concerns that the new government might turn into an authoritarian regime akin to Latin American "banana republics" that suppressed the people's will (Mango, 2017: 463-464). While tolerating their criticisms for a time, Mustafa Kemal continued to consolidate his power.

Only a year after passionately defending the coexistence of secular authority and the caliph, stripped of any temporal power, he decided to abolish the caliphate altogether. According to the Kemalist narrative, the abolition of the caliphate was necessitated by the activities of Mustafa Kemal's opponents, particularly his closest allies from the War of Independence. These individuals allegedly sought to use the caliph as a political counterweight to the emerging regime in Ankara. This claim was supported by the behavior of the caliph himself, who requested budget allocations and expressed a desire to wear ceremonial attire like his illustrious predecessors - actions interpreted as political ambitions.

However, the leaders of the national movement distanced themselves from these claims, pledging their loyalty to the new regime. The Istanbul press, accused of playing a role in the conspiracy, was silenced through a farcical trial by the Martial Law Court (*İstiklal Mahkemesi*) (Ibid: 463-466). Meanwhile, Mustafa Kemal restricted the caliph's privileges, forbidding him from wearing ceremonial attire and halving his budget allocations (Doğan, 2016: 135). These reasons seem to have been constructed, with the true cause of the abolition of the caliphate lying deeper.

Mustafa Kemal gave Mehmed Seyyid, the Minister of Justice, who was well versed in *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence), the task of defending the proposal for the abolition of the caliphate in the National Assembly with religious arguments. Seyyid emphasized that the caliphate was essentially a political institution rooted in temporal power, with no inherent connection to Sharia or Islamic belief. He argued that once the caliphate lost its temporal power, it became meaningless and could be replaced by a form of governance suited to the needs of the time (Hanioğlu, 2011: 151).[12]

During the parliamentary session, several deputies spoke in favor of the proposal, offering arguments that reflect some of the constitutive elements of the Kemalist discourse, which still burden Turkish social life today. The first significant theme in these speeches was hostility toward the Ottoman dynasty. Deputies argued that the caliphate should be abolished because it perpetuated the Ottoman dynasty, which was accused of enslaving and exploiting the people, causing the decline of the Turkish nation, and leaving behind a history of bloodshed. They contended that the dynasty was undeserving of the institution of the caliphate (Doğan, 2016: 140). The most vitriolic expression of anti-Ottoman sentiment came from Ihsan Eryavuz, a deputy and the head of the martial law court (*İstiklal Mahkemesi*), who had previously been sent to Istanbul to silence newspapers that wrote favorably about the caliphate. Eryavuz demanded that "the graves of Ottoman rulers be exhumed and their bones scattered" (Mango, 2017: 469-470). This hostility toward

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12   After listening to the speech of Mehmed Seyyid, who was a religious figure, Mustafa Kemal said that "Seyyid Bey had fulfilled his last duty" and only two days later dismissed him from his post as Minister of Justice. Andrew Mango, somewhat ironically, comments that this case shows the tolerance with which the reformers, led by Mustafa Kemal, viewed religious figures, regardless of the fact that they competed to show greater revolutionary fervor (2017: 470).

the Ottomans was discursive in nature. On the one hand, in the Assembly and pro-regime newspapers, the Ottomans were constructed as the greatest enemies of the Turkish people, legitimizing hatred toward them. On the other hand, the government expressed this sentiment concretely by removing symbols of Ottoman heritage. Ottoman sultans' calligraphic emblems (*tuğra*) were removed from public buildings, and many other historical remnants of the Ottoman period were either destroyed or left to decay (Doğan, 2016: 112).[13]

Another prominent argument in the parliamentary debates on the abolition of the caliphate was the narrative of betrayal by Arabs. The meaninglessness of the caliphate is argued by the fact that during World War I, Arabs had rebelled against the Ottoman State, and that Arabs and Indian Muslims had fought alongside the Allied forces.[14] One deputy (out of only two who dared to oppose the proposal) countered this narrative, pointing out that these Muslims were prisoners under British rule and that their situation was similar to that of Turks in the west of the country, who were unable to join the resistance movement. Deputies, who argued the meaninglessness of the caliphate by the absence of any help from Muslims from other countries during the War of Independence (*İstiklal Savaşı*), disregarded over the support they received from the Muslims of India (Ibid: 142).

Despite the extent to which the national movement benefited from the institution of the caliphate during the war that was presented as a struggle to liberate the "honorable institution of the caliphate", the fact remains that for many Muslims, the caliphate represented a sense of belonging to a broader, imagined Islamic community (*Ummah*) that

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13 How vital this animosity towards the Ottoman heritage is, is shown by an example that happened recently. In the municipal elections held on 31.3.2019. the Kemalist CHP party won power in the municipality of Bilecik, the first center of the Ottoman state. As soon as they took power, they removed the ceramic relief with motifs from the Ottoman period from the walls of the municipality building. See: https://www.timeturk.com/bilecik-belediyesi-chp-ye-gecti-saray-kelimesi-ve-osmanli-figurleri-kaldirildi/haber-1073095

14 The issue of the role of Arabs in World War I is an issue that still deeply polarizes Turkish society today. The Kemalist discourse foregrounds the uprising led by some Arab tribal leaders, instructed by England, thus deepening hatred towards Arabs in general, while the Islamist discourse emphasizes that on all fronts, and especially in the Battle of the Dardanelles, Arabs fought in the ranks of the Ottoman army in far greater numbers than those who participated in the uprising. This attitude towards Arabs was also reflected in the state policy towards Arab countries. An interesting indicator of this relationship in the early period was the case of two conferences of Islamic countries: In 1926, Turkey sent two semi-official observers to the conference in Mecca, while in 1931 it refused to send its representatives to the conference held in Jerusalem on the pretext that this would mean "using religion for political purposes" (Jäschke, 1972, 21).

transcended national and political boundaries. This was confirmed by the widespread public condemnation meted out by the act of abolishing the caliphate in many parts of the Islamic world, especially in Tunisia, despite the fact that Mustafa Kemal had until then been celebrated in those parts of the world as a heroic figure in the fight against European imperialism. The institution's symbolic significance was too profound for many to accept its elimination.

However, the caliphate could not survive in Turkey due to the core tenet of Kemalist discourse: the irreconcilable dichotomy between the West/modern civilization and Islam. This foundational aspect of Kemalist thought left no room for reconciling Islamic (indigenous) culture with Western values (Sayyid, 1997: 60; see also Azak, 2010: 11). Reflecting on the abolition of the caliphate later, Mustafa Kemal remarked: "As for the Caliphate, it could only have been a laughing-stock in the eyes of the civilized world, enjoying the blessings of science" (Ibid: 59). This psychological factor - shame and a sense of inferiority before the West - illustrates the extent to which the hierarchical dichotomy between the West, which in the Kemalist discourse is equated with the civilized world, and Islam shaped the Kemalist modernization project. For the Kemalist elite, this project was not merely a set of measures to restore the country and integrate it into the ranks of developed countries; it was also a "performance staged for an imagined Western audience" (Ahıska, 2003: 367). The fear of embarrassment before the "Western gaze," whether real or imagined, persisted throughout the Kemalist era. In Turkish school textbooks, all reforms are interpreted as a "rescue from being ridiculous" (*gülünç olmaktan kurtulmak*) (Atalay, 2018: 129).

On March 3, 1924, alongside the abolition of the caliphate, two additional key laws were enacted, marking significant milestones on the path toward the secularization of Turkey. The first of these was the Law on the Unification of Education (*Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu*). This law centralized all educational institutions under the authority of the Ministry of Education. The same law envisioned the establishment of "schools for imams and *hatips*" with the aim of educating officials responsible for religious services, such as the duties of leading prayers (*imamet*) and delivering religious lectures (*hitabet*)," which would replace the existing madrasas, as well as a theological faculty that would train "experts in religious matters" (İnalcık, 2016: 86). In Kemalist literature, as well as among some Western authors, such control

of religious education by the state is interpreted as an effort to separate it from traditional values and institutions, rather than as an attempt to eliminate religion. The argument was that if the state aimed to eliminate religion, it wouldn't have established new religious schools at all (Ibid; Berkes, 2018: 484; Turner, 1974: 165; Atabaki, 2004: 57). However, the fate of these schools suggests otherwise: By replacing medreses with state-controlled institutions, the government created the appearance of mere transformation, while its actual intent was far more radical. Therefore, I will treat this issue as one of the earliest measures from the third phase when the negation of religion occurs.

The second law passed on the same day the caliphate was abolished is the law that abolishes the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Waqfs (*Şer'iyye ve Evkaf Vekaleti*). Instead of this ministry, the Directorate of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*) was established, which is responsible for the religious and ritual affairs of Muslims, and the General Directorate of Waqfs (*Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü*). After that, the Sharia courts were abolished as the last remaining religious institution in the state's structure.

The influence of Sharia law in the final period of the Ottoman state was reduced almost exclusively to family law (Zürcher, 2000: 253). In the final years of the Ottoman state, the Young Turk government sought to reconcile Islam and modernization in this segment through a liberal interpretation of the Hanbali legal school, in order to limit polygamy and ensure women's right to divorce (Hanioğlu, 2011: 62). Mehmed Seyyid, an Islamic jurist and then Minister of Justice, also relied on that reconciliatory approach when, on Mustafa Kemal's orders, he defended the decision to abolish the caliphate at the podium of the National Assembly: After brilliantly defending Mustafa Kemal's views on the caliphate, he spoke about how the Turks should create laws in accordance with their national spirit, citing the example of the Swiss Civil Code as something that Turkish legislation should never adopt. Mehmed Seyyid's statement clearly showed that he did not understand the extent to which Mustafa Kemal was committed to Westernization, as two years later, with only minor modifications, the Swiss Civil Code was adopted. This statement cost Mehmed Seyyid his position as minister (Ibid: 151).

In fact, Mehmed Seyyid at the podium reflected the stance of the commission responsible for legal reform, which he headed. Starting from the fact that national law is a product of prevailing customs and that it

can only be replaced through the evolution of those folk customs, the commission members believed that laws should be gradually reformed in line with the cultural habits and traditions of the country (Göle, 1996: 74). Mustafa Kemal did not accept the commission's argument because he wanted radical changes and a complete break from tradition. The radical nature of this break is best illustrated by the following fact: in Article 1 of the adopted Swiss Civil Code, it is stated that in situations not defined by law, the judge should follow "the doctrine and tradition accepted by all", while in the Turkish law, the word "tradition" was avoided, and the formulation "scientific research and decisions of other judges" was used (Jäschke, 1972: 23). The legal reform was completed in 1926 with the adoption of "copied" European laws (Tunçay, 2015: 92). For example, the penal code was adopted from fascist Italy at the time, with the difference that the death penalty was abolished in Italy but not in Turkey (Mango, 2017: 506; Zürcher, 2000: 272). A psychological factor is also present behind the legal reform; during the peace negotiations in Lausanne, representatives of the European powers insulted the Turkish judiciary and mocked the Turks, claiming that religious law was applied in Turkey, after which members of the Turkish delegation promised to carry out legal reform (Inalcık, 2016: 88-89).

The reforms through which the government partially abolished and partially placed under its control Islamic institutions and financial resources used to sustain religious life are considered in literature as Mustafa Kemal's success in the fight against the traditional *ulema*; in this way, he thwarted the greatest threat to the legitimacy of the republican regime – the possibility of reviving an Islamic state based on the interpretation of Sharia (Howard, 2016: 96; see also: Turner, 1974: 166). However, in carrying out these radical secular reforms, Mustafa Kemal encountered no resistance from the *ulema*, which confirms the fact that the *ulema* had already been bureaucratized and placed under the control of the state in the Ottoman Empire (Zürcher, 2004: 102). For comparison, Reza Pahlavi was not so fortunate: When Reza Shah attempted similar reforms and sought to declare a republic, he encountered fierce opposition from the *ulama*, allied with the *bazaar*, and had to abandon his plan (Atabaki, 2004: 58). Similarly, when his son attempted to introduce women's suffrage in 1962 by establishing local councils, protests organized in mosques and medreses forced him to back down (İnalcık, 2016: 56).

Since the *ulema* in Turkey was not in conflict with the state and did not pose a real threat to it, we can conclude that the rigorous secular reforms of the Kemalist regime did not arise from the factual state of affairs and real needs, that is, they were not based on their own, but on European experience; they had a consciously mimetic character and "represent the most dramatic and systematic attempt to politically impose a specifically Western understanding of secularism" (Turner, 1974: 164). Mustafa Kemal emphasized in his speeches that modern, or Western, civilization must be followed in its entirety, unconditionally and uncompromisingly, and thus the understanding of secularism must be entirely based on the European experience because, in his opinion, this is the only way to achieve progress and reach the level of modern civilization. However, there were at least three key differences between Kemalist secular reforms and Europe's secularization experience. These differences would limit the success of Turkey's modernization project and perpetuate divisions within Turkish society.

The first and most significant difference lies in the fact that secularization in Europe was a product of socio-economic dynamics, specifically economic modernization, whereas in Turkey, it was imposed through political measures by an autocratic and statist government (Turner, 1974: 168; Tanör, 1999: 195; Hanioğlu, 2011: 205-206). The Kemalist elite was determined to follow the European path to modernization but overlooked - or remained silent about - the hierarchy of values in the West. In the West, secularization was a product of economic modernization, while for the Kemalist elite, it was a prerequisite for modernization. Guided by an orientalist ontological schema, the Kemalist elite believed that before undertaking any other reform steps, they first had to eliminate all Islamic institutions and the influence of religion in society. According to this ontological schema, Islam was inherently backward and represented an obstacle to progress. Unfortunately, this is where they stopped; following rigorous secular reforms, they did not implement genuine socio-economic reforms or attempt to alter property relations in the country (Zürcher, 2000: 253). As a result, a gap developed between the Kemalist elites and the people, which became evident only after the collapse of the totalitarian/dictatorial regime and the holding of the first free, multi-party elections in 1950, when the Kemalist party, CHP, experienced a complete political defeat. This gap was also acknowledged by Bülent Ecevit, a prominent Kemalist and a multiple-term Prime Minister of Turkey, who defined its causes as follows:

> The people oppose reforms imposed from above, by the force of law, and the bureaucracy that looks down on them. They also oppose the 'oppressive lords' who retained their power by rallying around the party. The people want to stop being humiliated; they want a state that will respect their feelings and desires and honor their dignity (Inalcık, 2016: 71-72).

Another significant difference is that the Kemalist secular reforms did not stop at secularizing the state, i.e., separating religion from the state. Instead, the Kemalist regime abolished some religious institutions, stripped others of their autonomy, and placed them entirely under its control - actions that are contradictory to secularism. Following the abolition of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Foundations (*Şer'iyye ve Evkaf Vekaleti*), the Directorate of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*) was established to oversee the religious and ritual affairs of Muslims. This Directorate functioned as a public institution, whose role was limited to providing technical services; it had no spiritual authority, could not propose Islamic regulations, and was prohibited from engaging in theological research (Tanör, 1999: 192-193). From 1931 onward, the Directorate did not even have authority over the hiring or dismissal of religious officials in mosques (Jäschke, 1972: 59). The profile of this institution responsible for managing religious affairs best illustrates the nature of secularism in Turkey: religion could not interfere in state affairs, while the state could interfere in religious matters, regulate them, and exert control. In this way, secularism in Turkey became an instrument for controlling religion (Tunçay, 2019).

The most serious consequence of the state's attempt to monopolize the domain of religion was that the Kemalist regime created the perception that any Islamic activity outside the framework defined by the state posed a threat to society (Azak, 2010: 16). This division formed the basis of a discursive strategy that labeled any understanding or expression of faith contrary to the Kemalist conception as reactionary (*irtica*), a topic that will be discussed in more detail later in the text.

The third significant characteristic of Turkey's secular reforms is that they did not remain confined to the institutional level but extended to the personal level as well. The goal of these reforms was not only to separate religion from the state but also to free people's minds from Islamic concepts and practices (Sayyid, 1997: 64), and from all forms of cultural conservatism (Alaranta, 2014: 24). The Kemalist regime was determined to transform the domain of popular religious expression and

cultural habits of the people. All the reforms undertaken with this goal had a mimetic character; their aim was to emulate the European model of socio-cultural life. The most drastic step in this direction was the Hat Law, which most directly interfered with the private sphere and cultural habits of the people. Kemalism focused on adopting cultural habits and daily practices from the West while neglecting to adopt good practices in the areas of political organization and state functionality. As a result, Kemalist reforms were reduced to superficial superstructural changes that did not impact the economic structure (Göle, 1996: 73). Ultimately, this ambitious modernist project, ostensibly dedicated to affirming Enlightenment ideas centered on faith in the primacy of rational knowledge and science, was reduced to a few mimetic reforms aimed at imitating the cultural habits of the civilized world, i.e., the West. As Şerif Mardin concludes: "The republic took over educational institutions and cultural (museums, painting and sculpture, secularism) from the West without realizing that these were just the tip of an iceberg of meanings, perceptions, and ontological positions" (Mardin, 1997: 65). This character of Kemalism is clearly evident in its reforms of socio-cultural life.

3.2.2.2. Transformation of Socio-Cultural Life

The secular reforms that abolished the caliphate, traditional religious schools, and sharia courts did not provoke a reaction from the ulema but did spark a rebellion in the mountainous southeastern region of the country. A year after these changes, an uprising broke out near the city of Diyarbakir, led by Sheikh Said, a prominent leader of the Naqshbandi order. The rhetoric of the rebels indicated that this was an uprising against secular reforms, particularly the abolition of the caliphate. Sunni Kurds had fought alongside Turks in the War of Independence, accepting Mustafa Kemal's leadership because he had promised to preserve the caliphate. With the abolition of the caliphate, the key bond between the two peoples that had held society together was severed (Dogan, 2016: 153; Zürcher, 2000: 249).

The Kemalist discourse framed this uprising solely as resistance from religious fanaticism against secular reforms, but a nationalistic element was also at play in the background. During the war, Mustafa Kemal had promised autonomy to the Kurds, but after the war, not only

was autonomy not granted, but the Kemalist regime began denying their national identity, banning the use of the Kurdish language in schools and other public institutions (Zürcher, 2000: 249; Mango, 2017: 467) and referring to them as "Mountain Turks" (*Dağ Kürdü*) (Dogan, 2016: 164). The rebels initially achieved some success, capturing a large number of villages and the town of Elazığ, after which they attempted to seize the city of Diyarbakir. However, they failed due to the lack of support from the local population. The then Prime Minister, Fethi Okyar, a moderate politician, believed the rebellion was local in character and that the government's response should reflect that (Kinross, 2013: 419-421). However, Mustafa Kemal was unwilling to leave the matter to chance - or possibly unwilling to miss the opportunity: Fethi Okyar was dismissed, and the new Prime Minister, İsmet İnönü, declared a state of emergency across the entire country and passed the Law on the Maintenance of Order (*Takrir-i Sükûn Kanunu*), which granted the government dictatorial powers for the next four years and reactivated the martial law court (*Istiklal Mahkemesi*). Participants in the rebellion, as well as other opponents of the regime throughout the country, were brought before these courts. Over the next four years, these courts sentenced 660 people to death (Zürcher, 2000: 252). That summer marked the beginning of an all-out assault on traditionalism, with traditional clothing being the initial target, particularly the fez, which symbolized the divide between Turks and the Western world (Chehabi, 2004: 212).

Mustafa Kemal initiated his campaign against traditional clothing in the city of Kastamonu, known for its conservative milieu, and then continued to nearby towns. Appearing before gathered crowds in Western-style suits and wearing a hat, he delivered speeches hinting at impending changes. On the third day of his journey, during one such gathering, he delivered a speech in which he said:

> Ladies and gentlemen, the Turkish people who founded the Republic of Turkey are civilized... But I, as your born brother, your friend, and your father, tell you: When the people of Turkey claim to be civilized, they must prove and demonstrate this through their thinking and appearance. When the people of Turkey claim to be civilized, they must demonstrate it through their family life and lifestyle. In short, when the people of Turkey claim to be civilized, they must demonstrate it with their outward appearance, from head to toe, showing that they are civilized and progressive. I want to be absolutely clear so that everyone understands what I mean. Therefore, I

will ask you: Is our clothing national?” (“No!”- the crowd responded.) “Is our clothing civilized and international?” (“No!”- the crowd responded.) “I agree with you. This ridiculous clothing, a mixture of different styles, is neither national nor international. Our people deserve civilized and international clothing. That is what we will wear: shoes or boots, trousers, a vest, a shirt, a tie, a detachable collar, a jacket, and, of course, on the head, a hat with sun protection to complete the ensemble. (Kinross, 2013: 436)

Mustafa Kemal first demonstrated through his own example the direction in which the “cultural revolution” would move, and then discursively shaped the Kemalist modernist project: Western clothing and appearance were equated with civilization, while Eastern/Islamic clothing was portrayed as an obstacle to this goal and had to be eradicated. On another occasion, he expressed this dichotomy even more directly, stating that refusing to wear Western clothing meant “living with superstitions and medieval ideas instead of embracing a civilization capable of boring tunnels through mountains, flying in the sky, and observing everything, from molecules invisible to the naked eye to stars” (Hanioğlu, 2011: 61).

Traditional Turkish clothing was not only a symbol of superstition and backwardness but also ridiculed as laughable and a source of mockery by Europeans. Mustafa Kemal himself experienced this ridicule. During a trip to Europe in 1910, while waiting for a train at a station in Belgrade, Serbian children mocked the fez worn by his friend, Major Selahattin (Nereid, 2011: 710). Now, he too mocked the clothing of his compatriots. Returning to Ankara, he stopped again in Kastamonu. At one point, he pointed to a man in the gathered crowd and said: “He is wearing a fez, with a green *saruk* (a thin scarf wrapped around the fez) on it, a *mintan* (a long-sleeved shirt without a collar) below, a jacket like mine over it, and I can’t see what’s underneath. What kind of clothing is that? Would a civilized man allow himself to wear such bizarre clothing and become a laughingstock to the entire world?” (Mango, 2017: 502)

On November 25, 1925, a proposal for the Law on the Mandatory Wearing of Hats (*Şapka İktizası Hakkında Kanun*) was submitted to the Grand National Assembly. The proposal faced opposition from Nurettin Paşa, a member of parliament from Bursa and a controversial hero of the War of Independence. He reminded the Assembly that political decisions aimed at modernizing society must respect the people’s national sovereignty and individual integrity:

> The proposed law is against the constitution articles 3 (the sovereignty belongs to the nation/people), 68 (all Turks are born free and live free), 70 (the constitution guarantees the right and protection of personal integrity, conscience, thought, utterance, religious practice, ownership, property, etc.), 71 (the security of personal property), 73 (torture, cruelty, and confiscation are forbidden), 74 (No one has the right to force anyone to commit self-sacrifice/self-denial /*hiç bir kimse hiç bir fedakarlığa icbar edilemez*/), and 103 (No law which violates the principles of the Constitution can be enacted); it thus violates national sovereignty /*milli hakimiyet*/ and the integrity of the individual /*kişisel dokunmazlık*/ and therefore the proposal must be rejected (Nereid, 2011: 714).

Using a modernist discourse to oppose the proposal, Nurettin Paşa warned the Assembly that the law infringed upon personal freedom even more than during the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II, whose policies the Kemalist regime had criticized to establish its legitimacy: "We condemned the oppressive policies of Abdulhamid II for much less grave than this. We must therefore not introduce into the world an innovation which has not been introduced into any other country, nor must we strike at the heart of liberty" (Chehabi, 2004: 215). This speech provoked anger among Kemalist MPs, who accused him of being a troublemaker and hypocrite (Nereid, 2011: 715), labeling him an enemy of the people. They reminded him that "the revolution is a flood that sweeps away everything in its path" (Mango, 2017: 500).

Two arguments offered in response to Nurettin Paşa's objections are indicative of Kemalist discourse. Minister of Justice Mahmut Esat responded from the perspective of constitutional rights:

> But how can it be against the constitution's statement that everyone belonging to the Turkish nation is born free and lives free, to adopt the attires of free and civilized nations? Furthermore, there is always a limitation (*hudut*) on freedom; the limit of personal freedom is the exalted benefit of Turks and the Turkish nation... Freedom cannot be a toy in the hands of reactionaries (*irticanın elinde oyuncak olmaz*) (Nereid, 2011: 715)ç

These words reflect the paternalistic conception of Kemalist authority, which claimed the right to decide even what people should wear, justifying it as serving the higher interests of the nation - interests defined by the Kemalist elite. Another significant argument was made by MP Şükrü Kaya, who stated "that the Turkish nation would not connect its destiny to the obsolete thoughts of sixth and seventh centuries, the Era of Prophet Mohammad" (Dogan, 2016: 213).

Şükrü Kaya's statement demonstrates that open attacks on Islam had already begun at that time. Through an essentialist approach, which is a core feature of Orientalist discourse, Islam was reduced to an "essentializing caricature" (Sayyid, 1997: 32) of the "Oriental man" wearing clothing that hindered progress and was ridiculed by the civilized world. With the passage of the Law on the Mandatory Wearing of Hats, adopted with only two dissenting votes, the persecution of Oriental symbols in Turkish socio-cultural life began, along with the rejection of ideas associated with the Prophet Muhammad's era. The debate surrounding this law marked the last discussion in the Grand National Assembly; henceforth, the Assembly would merely serve to rubber-stamp decisions made by the Republican People's Party (CHP) on the government's orders (Mango, 2017: 504).

Textbooks from the subject Atatürk's Principles and History of the Revolution (*Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılâp Tarihi*) claim that following Mustafa Kemal's campaign, during which he demonstrated how Turks should (or must) dress, the people enthusiastically began to follow his example, adopting the hat as an integral part of their attire (Kili, 1982: 164; Mumcu, 1988: 168). This claim was also incorporated into the text of the law itself. Article 1 of the law, which mandated the wearing of hats and banned the fez, states:

> Members of the Grand National Assembly and officials and employees of central and local administration and of all institutions are obliged to wear the hat, *which the Turkish nation has assumed*. The general headdres of the Turkish people also is the hat, and the government forbids the continuation of any practice that is incompatible with this." (*emphasis added*) (Chehabi, 2004: 214)

Upon Mustafa Kemal's return to Ankara and his visits to other locations, he was greeted by citizens wearing hats. However, most of these individuals were employees of state institutions who had been ordered to wear hats by decree even before the law was passed, and the receptions were organized by local government officials (Dogan, 2016: 207). Once the law was enacted and the police began monitoring its enforcement, colorful scenes unfolded in Turkish cities and villages. The New York Times reported that people in Istanbul rushed to stores selling anything that resembled a hat (Ibid: 208). Those who disliked wearing hats found ways around it, such as placing cloths beneath the hats so they

would not touch their heads. In the absence of available hats or due to financial constraints, people came up with creative solutions: some street vendors wore paper hats, and in some places, out of ignorance or a desire to avoid arrest, people even donned women's hats (Chehabi, 2004: 217; Kinross, 2013: 437; Mango, 2017: 505).

The law, however, did not meet with universal enthusiasm. Although most citizens - whether willingly or due to legal coercion - accepted the new reality, protests erupted in cities such as Rize, Kayseri, Maraş, and Erzurum in northeastern Anatolia. The most serious situation occurred in Erzurum, where Sheikh Osman Hodja and a group of 30 individuals petitioned the governor to allow them to continue wearing their local traditional caps (*ağniye, kabalak*), which were better suited for the region's cold winters. The petition was denied, and Sheikh Osman Hodja was arrested, prompting a crowd of about 2,000 people to gather in front of the governor's office. Local gendarmerie opened fire, killing 23 protesters (Chehabi, 2004: 215-216). Following these protests, the martial law court (*Istiklal Mahkemesi*) was dispatched to the area, sentencing 20 individuals to death by hanging (Mango, 2017: 504).

Among those sentenced to death was Islamic scholar Iskilipli Atif, a graduate of the Faculty of Theology at Istanbul University, a Quranic exegesis teacher at Fatih Mosque in Istanbul, and the author of several books. He was convicted because of his book *Frenk mukallidliği ve şapka* (Imitating Europeans and the Hat), in which he criticized the Kemalist effort to construct Turkish identity through self-negation and abandonment of Muslim culture. While the Kemalists were determined to fully embrace Western civilization, equating culture with civilization, Iskilipli Atif made a distinction between the material and spiritual dimensions of Western civilization, advocating for the adoption and development of its material dimension. In the context of opposition to the Kemalist regime, "Atif was important as someone who articulated Islam as a universalistic ideology and managed to generalize some of the principles involved in modernization as something other than westernization" (Nereid, 2011: 216). A precedent in Atif's execution was the fact that the incriminating book was written a year and a half before the Hat Law was enacted. Andrew Mango described this case as the worst example of legal terror (2017: 504).

An important question in the context of resisting the imposition of wearing hats is why the people rebelled against the Law on the Mandatory Wearing of Hats but showed almost no opposition to the abolition of

the Caliphate and other secular reforms, except for the local uprising of Sheikh Said, which had both religious and national characteristics. The answer lies in both the symbolism of the hat - protesters viewed it as a symbol of the West, a break with the past, secularization, and a threat to national unity based on Islam as the most important integrative factor between Turks and Kurds - and in the fear that government measures would extend to other aspects of cultural and religious life. For example, protests in the city of Kayseri were sparked by rumors that the government's next step would be to ban veils and the possession of the Quran (Nereid, 2011: 722). Unfortunately, it would later become evident that these fears were not entirely unfounded, which will be discussed later.

The Kemalist focus on the clothing habits of the people - just two to three years after the country emerged from war - perhaps best illustrates the nature of the modernization project under Kemalist rule: instead of focusing on substantive issues such as the country's economic recovery, the development of rural areas, and the establishment of functional, democratic governance, the Kemalist regime wasted time and energy insisting on superficial emulation of Western socio-cultural life. In a country exhausted by years of war, like Turkey at the time, the legal regulation of hat-wearing represented "a masquerade aimed at concealing the gap between the ideals - the Westernized urban elites of Istanbul - and the reality - the poor peasants of Turkey's rural areas, confusing modernization with social responsibility" (Ibid: 709). Contrasting this reformist trajectory of the Kemalist regime with Marxist ideology, Mango (2017: 501) observed: "Marxists fought against class differences, while Mustafa Kemal, the most consistent and radical Turkish modernizer, decided to eliminate differences in lifestyle, and thereby differences in clothing." This Kemalist preoccupation with outward appearances rather than fundamental problems would resurface at the end of the 20th century when Kemalist elites would persecute veiled women in public spaces.

Alongside the fez, as a symbol of (Islamic) tradition, dervish orders also came under attack from the Kemalist regime. These orders likely wielded greater influence over the broader populace than the official, orthodox Islamic ulema (Ahmad, 1993: 79-80). A law was enacted banning all activities of dervish orders, and their *tekke* (lodges) and *zaviye* (small Sufi lodges) were closed. The same law even prohibited visits to the tombs of Ottoman sultans. The suppression of dervish orders was the

most significant step toward the secularization of social life in Turkey (Zürcher, 2000: 278). Dervish orders represented institutionalized forms of activity rooted in the teachings of *tasawwuf* (Sufism), which places particular emphasis on the development of spiritual dimensions within individuals. These orders played a crucial role in the social life of the Ottoman state. During the late Ottoman period, there were around 160 dervish orders, two of which held special political significance: the Mevlevi order, known among the public for its piety and granted privileges by the state, such as honorary participation in the enthronement ceremonies of new sultans; and the Bektashi order, which had close ties to the Janissaries (Jäschke, 1972: 35). Although some dervish orders, such as the Bektashis, had a heterodox character, incorporating elements of Sufism, Shi'ism, Christianity, and even Shamanism (Ibid), most operated within the bounds of orthodoxy. These orders also played a significant role in the War of Independence, responding to Mustafa Kemal's call to join the struggle for the country's liberation and participating in the work of the National Assembly in Ankara. The first convocation of the Grand National Assembly included ten leading sheikhs from the Mevlevi, Bektashi, and Naqshbandi orders (Dogan, 2016: 224). In addition, tekkes served an essential function in preserving "social and cultural codes" and fostering social solidarity. However, they too suffered the fate of other religious institutions and practices that were banned during this time, as they were deemed relics of the past (Turan, 2019: 278). Reflecting on his decision to abolish all dervish orders in his *Nutuk*, Mustafa Kemal stated:

> To abolish the dervish lodges and to ban all of the religious orders were done during the era of the Law on the Maintenance of the Order. The executions and applications in this issue were very necessary to prove that our society did not consist of people who were primitive and tied to the superstition. Is it possible to say a modern nation has a society which was dragged by sheikhs, *sayyids*[15], *chalabis*[16] and left their fates and souls to the hands of fortune tellers, wizards, and exorcists? Should the works of these men and institutions, which showed the real character of the Turkish nation in a false way, be overlooked in the new Turkish State and Republic? We used the Law on the Maintenance Order in this reform to prove that our nation was not bigoted and in the medieval mentality (Dogan, 2016: 225).

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15   The title indicates that the person is descended from the Prophet Muhammad.
16   A title in the Mevlevi Tariqat.

In these words, one can observe the same discursive strategy as in the case of the fez ban: dervish orders are used synecdochically as markers of a medieval mentality and are declared to be the very source of superstition, despite their diversity. Mustafa Kemal no longer emphasized the naturalness and rationality of the Islamic faith, as he had done a few years earlier; instead, he dismissed the superstition he associated with dervish orders as an obstacle to Western civilization, not to (rational and natural) Islam.

The next radical reform of the Kemalist regime was the change in the reckoning of time. The Islamic calendar, which begins with the Hijra - the Prophet Muhammad's migration from Mecca to Medina - was abandoned, and from January 1, 1926, Turkey adopted the Gregorian calendar. Furthermore, in 1935, Sunday replaced Friday, the traditional day for Jumu'ah prayer (the central weekly Muslim prayer), as the official day of rest (Ahmad, 1993: 80). Another step in the "de-Islamization of time" (Hanioğlu, 2011: 218) was the change in the reckoning of the beginning of the day. The Western system was adopted, replacing the Islamic system linked to the schedule of daily prayers, in which a new day begins at sunset.

Perhaps the most radical reform in the process of cultural transformation was the 1928 law replacing the Arabic script with the Latin alphabet. Discussions about whether the Arabic script was suitable for the Turkish language had emerged in the Ottoman State as early as the mid-19th century, given that Turkish has more vowels and fewer consonants than Arabic, which made learning the script somewhat more difficult and was seen by some as a reason for low literacy rates (Turan, 2018: 382-383; Ahmad, 1993: 80). This issue was even more sensitive due to the symbolism attributed to the script. For conservative circles, abandoning the Arabic script was unacceptable because it was considered sacred, having been used to record divine revelation, and because it symbolized the unity of the Muslim world (Turan, 2018: 385-387). On the other hand, for Mustafa Kemal, the script held a completely different symbolism. Announcing this radical step, he stated:

> Friends, with the new Turkish alphabet, the beauty, harmony, and richness of our language will be revealed. We must rid ourselves of incomprehensible signs, which we cannot understand and which have held our minds in an iron framework (*demir çerçeve*) for centuries. (Ibid: 390)

From these words, it can be inferred that the motivation for the script reform was not solely the need to adopt a more functional writing system but also the symbolism of the script itself. It was perceived as a relic of an inherently backward and restrictive Oriental-Islamic civilization. This was explicitly confirmed by Mustafa Kemal's closest collaborator and successor, İsmet İnönü:

> The script reform cannot be linked to the need to facilitate reading and writing. That was Enver Pasha's motivation.[17] For us, however, the benefit of the script reform lay in facilitating cultural change. Like it or not, we distanced ourselves from Arab culture. (Atalay, 2018: 117)

The radical nature of the Turkish script reform lay not only in mandating the use of the Latin alphabet, officially referred to as the "Turkish alphabet"[18], but also in strictly prohibiting the use of the old script. As part of this reform, Arabic and Persian languages were removed from school curricula in 1930 (Turan, 2018: 393). The result was that everything previously written in Ottoman Turkish - including the entirety of the cultural and historical heritage - became inaccessible and incomprehensible to the new generation. Mete Tunçay (2015: 92) vividly described this radical break with the past as akin to what Tariq ibn Ziyad did when he burned all his ships upon landing on the Iberian Peninsula to prevent retreat. Alongside the Arabic script, Arabic numerals were also banned and replaced with international ones, which, ironically, had been derived from Arabic numbers (Mango, 2017: 532).

Guided by the belief that cultural transformation was the foundation of modernization, Mustafa Kemal extended his reforms into the domain of music, arguing that "there can be no revolution without (a revolution in) music (*Müziksiz devrim olmaz*)" (Mango, 2017: 534). The state's intervention in music reflects how the West-East dichotomy hindered the possibility of an authentic modernization process in Turkey. While Mustafa Kemal himself enjoyed traditional Turkish songs and dances and knew only a few arias, he nonetheless wanted all Turks to listen to Western music, considering it not a matter of individual taste but of progress (Hanioğlu, 2011: 219).

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17   Just before the First World War, Enver Pasha tried to reform the script of the time in such a way that Arabic letters were written separately and not assembled, but that script did not take off because it turned out to be dysfunctional (Turan, 2018: 386).

18   Andrew Mango (2017: 534) is somewhat ironic: "Mustafa Kemal (...) presented the change as a 'transition from Arabic to Turkish letters,' thus transforming the infidel European alphabet into the alphabet of Turkish patriots and nationalists."

To legitimize these cultural reforms, Mustafa Kemal invoked the argument of cultural determinism: just as traditional clothing, epitomized by the fez, prevented Turkey from catching up with "civilization capable of boring tunnels through mountains, flying in the sky, and observing everything," and just as the old Arabic script "held our minds in an iron framework (*demir çerçeve*) for centuries," so too, in his view, traditional music stifled and constrained the vibrant Turkish spirit. After listening to a performance by the renowned Egyptian singer Munira al-Mahdiyya at a gathering, Mustafa Kemal praised her talent but added:

> However, this music, this simple music, can no longer satisfy the advanced spirit and feelings of the Turks. Now, across from here, the music of the civilized world can be heard. The people, who so far seemed indifferent to what is called Eastern music, immediately responded; everyone is dancing and, joyfully, acting according to their nature... The people paid for their mistakes with blood. Now they are jubilant, now the Turk is cheerful, cheerful as it is in his nature. (Mango, 2017: 534)

Traditional music faced its first blow with the closure of dervish tekkes in 1925, as these were significant spaces for creating and performing traditional music (Hanioğlu, 2011: 220; Dogan, 2016: 223). The following year, Alla Turca music was removed from school curricula (Koçak, 2015: 393). The final phase of this transformation came in 1935 with a ban on broadcasting traditional music on the radio and the prohibition of its public performance by local authorities. An official statement by the Minister of the Interior explained: „Inspired by His Excellency Gazi Mustafa Kemal's attitude toward traditional music, the Ministry of the Interior has instructed all relevant authorities that, starting tonight, all radio programs will exclude Alla Turca music and broadcast only national musical compositions that employ Western musical techniques and are performed by musicians trained in Western practices" (Hanioğlu, 2011: 221). The people's reaction to the ban on performing and broadcasting traditional music best illustrates the fact that the people did not accept the comprehensive modernization imposed from above. After the ban took effect, people largely stopped listening to Turkish radio stations and instead began tuning in to Radio Cairo. This public defiance eventually forced the Turkish authorities to lift the ban only eight months after it was enacted (Ibid; Koçak, 2015: 393).

3.2.2.3. Religious Transformation

As noted earlier, Turkish secularism sought not only to transform or reshape the state but also to remake society and individuals in its image. This persistent effort to reshape lifestyles, outward appearances, language, script, and even the music people listened to, often through the force of law and at times through brutal measures, gave Turkish secularism its "radical and militant character" (Tanör, 1999: 191). The Kemalist modernization project, rooted in such an authoritarian regime, did not recognize an autonomous sphere within civil society (Göle, 1996: 132). Consequently, the autonomy of religious institutions was abolished, with these institutions placed entirely under state control through the Directorate of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*) and the General Directorate of Foundations (*Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü*). The Kemalist regime did not stop there but went even further by deciding to intervene in the practice of religion itself and reshape it in line with its policy of constructing a national identity. One key ritualistic aspect that the regime sought to change was the language of religious practices. The goal was to replace Arabic with Turkish, just as the Arabic script had been replaced with the Latin alphabet.

Chronologically, the first aspect of religious practice to be addressed by the Kemalist regime was the use of Arabic in khutbahs (sermons). A khutbah is an integral part of the weekly Friday prayer (Jumu'ah) and involves the imam's address or speech, in which, alongside expressing gratitude to God and praying for the believers, he provides guidance and advice to the congregation to be God-conscious (*vaaz* or *nasihat*) and discusses social issues from the perspective of faith. While most Islamic legal authorities - except for Abu Hanifa and some other Hanafi jurists - consider it obligatory to use Arabic in the khutbah, many allow the use of the local language for the section containing advice and admonitions (Baktir, 1998: 425). The purpose of the khutbah is to address contemporary issues affecting individuals and society from the pulpit (*minber*) (Ibid: 426). However, this purpose was largely lost over time, as khutbahs during the Ottoman period were delivered almost exclusively in Arabic - a language incomprehensible to most of the empire's population. By the late 19th and early 20th centuries, during the rise of reformist ideas, criticisms began to emerge regarding the exclusive use of Arabic and the melodic tone of its recitation. These criticisms intensified after 1908, with demands for

the use of Turkish in khutbahs coming from intellectuals in nationalist circles, who saw this as a tool for awakening and shaping Turkish national identity, as well as from conservative groups, who provided religious justifications for this change (Cündioğlu, 1999: 31-39).

As public awareness of the importance of using Turkish in khutbahs grew - and as such a change found firm grounding in Islamic principles - the reforms initiated by the Kemalist government in this area were quickly internalized. As mentioned earlier, Mustafa Kemal stated as early as 1923 that khutbahs had "always been a source of spiritual joy and light for the minds of the people" and that, to maintain this function, "the khutbahs must and will be delivered entirely in Turkish and in accordance with the needs of the times" (Cündioğlu, 1998: 48). Two years later, in 1925, two members of the National Assembly proposed making Turkish mandatory in khutbahs (Ibid: 50). This finally occurred in 1927, when Rifat Börekçi, the head of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, issued a directive to all imams stating that the recitation of Quranic verses and hadiths in khutbahs would henceforth be done in both the original Arabic and their Turkish translations, while the section containing advice and admonitions would be delivered exclusively in Turkish. Along with this directive, imams were provided with a collection of 58 standardized khutbahs for use during Friday prayers (Jäschke, 1972: 44).

Following this reform, which was rooted in Islamic jurisprudence, further attempts were made to replace the Arabic text of the Quran with its Turkish translation. The first step in this direction was taken in 1925 when the Kemalist government officially commissioned, through the Directorate of Religious Affairs, the preparation of a Turkish translation of the Quran, allocating budgetary funds for the task (Cündioğlu, 1998: 54-56). While partial and complete translations of the Quran into Turkish had been undertaken since the early 11th century, there was no widely accepted version by the early 20th century. The government entrusted this task to Mehmed Akif, the author of the national anthem and a respected scholar in Islamic disciplines. Initially, Mehmed Akif accepted the task, believing that it would contribute to the enrichment of religious life and public enlightenment. However, as he observed the trajectory of the Kemalist regime's reforms, he voluntarily exiled himself to Egypt and, in 1926, abandoned the project, fearing that his translation might be misused - specifically, that it could be mandated for use in prayers in place of the original Arabic text. "As a devout man who lived in voluntary

exile because he opposed the secular reforms of the Kemalist regime, he believed that the Turkification of religious rituals represented a further step toward 'de-Islamization'" (Ibid: 51). Subsequent events would confirm Mehmed Akif's fears.

In the same year that Mehmed Akif abandoned the project and returned the advance payment he had received, an imam at Göztepe Mosque in Istanbul, Mehmed Cemaleddin, led the Jumu'ah prayer by reciting Turkish translations of Quranic passages instead of the original Arabic text. This act shocked the congregation, who complained to the Directorate of Religious Affairs and the Üsküdar Muftiate. As a result, the imam was dismissed and reassigned as a teacher at a school for imams and hatibs (Cündioğlu, 1998: 59; Cündioğlu, 1999: 64). Given that the Kemalist elite had consolidated power under the Law on the Maintenance of Order (*Takrir-i Sükûn Kanunu*) by eliminating all forms of opposition, this event must be understood as part of the broader process of Turkifying religious rituals, effectively serving as an early test case (Atalay, 2018: 77). At the time, only pro-regime newspapers operated, and they celebrated this event with headlines like: *An Enlightened Hodja Led Prayer in Turkish: Allah is Great!* (Cündioğlu, 1998: 58). Prominent Kemalist ideologist and Member of Parliament Ahmed Ağaoğlu published an article in the newspaper *Milliyet*, stating:

> The facts show that the Turks are the only true force that has defended and preserved Islam. Islam cannot survive without the Turks. Therefore, the Turks must be spiritually and materially strong for Islam to be spiritually and materially strong. For this reason, all spiritual and material factors representing Turkish national identity must be developed. Among these factors, the most important are the Turkish language and a proper understanding of religion (*şuurlu din*). For a Turk to properly understand religion, he must have direct access to its sources: the Quran and all the prayers prescribed by the Quran. He must benefit from them by understanding them. The Turkish people have been engaged in a great struggle for six years solely for this purpose. What will be the use of this struggle if their language, religion, and other aspects of life remain the same as before? Thus, the hodja who led the prayer in Turkish has contributed to the development of our language and religion, and therefore to the principles of the revolution and the struggle we are waging (Cündioğlu, 1999: 230-231).

These words encapsulate the discursive strategy through which, in the subsequent period, intervention in ritual practices was legitimized, that

is, by which religion was integrated into secular discourse: Religion, as an important factor of national identity, should possess a national character, which is most evident in the use of the national language for ritual purposes. The government paid little heed to the opinions of relevant Islamic authorities, even though the position of these authorities had been made clear earlier by Rifat Börekçi,[19] who in 1924 categorically rejected the idea of replacing the Quran's original Arabic text with a Turkish translation in prayer. However, after the government banned non-regime newspapers using the *Takrir-i Sükûn Kanunu*, dissenting voices, including those of prominent ulema such as Rifat Börekçi, were effectively silenced (Ibid: 54).

By 1925, pro-regime newspapers began publishing articles advocating for the replacement of the Quran's Arabic text with its Turkish translation in prayer, citing a fatwa by Abu Hanifa, which allowed for the recitation of translations in very specific circumstances (Ibid: 55-61).[20] However, even within the Hanafi school, this view was not accepted as a general ruling for the use of the vernacular in prayer. Consequently, this idea lacked a basis in Islamic sources and was instead driven by purely political and ideological motives (Ibid: 40).

The second mechanism through which the Kemalist government prepared the ground and sought to legitimize further steps toward the Turkification of religious rituals was the newly established Faculty of Theology. Two years after the imam of Istanbul's Göztepe Mosque conducted a prayer entirely in Turkish, on June 20, 1928, newspapers published a draft program for religious reform reportedly prepared by a commission from the Faculty of Theology at Istanbul University. The introductory section of this document emphasized the significance of the "extraordinary Turkish revolution in the field of democracy" and the need for religion, like other social institutions, to "keep up with the needs of life and follow the path of development" (Jäschke, 1972: 40). The following proposals for reforming religious life were outlined:

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19 Rifat Börekçi, during the War of Independence, served as the mufti of Ankara. He led the Anatolian ulema who supported Mustafa Kemal and legitimized the national movement through a fatwa. (Doğan, 2013:155; Turan, 2013:125).

20 In one of these texts, the author expresses surprise as to why no one in the public sphere is speaking out about this presented idea: "However, we see that no one says anything against this presented idea. What could be the reason for this silence?" (Ibid: 61). At the cost of repetition, it must be emphasized that these texts appear at a time when only regime-controlled newspapers were allowed to operate, making the author's astonishment sound grotesque.

1. Form of worship: Our places of worship should be clean, orderly, and welcoming for visitation and use. Benches for seating and coat racks should be installed in places of worship, and clean footwear should be allowed inside. This is the health-related aspect of religious reform.

2. Language of rituals: The language of rituals should be Turkish. The format of rituals (*ayin*), prayers, and khutbahs should be accepted and used in Turkish. They should not only be memorized but also be read from books, for which places of worship should be equipped.

3. Character of rituals: Rituals should be performed in an extremely aesthetic, moving, and spiritual manner. To achieve this, muezzins and imams with singing talent should be trained. Additionally, musical devices should be installed in places of worship. Modern and instrumental music in the form of hymns (*ilahi*) is necessary in places of worship.

4. Intellectual aspect of rituals: It is not enough to simply print khutbahs. Oratory is inseparable from melodious recitation (*kıraat*); in khutbahs, the focus should not be on directly scientific or economic ideas but on religious values and categories. This can only be provided by philosophers of religion (*din filozofları*) skilled in oratory.

   (...) The Turkish revolution identified this need through the establishment of this faculty. Based on the experience of three years of academic work, our faculty has concluded that this reform is necessary and that it will bring benefit and honor to Turkish society. We are convinced that this should be presented to the relevant authorities for the nation's welfare. (Ibid: 40-41).

Years after Mustafa Kemal's death, testimonies from members of this commission shed light on the events surrounding the draft. According to these accounts, the draft was prepared by İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, a professor of pedagogy at the Faculty of Theology, at Mustafa Kemal's request. The draft was then presented to the faculty commission by the dean, Fuat Köprülü. The members of the commission realized that they were faced with a fait accompli, which led to heated debates. Although the majority were in favor of adopting the draft, the meeting ended without a final decision, as members had to attend the funeral of a

colleague, a professor of Persian. The next day, newspapers published news that the commission had approved the draft along with the full text of the reform proposals (Cündioğlu, 1999: 79-92). This premature public announcement seems to have sealed the fate of the initiative. Mustafa Kemal was reportedly angered that the draft was made public before being finalized and approved by the commission. As a result, the proposal was abandoned (Ergin, 1997: 1964, cited in Azak, 2010: 53). On the other hand, Gotthard Jäschke (1972: 42) suggests that the public backlash against the draft forced the government to deny the plan and disband the commission. In the subsequent period, there were no further attempts at radical reforms, such as introducing musical instruments and seating benches into mosques in the style of Christian churches.[21] However, Mustafa Kemal did not abandon the Turkification of ritual language.

The next step was the events of 1932, which Mustafa Kemal referred to as "the final phase of our revolution" (Atalay, 2018: 78). This time, he personally became involved in the project (Azak, 2010: 54-56). He invited several Istanbul-based *hafizes* (Quran reciters) trained in music and tasked them with practicing the text of the *takbir* (declaration of Allah's greatness) and *adhan* (call to prayer) in Turkish. During Ramadan, in major Istanbul mosques, they melodiously recited translations of selected Quranic verses after prayers. Newspapers reported extensively on these events, publishing translations of Quranic chapters that were to be recited by the hafizes. The central event took place on the 27th night of Ramadan at the Hagia Sophia Mosque. This event was broadcast live on the radio and through loudspeakers installed throughout the city, allowing tens of thousands gathered around the mosque to follow the program (Cündioğlu, 1998: 91). Similar programs were held in other cities across Turkey. In the following year, the same program was repeated at Hagia Sophia Mosque, this time attended by foreign diplomats (Ibid: 102).

However, that year, activities aimed at replacing the Arabic text of the Qur'an with a Turkish translation abruptly ceased. Despite the political climate that allowed the government to implement almost any reform - including legally mandating the use of a Turkish Quran translation in

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21   The organs of the Kemalist Republican People's Party (CHP) in 1945 considered a proposal to reform religious rituals, transform mosques into cultural institutions modeled after People's Houses (*Halk Evleri*), and change the function and timing of daily prayers. However, this proposal was not adopted (Azak, 2010: 58).

prayers - this was not pursued. However, the Turkish *adhan*, *iqama*, and *sala*[22] were legally mandated. From 1941, reciting the original Arabic *adhan* and *iqama* became punishable by imprisonment of up to three months. This provision was only repealed in 1950 after the transition to a multi-party system. The justification for the law stated that it was necessary to "rescue the people from the influence of the Arabic language attaching them to old mentalities and old traditions" (Azak, 2010: 58).[23]

Dücane Cündioğlu (1999: 24) argues that the regime did not insist on using a Turkish Quran translation in prayers because there was no reliable, official Turkish translation of the Quran at the time. Supporting this view, Falih Rıfkı Atay, one of Mustafa Kemal's closest associates and biographers, wrote in 1949: "Had Atatürk lived longer, the Quran would long ago have been recited in Turkish." (Cündioğlu, 1998: 115). The decision to mandate the Turkish *adhan* but not pursue further Quranic translation reforms may be tied to the *adhan*'s public function - it is recited from minarets, symbolizing a public declaration. In contrast, prayers are conducted inside mosques, falling into the private sphere. To complete the picture of this important segment of Kemalist discourse, I will present a few concluding considerations about the possible motives that the Kemalist elite had in the process they referred to as "religious reform".

In literature, this process is often linked to the ideological background of Mustafa Kemal, which was heavily influenced by Ziya Gökalp, a prominent ideologist of Turkish nationalism. Regarding the role of religion in shaping national identity, Ziya Gökalp drew inspiration from the ideas of the prominent French sociologist Émile Durkheim, who believed that religion contributes to social solidarity. The influence of Ziya Gökalp is evident in this phase of Kemalist secularism, during which religion was

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22 The recitation of the *sala*, which announces someone's death, was banned in 1937. In the memorandum issued on this occasion, it was stated that the *sala* was abolished "because it has a very negative effect on sick individuals and those with weak nerves." (Cündioğlu, 1999: 99).

23 The people continuously showed either active or passive resistance to the ban on reciting the adhan in Arabic. Numerous arrests were recorded for reciting the adhan in Arabic, the most notable being the so-called Bursa Incident (*Bursa Olayı*) of 1933. Similarly to the case of the Hat Law, people found various ways to avoid punishment. For example, it was reported that elderly individuals sent children to recite the adhan because they themselves refused to recite it in Turkish (Azak, 2010: 59-60). According to a report by the Minister of Justice from 1947, 29 people were arrested that year for violating the ban (Jäschke, 1972: 46).

treated as one of the sources of national culture and social integration (Turner, 1974: 164). The Kemalist intervention in the realm of religious practice, as well as the overall Kemalist modernization project, had a mimetic character, as it was inspired by the experiences of the Christian Reformation in Europe. This is evident in a work titled *Gazi ve İnkılâp* (The Gazi and the Revolution), published in 1933, shortly after events referred to as the Religious Reformation/Revolution (*Din İnkılâbı*):

> Even if the Turkish Revolution had achieved nothing else beyond translating the language of rituals into Turkish, it would have done a great service by removing the false interpreters of the veiled language, thus eliminating the obstacle between the people and the God they worship. (…) The translation of the Christian Holy Book into English or German marked the beginning of the revival and awakening of national consciousness among those peoples. Wouldn't the translation of the Qur'an, which has such a profound influence on the consciousness of the people, and the use of the mother tongue in sermons yield significant benefits for both the language and religion in our case as well? Our answer is: it would! (Cündioğlu, 1998: 95).

The goal that the Kemalist elite, or at least part of it,[24] sought to achieve through the so-called reform of religion was similar to that achieved by the Christian Reformation. Just as Luther's translation of the Bible into German led to the affirmation of the national language and literature, the awakening of national consciousness, and liberation "from the Roman and Latin yoke," the translation of the Qur'an into Turkish - more specifically, the use of the Turkish translation of the Qur'an in rituals - was intended to liberate Turks from "servitude to the Arab mentality" (Ibid: 9). Therefore, the aim of this reform was not religious enlightenment but national awareness. In practice, this reform amounted to the mere instrumentalization of religion to serve the needs of the Kemalist regime. This intention is evident in the words of Ahmed Hamdi Başar, one of the witnesses of these events and a former advisor to Mustafa Kemal:

> We must not reject or remove religion from society; rather, we must place it in the service of the revolution. Destroying mosques and replacing them with People's Houses (*Halk Evleri*) will not achieve our goal at all. Through mosques, we can always address the people who gather there,

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24 Onur Atalay (2018: 75-84) notes that throughout this period, there were two factions within the Kemalist elite: the conciliatory faction (telifçi), which aimed to reconcile religion with the modernization project, and the radical faction, which advocated for the complete rejection of religion. The radical faction would prevail in 1933.

turn them into modern People's Houses, abolish the religious clergy, and allow everyone to speak in the name of religion and this world. (Cündioğlu, 1998: 98).

The most direct means by which the Kemalist government instrumentalized religion was through sermons (*khutbah*). There were clear procedures by which the government strictly monitored activities related to sermons and public lectures in mosques: state authorities made the final selection of speakers, sermon topics were pre-determined, and every speaker had to submit a summary of the sermon for review (Esen, 2011: 130-131). The government not only supervised the content of sermons but also used them as a propaganda tool for implementing its policies. A. Kıvanç Esen cites an interesting example of an instruction to include a call in a sermon encouraging people to save money in domestic banks to support the national savings plan (Ibid: 135-136).

Over time, Kemalists sought to attribute a higher purpose to these interventions in Muslim ritual practices, presenting them as attempts at the "rationalization" of religion to create an "enlightened and humanized Islam" (Berkes, 1964: 483). However, considering the fact that these reforms - deemed a caricature of religious reform by Herbert Wilhelm Duda, a renowned Austrian orientalist and a witness to many events of the time (Jäschke, 1972: 108) - offended the religious sentiments of the population (Cündioğlu, 1999: 127) and caused significant dissatisfaction (Tunçay, 2015: 94), the assertion by General Kazım Karabekir about Mustafa Kemal's intentions seems well-founded. He expressed his concern as follows:

> The Gazi [Mustafa Kemal] wishes to entrust certain snobs, opponents of Islam, with translating the Holy Qur'an. Then he will order that this translation be used in prayers, while banning its recitation in Arabic. Together with these snobs, he will turn this into a mockery, after which he will remove both the Qur'an and Islam. With such an environment, he has embarked on a dangerous path. (Cündioğlu, 1999: 47).

The measures taken during the final phase of Kemalist reforms confirm that Karabekir's fears were far from unfounded.

3.2.3. Negation Phase

A clear shift in Kemalist policy toward religion was observed by Herbert Wilhelm Duda, an Austrian orientalist and witness to the period:

> We see that the movement for religious reform in Turkey disappeared within a short time. The nationalist theorists soon grew tired of addressing the contemporary problems of Islam. Thus, Kemalist Turkey's cultural policy took a turn for the worse, from negligence to outright hostility toward religion. This hostility manifested itself in the practical closure of all avenues for training religious personnel and in propaganda equating piety with reactionary behavior and anti-nationalism. (Jäschke, 1972: 108).

As Duda noted, one of the earliest signs of the Kemalist elite's antagonistic attitude toward religion was the closure of religious schools. Had the government been genuinely interested in religious reform, it would have pursued this through reforming existing religious educational institutions. As mentioned earlier, on March 3, 1924, the same day the caliphate was abolished, the Law on the Unification of Education (*Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu*) was passed, bringing all schools under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education. This law led to the closure of traditional religious schools (*medrese*). The law also provided for the establishment of schools for imams and *hatips t*o train personnel for religious duties such as leading prayers (*imamet*) and delivering sermons (*hitabet*). Additionally, it mandated the creation of a faculty of theology to educate "specialists in religious matters" (İnalcık, 2016: 86). Out of the 479 traditional medrese, only 29 schools for imams and *hatips* were opened. However, within five years, all of these schools were closed under the pretext of insufficient student interest. The real reasons for their closure, however, were ideological, as evidenced by several measures taken to force these institutions to shut down:

- In the first year of their operation, funding for these schools was cut under the guise of austerity measures, even though this was not the case for other schools.
- The official status of religious personnel as civil servants was revoked.
- Teachers in these schools were dismissed under various pretexts.
- These schools only offered classes equivalent to the final years of elementary school. Since no secondary-level departments

were established, graduates could not proceed to the Faculty of Theology. This lack of continuity ultimately sealed the fate of the Faculty of Theology, which was closed in 1933 (Öcal, 2008: 223-224).

Despite these obstacles, in certain areas, such as the imam and *hatip* school in Kütahya, interest in religious education remained higher than in secular schools, which had full state support. Nonetheless, these schools eventually met the same fate as other closed religious institutions (Ibid: 223). Thus, the establishment of schools for imams and *hatips* in place of traditional medrese was nothing more than a facade to mitigate potential backlash against the radical measures aimed at eliminating religion from public life.

The result of these policies was a severe shortage of religious personnel within two decades. In many villages, it became difficult to find an imam to perform funeral prayers (*janazah*).[25] This prompted the Kemalist government to launch Imam and Hatip Courses (*İmam Hatip Kursları*), with the first courses being introduced in 1949 (Jäschke, 1972: 77). However, this effort was a belated attempt by the Kemalist elite to acknowledge the needs and desires of the population. By the following year, the single-party system collapsed, signaling the end of an era.

Kemalism revealed its most destructive face toward mosques. One of the first actions taken by the government regarding mosques were directives issued in 1927 and 1928, which called for determining the "real need" for mosques and closing those deemed unnecessary. The criteria for determining such a need included some objective factors, such as whether the mosque had a regular congregation, whether it was in good condition, and whether it held historical and architectural value. However, there was also an ideological criterion: there had to be a minimum distance of 500 meters between two mosques (Esen, 2011: 99–103; Jäschke, 1972: 64–65).

During the 20 years of Kemalist rule, 2,815 mosques and prayer spaces (*mescid*) were closed, representing nearly 50% of their total

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25   The *janazah* prayer is perhaps the best representation of what could be called the Kemalist paradox; no matter how fiercely some Kemalists fought against religion during their lifetime, in the end, the *janazah* prayer was still performed for them. Jäschke (1972: 111) mentions that the *janazah* prayer was performed for Recep Peker, a long-serving general secretary of the party and the most radical advocate of secularism, as well as for Abdullah Cevdet, the "eternal enemy of Islam," who had requested during his lifetime to be cremated after death.

number (Öztürk, 1995: 492; cited in Esen, 2011: 113). While there were already recorded instances of selling closed mosques during this period (Jäschke, 1972: 66), there was no legal framework governing such actions until 1935. That year, the government enacted a law permitting the sale of closed mosques. However, public interest in purchasing mosques did not meet the expectations of the authorities, likely reflecting public dissatisfaction and disapproval of such actions. In response, the government attempted to resolve this issue by lowering prices. When even this failed, the authorities resorted to more radical measures: first, the mosque would be demolished, and then the building materials and land would be sold separately (Esen, 2011: 115–116). While it is true that the Kemalist government used the proceeds from the sale of mosques to restore numerous historically and architecturally significant mosques, this was not done out of respect for their "sacredness." Rather, these structures were seen as products of Turkish genius (Ibid: 128). Similarly, as the Turkification of religious rituals aimed to make people in Turkey "better Turks" (Azak, 2010: 48), rather than better or more conscious believers, mosques were restored because they were considered national monuments rather than religious structures. The atmosphere of the time is best illustrated by an anecdote recorded by Mete Tunçay (2015: 95): The Commission for Applied Arts requested permission from the Minister of Education to convert the Sultan Ahmed Mosque into an art gallery. The proposal included making openings in the mosque's dome to allow better lighting for the displayed paintings. The minister initially intended to approve the request but ultimately backed down due to strong opposition from an architect.

A similar model of the gradual removal of religion from society was applied in the case of religious education in schools. Initially, the number of religious education classes was reduced from two to one hour per week, and the curriculum was adjusted to align with the ideological framework of Kemalism. In 1928, religious education was eliminated from the upper grades of elementary schools. By 1933, it was completely removed from urban schools, and by 1939, it was removed from rural schools as well (Atalay, 2018: 80–81). This effort went beyond excluding religion from schools. Between 1934 and 1942, the government also banned the printing of religious literature. For example, in 1934, the Publishing Directorate under the Ministry of the Interior denied a permit to print a book about the Prophet Muhammad, stating that the

government did not want to "create a religious atmosphere or awaken religious consciousness among young people" (Cündioğlu, 1999: 100).

Once religious education was banished from schools and the publication of religious literature was prohibited, religion was depicted in school textbooks in a way that reflected Mustafa Kemal's perspective. According to Şükrü Hanioğlu (2011: 131–132), the author of the only intellectual biography of Mustafa Kemal, this narrative about Islam was largely based on the work of renowned orientalist Leone Caetani. Caetani argued that the Qur'an was not a divine revelation but a text authored by the Prophet Muhammad, who borrowed elements from Judaism, and that the spread of Islam was driven by the greed of Arab tribes rather than religious fervor. For example, one history textbook described the Arab conquest of non-Arab peoples as marking the beginning of the struggle between Arabs and Turks, stating that "a flood of Bedouins from the Arabian deserts swept over the developed and prosperous Turkish cities through the valleys of Iran." Elsewhere, Islam was referred to as an "Arab religion" that "stifled national feelings and enthusiasm because the religion founded by Muhammad promoted an Arab nationalist agenda" (Ibid: 132). While this narrative of Islam as an Arab religion was later removed from textbooks, it persisted within popular Kemalist discourse.

3.3. Good Muslims vs. Bad Muslims

To understand the central discursive strategy of Kemalism regarding Islam, it is necessary to summarize the phases of Kemalist reforms concerning religion:

- Removal of religion from state affairs: This included the abolition of the caliphate, Sharia courts, religious schools, and the constitutional provision designating Islam as the state religion.
- State control over religion: This was achieved through the establishment of state institutions responsible for managing religious affairs, such as the Directorate of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*) and the General Directorate of Foundations (*Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü*).
- Instrumentalization of religion: Religion was used as a tool for government propaganda through sermons (khutbah) and religious lectures.

- Removal of religion from social and cultural life: Measures included the elimination of religious education, the banning of dervish orders, the prohibition of using and teaching Arabic script, the banning of religious literature, and regulations on clothing.

At the end of this process, religion was confined to exist solely within the boundaries of the mosque and an individual's conscience (Turan, 2015: 271; Tanör, 1999: 191). Recep Peker, a long-serving secretary-general and ideologist of the Kemalist party, expressed this vision explicitly: "The boundary for expressing religion in Turkey is the skin of a citizen. It has no place in society, administration, or politics." (Atalay, 2018: 85). This concept formed the foundation of a specific discourse that divided society into "good Muslims" and "bad Muslims." Good Muslims were those who adhered to the Kemalist conception of religion, which was confined to "four walls." Bad Muslims, on the other hand, were those who disrupted this conception. These "other" Muslims were labeled with terms such as *mürteci* (reactionary), *irtica* (reactionary forces), *gerici* (reactionary), *şeriatçı* (Sharia supporter), *dinci* (advocate of theocratic rule), *bağnaz* (bigot), and *yobaz* (fanatic). The role of what Kemalist discourse referred to as reactionary Islam (*irtica*), political Islam or Islamism (*İslamcılık*) was vividly described by Hamit Bozarslan (2000: 66):

> The new elites, whose imagination was shaped by thrilling scenes from the French Revolution – though often misunderstood – needed a victory that would match the historical significance they assigned to themselves. Such a victory would allow them to erase the prior period from history and begin a "true" history. To achieve this, they required a "strong" and "legitimate" enemy. Islamism, as a symbol of the past, backwardness, and the Middle Ages, was an ideal target.

This antagonism between Islam and Kemalism, which provided Kemalism with internal consistency, was discursively constructed in the textbooks titled *Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılâp Tarihi* (Atatürk's Principles and the History of the Revolution). These textbooks depicted any form of political opposition or resistance to Mustafa Kemal and the Kemalist conception of secularism as Islamic reactionism.

One early example is the portrayal of opposition within the first session of the Grand National Assembly in Ankara. Kemalist literature

and textbooks characterize these opposition deputies' actions as reactionary attempts to restore the old Islamic order and resist the establishment of the Republic (Mumcu, 1988: 110; Kili, 1982: 149–150). However, recent literature shows that their disagreement with Mustafa Kemal was not ideological but personal; they opposed the concentration of all power in his hands and accused him of aspiring to dictatorship (Hanioğlu, 2011: 116–117). Following the end of the War of Independence, Mustafa Kemal eliminated these opposition deputies from the first parliament. However, the generals who had fought alongside him in the War of Independence remained in the assembly, as their fame and public support made them untouchable at the time. In 1924, these generals established Turkey's first opposition party, the Progressive Republican Party (*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*). Kemalist textbooks claim that these leaders of the War of Independence broke with Mustafa Kemal and founded the opposition party because they deeply believed in a religious state system. As evidence, they cite Article 6 of the party's program, which states: "The party respects religious beliefs." Textbooks describe this as a reason why all "reactionaries flocked to this party" (Mumcu, 1998: 127–130; Kili, 1982: 159–160). However, recent studies reveal that this party was also committed to secularism but advocated for decentralization, separation of powers, evolutionary reform, and a liberal approach to the economy – contrasting with the radical, centralist, and authoritarian tendencies of the Kemalist Republican People's Party (CHP) (Zürcher, 2000: 246). Most of the generals who opposed Mustafa Kemal were far from reactionaries; they were liberals and modernists who refused to replace absolute monarchy with an absolute republic under the rule of a single individual (Ahmad, 1993: 56). In 1925, the Progressive Republican Party was shut down by the martial law court (*İstiklal Mahkemesi*), accused of inciting the Sheikh Said rebellion in southeastern Turkey. This was merely a pretext for the Kemalist government to eliminate political opposition, using the dictatorial powers granted by the Law on the Maintenance of Order (*Takrir-i Sükûn Kanunu*).

Another incident frequently depicted in the *Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılâp Tarihi* textbooks as an example of reactionary forces at work was the protest in Bursa against the government's order to recite the adhan in Turkish instead of Arabic. Protesters gathered outside the local office of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, demanding that the

adhan be recited in Arabic, arguing that Christians and Jews were free to perform their prayers in their native languages within their places of worship (Cündioğlu, 1998: 103; Azak, 2010: 59). One textbook describes the event as follows (Mumcu, 1994b: 71):

> Atatürk devised interesting ways to awaken Turks' love for their language. One of these was the Turkification of the adhan and the iqama (the second call to prayer), which are nothing more than calls to Muslims for prayer but had been recited in Arabic by habit for over a thousand years. Atatürk requested that the adhan and iqama be translated into Turkish in an elegant style, without distorting their meaning. Now, Turkish Muslims went to prayer understanding the meaning of the call.

> When the call to prayer began to be recited in Turkish, it drove the *reactionaries* crazy again. Certain people, who could not comprehend that it was natural for Muslims to perform the call to prayer in their own language – and that doing so was actually in line with the essence of religion – began to incite the public on February 1, 1933, after prayers in the Ulu Mosque in Bursa, and staged a protest outside the government office. They considered performing this religious obligation in Turkish an act of infidelity.

> This event did not escalate significantly. The people did not join the protests. Security forces immediately arrested those responsible.

A pivotal event in the Kemalist narrative, used extensively for its symbolic value to instill fear of reactionary Islam, is the so-called Menemen Incident (*Menemen Olayı*). This event was preceded by the establishment of yet another opposition party, the third since the founding of the Republic, the Free Republican Party (*Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*), on August 12, 1930. According to textbooks, this party was founded at the initiative of Mustafa Kemal himself. He personally chose the leader of the party and gave assurances that it would not be banned, as had been the case with the earlier Progressive Republican Party (*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*) (Kili, 1982: 176). The official reason for founding this party was Mustafa Kemal's belief that "another political party was needed to criticize the government's economic policies and thus guide them in a better direction." The textbooks claim that Mustafa Kemal personally encouraged many of his friends to join this party. However, the party was dissolved in November of the same year due to the infiltration of "reactionaries" into its ranks (Mumcu, 1988: 144–145). This official narrative, however, obscures

the underlying reality of the Kemalist regime, namely the estrangement of the Kemalist elites from the people and their poor economic policies. Feroz Ahmad (1993: 59-60) highlights this disconnect:

> At home, the Republicans were so completely out of touch with the masses that they sincerely believed that the opposition would require state protection when its leaders criticised the government. In fact, the people were so alienated from their rulers that they responded with enthusiasm to the appeals of the Free Party. Large crowds greeted Fethi virtually everywhere he went in Anatolia and all opposition to the regime seemed to coalesce around the Free Party. There were demonstrations in Izmir on Fethi's arrival in September 1930. These were followed by strikes and an upsurge of militancy among the small working class. Kemal, shaken by this totally unexpected popular response, decided to end the experiment in two-party politics by dissolving the loyal opposition on 17 November 1930.

As with the case of the Progressive Republican Party, in the case of the Free Republican Party, the Kemalist narrative frames the closure of the party within the context of reactionary forces, thus legitimizing the removal of opposition. By constructing fear of reactionary Islam in this way, the Kemalist discourse established its hegemony and maintained it throughout the twentieth century. Textbooks associate the closure of the Free Republican Party with the so-called Menemen Incident (*Menemen Olayı*). For instance, one textbook describes this event as follows (Mumcu, 1998: 142-143):

> The last and most severe reaction against secularism occurred in Menemen. As will be seen below, in 1930 Atatürk attempted to establish a multiparty system in the country. Although the Free Republican Party, which was established at that time, firmly expressed its commitment to the principle of secularism, *reactionary elements* began infiltrating the party. Members of former dervish orders began openly demanding the implementation of sharia. *Reactionary movements* particularly gained strength in the Aegean region. After the founder of this party voluntarily dissolved it on December 23, 1930, a hashish addict named Dervish Mehmet, a member of the Naqshbandi order, initiated a rebellion with his followers, shouting, "We want sharia." The insurgents surrounded Second Lieutenant Kubilay and his unit, who had been sent to quell the situation. Kubilay was injured by a bullet. Then his head was severed with a knife. Most tragically, while Dervish Mehmet committed this crime, some people among the gathered crowd applauded him. These criminals placed Kubilay's head on a green flag and attempted to incite the public to rebellion. However, the military's

response was fierce... Atatürk, who oversaw the punishment of these criminals, stated that this incident serves as a major lesson for Turkish intellectuals... Due to Atatürk's stern reaction, the reactionaries never raised their heads again.

Although historiography, through subsequent analysis of trial documentation related to participants in this event, has established that there is no evidence of a broader conspiracy and that it was instead an isolated, local event unrelated to the Free Republican Party, which had been dissolved a month before the incident, Kemalist literature and textbooks link the two events. This implication suggests that the party's leaders abused the freedom granted to them by Mustafa Kemal in his desire to establish democracy. Such discourse legitimizes Kemalist hegemony and the suspension of democracy under the pretense of "protecting it from fanatics or regime enemies who use religion for political purposes" (Azak, 2010: 25). Based on the above, it can be concluded that the Kemalist discourse relies on

> selective use of the past which sacralized and mythified the secularist policies of the single-party period, reproducing the fear of *irtica* though the use of the memory of past 'reactionary' events. This politics of memory, based on sdandardized and formulaic narrativization, manipulation or oblivion of selected past events, was crucial for the reproduction of the Kemalist conception of Islam. The past and present were linked in such a way in these narratives that present social events or actors appeared as mere repetitions or replicas of those of the past (Ibid: 175-176).

The reproduction of the Kemalist conception of Islam through the discourse based on selective memory allowed for the continuation of Kemalist hegemony throughout the twentieth and into the early twenty-first century. The final chapter of this study analyzes the Kemalist discourse on Islam at the end of the twentieth century through the lens of events surrounding the prohibition of headscarves at universities.

4
ANALYSIS OF NEWSPAPER ARTICLES REGARDING THE BAN ON HEADSCARVES IN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

4.1. The Role of Women in the Kemalist Modernization Project

According to the Kemalist discourse, the greatest success of the Kemalist regime lies in the improvement of women's status. The change in the status of women during that period is presented as the "liberation of women," as İsmet İnönü, Mustafa Kemal's closest associate and successor as President of the Republic of Turkey, expressed: "When the Turkish Revolution is mentioned, it will be said that it was the revolution that liberated women (*kadının kurtuluş inkılâbı*)." (Aksoy, 2005: 100) One of the women who directly experienced these changes was Nermin Abadan-Unat, the first female university professor in political science and a member of the Republican Senate. She once stated: "If it weren't for Mustafa Kemal, there probably wouldn't be me either.[26] I assume now you understand why I am a Kemalist, why I am a nationalist." (Doğan, 2016: 251).

The change in women's status was primarily manifested in the adoption the Swiss Civil Code in 1926, which abolished polygamy,

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[26] The formulation "If it weren't for Atatürk, there wouldn't be us" (*Atatürk olmasaydı biz de olmazdık*) became a commonplace in Kemalist discourse. The dissident discourse of Islamic provenance launched the antithesis of this slogan in the 1990s in the form of "We would still exist even if he hadn't been there."

guaranteed equal rights to divorce and inheritance, and granted women the right to vote and to be elected – first at the local level in 1930, and then in parliamentary elections in 1934. Additionally, it is emphasized that Kemalist reforms ensured equal access to education for both men and women. These changes brought an end to the segregation of women in social life, symbolically represented by clichés such as women staying "behind bars" (*kafeste*)[27] at home and wearing veils in public, as well as by the stereotype of men having up to four wives under Islamic law. In summary, according to Kemalist discourse, women were invisible in social life and deprived of all rights prior to the establishment of the republic. However, this ideological, "black-and-white" depiction of the change in women's status overlooks or conceals certain facts, which will be addressed further below.

The institutional prerequisites for women's education in the modern sense were established in the Ottoman Empire during the mid-19th century. The first secondary schools for girls (*ruşdiye*), which had a secular character, were opened in 1862. About a decade later, women began teaching in these schools. After 1883, women also held leadership positions in the field of education (Berkes, 1964: 176). During the same period, magazines for Muslim women began to be published, and in the struggle for women's rights during that period, Fatma Âliye and Ayşe Sıdıka stand out. In addition, the Industrial School for Women (*Mekteb-i Sanayi*) was opened in 1884 (Somel, 2003: 323). As Nilüfer Göle (1996: 35) notes, the emergence of fashion magazines with articles on hair and skin care, the introduction of Swedish gymnastics courses, and the establishment of a school for applied arts for women were not merely indicators of a Western lifestyle, but also evidence of the increasing socialization and visibility of women.

When it comes to polygamy, it is important to highlight that the stereotype of "four wives," produced with the intent to portray Islam as immoral and irrational, is a product of Orientalist discourse. This stereotype is based on a superficial interpretation of the Quran and a disregard for the lived practices of Muslims (Richardson, 2004: 9). In the Ottoman Empire, polygamy was largely practiced within a narrow circle of wealthy individuals (Somel, 2003: 323). Judicial inheritance records reveal that the percentage of polygamous marriages hovered around 10%. However, this figure might be misleading, as being recorded in

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27   It refers to the iron bars on the windows.

such registers often indicated relative wealth. On the other hand, some studies suggest that the percentage of polygamous marriages in Istanbul during the second half of the 19th century was as low as 2.51% (van Os, 2007: 193).

Similarly, the practice of veiling the face was primarily an urban phenomenon, prevalent mostly among affluent urban populations whose wealth allowed the women in their families not to engage in economic activities. Face veiling was rare among rural populations, which constituted the majority of the Ottoman population (Cronin, 2014: 5). This brief overview of the status of women in the Ottoman period would be incomplete without emphasizing that Ottoman women enjoyed financial protection in the form of independent ownership and management of their property. This stood in contrast to Western women, who only achieved such rights in the modern era (Lewis, 2010: 94). Given these facts, the question arises as to why the Kemalist discourse highlights changes in women's status as the greatest achievement of the Kemalist revolution/reforms, while ignoring or obscuring the evolutionary nature of these changes in the Ottoman period. I will try to answer this question below.

The central premise of the modernization discourse, which was widespread in the Muslim world in the early 20th century – including Turkey – was that the entire society suffered from the devastating effects of veiling and the exclusion of women from social life, which were perceived as the primary reasons for the backwardness of the Muslim world. In this discourse, the unveiling of women became a hallmark of modernity (Cronin, 2014: 2-3). Such a critique of veiling, adopted from European Orientalism, meant accepting European prejudices about Islam (Ibid: 6). Kemalism adopted this premise of the modernization discourse, constructing a narrative that prioritized women's rights and societal roles while relegating broader human rights issues to the background (Göle, 1996: 35; Doğan, 2016: 268). As a result, women in Kemalist discourse became the "primary agents of Westernization and secularization" and the "actresses who testified to the dramatic transformation of civilization" (Göle, 1996: 35). Kemalism promoted this role for women by popularizing individuals who served as role models of the "modern woman" (*çağdaş kadın*) or "Republican woman" (*Cumhuriyet kadını*). To that end, Mustafa Kemal adopted several daughters, providing them with every opportunity to become role models for other women.

Among these, Sabiha Gökçen stood out as a pilot in the armed forces, participating in the suppression of the Kurdish rebellion by bombing insurgents from the air. Another prominent figure was Âfet İnan, a history professor and staunch advocate of the Turkish Historical Thesis (*Türk Tarih Tezi*) (Hanioğlu, 2011: 210-212).[28] The promotion of the new image of Turkish women was also supported by events such as the Miss Turkey beauty pageant. The new regime used this competition to demonstrate its commitment to integrating into Western civilization. This was rewarded by the West in 1932 when Miss Turkey, Keriman Halis, was crowned the most beautiful woman in the world at a competition held in Belgium (Aktaş, 2018: 213).

Although Kemalist discourse portrays the changes in women's status as their liberation, the newfound freedom had clear limits. Women were assigned the role of being a mirror of societal modernization, but they were not allowed to step outside the boundaries of this prescribed role. Murat Aksoy emphasizes that Kemalist reforms effectively replaced a patriarchy rooted in religious authority with a secular patriarchy. During this period, women were encouraged to emulate the appearance and behavior of modern Western women but were also instructed to remain modest, responsible, and restrained (Aksoy, 2005: 108). A paradigmatic example of the role of women in the Kemalist modernization project and the limits of their freedom is the case of the Turkish Women's Association (*Türk Kadınlar Birliği*). This association was founded in 1924 by a group of women led by women's rights activist Nezihe Muhiddin. A year earlier, she attempted to establish a women's political party but was denied permission by the authorities (Doğan, 2016: 266-267). The association played a significant role in promoting the Kemalist regime, particularly in 1935, when it hosted the 20th Congress of the International Alliance of Women, showcasing Turkey's alignment with the West. However, during the congress, some members of the association delivered "mildly feminist" speeches, which

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28   At the center of this theory was the claim that the Turks were the drivers of history and the forerunners of modern civilization, as the ancient Sumerians and Hittites were, in fact, Turkish people. The primary goal of this theory, which in the early republican period represented state ideology and the official curriculum, was to provide Turks with a source of national pride that would suppress Ottoman heritage from national memory and present Turks as part of, or rather the forerunners of, Western civilization (Zürcher, 1993: 277-278). Within this theory, the Ottoman period becomes merely a brief, modest episode in the long and glorious history of the Turkish people, while Islam, as a defining feature of the Ottoman era, is portrayed as the main cause of the stagnation of the Turkish people (Hanioğlu, 2011: 164-165).

led to the organization being dissolved just two weeks later (Hanioğlu, 2011: 213).[29]

4.2. Kemalist Regime's Attitude Towards Women's Veiling

Although the Kemalist regime implemented radical reforms to neutralize the presence and influence of religion in public life – such as banning religious schools, removing religious instruction from curricula, outlawing dervish orders, banning the call to prayer (adhan) in Arabic, mandating the wearing of hats, and other measures – no law was enacted during this period to prohibit women's veiling. In the early years of consolidating power, Mustafa Kemal expressed a conciliatory attitude toward Islamic dress for women. On one occasion, he remarked:

> The veiling of women, as recommended by our religion, aligns with life and moral virtues. If our women veiled themselves as the sharia recommends, as religion commands, they would neither overcover nor overexpose. The veiling of women, as religion commands, is simple and not a burden for women. It does not hinder them from participating alongside men in social, economic, scientific, and everyday life. (Aksoy, 2005: 99)

This stance was consistent with the prevailing discourse of the time, which presented Islam as a rational religion while condemning its misuse in political and social life. Such misuse, it was claimed, resulted from a misunderstanding of the faith. However, by 1925, in the context of the Law on the Maintenance of Order (*Takrir-i Sükûn Kanunu*), which established totalitarian control, Mustafa Kemal began to express a different view on women's veiling: "Women should wear hats like men. Otherwise, we cannot progress. Here's an example: A civilized woman cannot go to Europe and appear among people with this on her head (*bu başla*)" (Atalay, 2018: 128). This ironic tone and sense of inferiority

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29   The association officially dissolved itself, arguing that there was no longer a need for its activities since women had been granted the right to vote in both local and parliamentary elections. However, this was part of a consistent pattern of eliminating all social factors that could represent parallelism or a threat to the regime. Following the same pattern, the activities of the following organizations were also banned: the National Turkish Students Association (*Millî Türk Talebe Birliği*), the Teachers' Association (*Muallimler Birliği*), the cultural and educational organization known as Turkish Hearths (*Türk Ocakları*), the Journalists' Association (*Gazeteciler Cemiyeti*), and the Reserve Officers' Association (*İhtiyat Subaylar Cemiyeti*) (Atalay, 2018: 189). All these organizations "dissolved themselves."

toward the West signaled that the new regime would not tolerate the continuation of veiling practices. Mustafa Kemal genuinely believed that political and social reforms would lead to the eradication of women's veiling in Turkey. After women were granted the right to vote in 1935, he stated: "Turkish women who wear *çarşaf* and are veiled (*çarşaflı ve kapalı*) will, in the future, need to be sought in history books" (Aksoy, 2005: 119). However, the Kemalist regime did not simply wait for veiling practices to fade away on their own. It also took concrete measures to accelerate this cultural transformation.

In the early period of the Republic, the government did not impose a nationwide legal ban on veiling but instead sought to regulate this aspect of social life through local authorities. As early as 1926, under the coordination of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, local authorities began issuing decrees prohibiting the wearing of face veils (*peçe*) and long, loose cloaks known as *çarşaf* (Adak, 2014: 59). These activities intensified in the second half of the 1930s, after women were granted the right to vote at the national level. The decisions by regional and municipal councils to ban the wearing of the *çarşaf* and *peçe* in some cities were so strictly enforced that police forces patrolled main streets to ensure women complied with the ban (Ibid: 69). Additionally, local authorities undertook propaganda campaigns to encourage women to abandon the *çarşaf* and *peçe*. These often involved public events where a few educated and prominent women would publicly remove their face veils (Metinsoy, 2014: 88). However, these efforts faced significant resistance from women. Some withdrew from public life in protest, others clashed with police while insisting on wearing the veil despite threats and fines, and some adopted "eclectic" forms of veiling[30] as a compromise (Ibid: 89).

The measures taken by the Kemalist regime during this early period yielded certain results, particularly in eliminating the practice of wearing face veils. However, the practice of wearing the *çarşaf* remained widespread, and Kemalist elites continued their efforts against it in the subsequent period. Murat Aksoy's study on the issue of women's veiling in Turkey, titled *Başörtüsü-Türban: Batılılaşma-Modernleşme, Laiklik ve Örtünme* (2005), provides data that allows the reconstruction of three stages in the development of the Kemalist discourse on women's veiling:

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30   In a similar way, at the end of the twentieth century, veiled female students found ways to continue their studies despite the ban on wearing headscarves at universities. The most common method was to wear some type of hat or wig over their headscarf.

1) From the 1940s to the 1960s, the main target of the Kemalist elites was the *çarşaf*. The Kemalist stance on this issue was most vocally articulated by the aforementioned Turkish Women's Association (*Türk Kadınlar Birliği*), which resumed its activities in 1949. In 1956, three members of this association, who were also members of parliament, proposed legislation to ban the wearing of the *çarşaf*. In the justification for their proposal, they argued that "measures must be taken against the *çarşaf*, which will shame us before the Western world and is, in itself, uncivilized clothing." They also suggested that "cheap coats should be provided for women wearing the *çarşaf* because they cannot find coats" (Ibid: 138). This bill was not adopted, and no similar attempts to legislate bans on women's veiling through parliamentary procedures would follow. Instead, such measures would be implemented through alternative means.

2) From the early 1960s to the late 1980s, headscarves (*başörtüsü*) and coats (*manto*), which Kemalists themselves had promoted in the 1950s as modern alternatives to the *çarşaf*, became the focus of restrictions. In the second half of the 1970s, the first bans on university attendance due to wearing headscarves were introduced, even though there was no legal basis for such prohibitions (Ibid: 144-145).

3) The first document that prohibited the wearing of headscarves in educational institutions was a regulation adopted by the Council of Ministers on July 22, 1981, a year after the military coup. The provisions of this regulation were incorporated into the Dress Code Regulation (*Kılık Kıyafet Yönetmeliği*), which was issued in 1982 by the Council of Higher Education (*Yükseköğretim Kurulu*) and would later serve as a basis for discrimination against veiled female students (Ibid: 164-165). However, two years later, the aforementioned regulation was amended. The government led by Prime Minister Turgut Özal, formed in 1983 following the first parliamentary elections after the military coup, requested the Council of Higher Education to find a more flexible solution regarding the prohibition on veiling. As a result, in 1984, the Council of Higher Education issued a decision to maintain the ban on wearing headscarves (*başörtüsü*) in educational institutions but allowed the use of "*türban* in a modern way".

Although the text of the decision did not clearly define the difference between a headscarf and a *türban*, the headscarf referred to traditional head covering that did not necessarily include covering the neck, while the term *türban*[31] denoted a modern style of veiling that obligatorily included covering the neck with a fashionable scarf (Ibid: 166-167). The difference between wearing a *türban* and a traditional headscarf was not merely formal but substantial. Nilüfer Göle (1991:16) defined this distinction as follows: "The headscarf (*başörtüsü*) remained within the boundaries of tradition, passed down from generation to generation, and passively adopted by women, while the *türban* implied that women actively embraced covering, thus expressing a political stance and marking the transition from the traditional space of life to the modern one... In this sense, veiling does not signify passive submission to general social norms but rather an active relationship with Islamic regulations."

The same year the Council of Higher Education confirmed the ban on traditional headscarf while permitting the wearing of *türban*, the State Council (*Danıştay*) rejected the appeal of a female student who had been expelled from university for refusing to unveil. This decision became a legal precedent that would subsequently serve as the legal basis for banning veiling at universities. Referring to this decision of the State Council, the President of the Republic of Turkey, Kenan Evren, the general who led the 1981 military coup, requested in 1986 that the Council of Higher Education annul the decision permitting the wearing of *türban*, which was carried out the same year (Aksoy, 2005: 169-171).

This sequence of events shaped the Kemalist ideological discourse on women's veiling: in the earliest periods, the wearing of the *çarşaf* and *peçe* was proscribed, followed by the *çarşaf* alone, then coats and traditional headscarves, and finally, the wearing of *türban*. This illustrates that Kemalism was not opposed to any specific form of veiling but to the act of veiling itself (Ibid: 144).

The prohibition of veiling at universities was not consistently enforced over time. The situation varied from one university to another, and victims of discrimination often organized protests. The issue intensified in 1998, a year after yet another military intervention. That year, the prohibition of veiling in schools and universities began to be systematically implemented. These bans were met with protests across

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31   Over time, the word *türban* in Kemalist discourse acquired a pejorative meaning of "politically motivated veiling," which is why it is rejected by Muslim circles.

the country. In the following section, I will analyze newspaper articles from that period that pertain to these events.

4.3.1. The 'Sharia Uprising': Lexical Arsenal of Kemalist Discourse

The first newspaper article I will analyze was published on October 13, 1998, in the daily newspaper *Cumhuriyet*. As *Cumhuriyet* is the most consistent mouthpiece of the Kemalist elites, this article represents a clear example of Kemalist discourse.

Türban yasağı bahanesiyle yapılan protesto gösterilerine tepki

'ZİNCİR EYLEMLERİ ŞERİAT PROVASI'

İstanbul Haber Servisi - Sözde üniversitelerde uygulanan türban yasağını protesto etmek amacıyla önceki gün İstanbul'da yapılan zincir eyleminin 'şeriatçı kalkışmanın ön provası' olduğu vurgulandı. Gerici eylemin Fazilet Partisi'nce örgütlendiği öne sürüldü.

Zincir eylemine ve Avrasya Maratonu'nun İstanbul Belediye Başkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın siyasi şovuna dönüşmesine İstanbulluların yanı sıra siyasi partiler de tepki gösterdi. CHP İstanbul İl Başkanı Etem Cankurtaran tarih ve dünya kenti olan İstanbul'un önceki günkü gösteriyle ezildiğini vurguladı. Cankurtaran dün yazılı bir açıklama yaparak „Bir taraftan laik cumhuriyete lanet yağdıran kara giysili, kara zihniyetli türban göstericileri kenti ezerken diğer cumhuriyete karşı suç işlemekten mahkum Tayyip Erdoğan geleneksel bir spor yarışmasının adını kirletmekteydi" diye belirtti. İrtica eylemleriyle türbanın masum bir örtünme aracı değil, siyasi bir bayrak olarak kullanıldığının bir kez daha kanıtlandığını vurgulayan Cankurtaran şöyle devam etti: „Bütün bu çirkinliklerin sorumlularını ve destekçilerini kınıyor, önümüzdeki süreçte ülke yönetimini, dini siyasete alet edenlerden, şeriat hukukunu isteyenlerden, partilerini mafya ve çete egemenliğine teslim edenlerden kurtarmayı CHP'liler olarak görev sayıyoruz. Laik-demokratik cumhuriyetten yana olanları, bir süreden beri yer altına inen ancak önceki gün yeniden başkaldıran irticaya karşı dayanışmaya çağırıyoruz."

İP İstanbul İl Başkanı Turan Özlü, zincir eyleminin cumhuriyetin 75. yılında cumhuriyete karşı bir meydan okuma olduğunu savundu. Özlü, eylemle ilgili dün yaptığı yazılı açıklamada zincir eyleminin en temel özelliğini şöyle ifade etti: „Eylemler belirli bir merkez tarafından planlanmış, örgütlenmiştir. Türkiye'nin hemen hemen bütün illerinde, aynı gün, aynı saatte eyleme

geçilmiştir. Şeriatçi kalkışma için prova yapılmıştır. Şeriatçi köşe yazarları ve gazeteler bu eylemin çağrısını yapmışlardır."

Eylemi planlayan ve örgütleyen gücün Fazilet Partisi olduğunu öne süren Özlü, FP Genel Başkanı Recai Kutan'ın bu yasadışı ve cumhuriyet yıkıcısı eyleme sahip çıktığına da dikkat çekti. Özlü, FP'li milletvekillerinin de bu eylemin içinde yer aldığını vurgulayarak hükümeti de olayları salt izlemek ve gereken önlemleri almamakla eleştirdi. Türkiyen'nin böyle bir hükümetle irticayla mücadele etmesinin olanaksız olduğunu vurgulayan Özlü „solda güçbirliği" çağrısını yineledi. Özlü şöyle devam etti: „Türkiye dışarıda ABD ve Batı tarafından dayatılan sorunlarla boğuşurken içerideki şer güçleri de harekete geçirilmiştir. Türkiye hayati ulusal davalar ile yüz yüze iken kendi içinden hançerlenmektedir. İrtica kendini Batı'ya bağlayarak Batı'yı arkasına alarak Türkiye'yi iç savaşa sürüklemektedir. Geri dönülmez bir noktaya gelmeden irtica saldırısı püskürtülmelidir."

Sosyalist İktidar Partisi (SİP) de eyleme arka çıkan devlet görevlilerinin hesap vermesini istedi. SİP Genel Merkezi tarafından yapılan yazılı açıklamada zincir eylemi sırasında İzmit'teki SİP Kocaeli İl binasına saldırıldığı ve binaya asılı olan ''Türban Maraş'tır, Sıvas'tır. Kahrolsun Gericilik'' yazılı pankartının indirilmek istendiği belirtilerek „Binaya girmeyi başaramayan gericilerin imdadına polis ve itfaiye yetişti ve pankartı indirdiler" denildi. Ülkemizde temel eğitim, güvenlik, üniversiteler gibi kurumların gericiler tarafından işgal edildiğinin herkesçe bilindiği vurgulanan açıklamada, gericilere arka çıkıp cesaret verenlerin, saldırıların hesabını yobazlarla birlikte verecekleri belirtildi.

Gazetemizi arayan çok sayıda yurttaş da „İstanbul'un kuşatılmasına göz yüman, bugüne dek bu ve benzer eylemleri küçümseyenler yarını göremeyenlerdir. Devletin tepesindekileri, siyasi partileri ve sivil toplum kuruluşlarını görevlerini yapmaya davet ediyoruz" şeklinde tepkilerini dile getirdiler.

Reaction to the protests held under the pretext of the *türban* ban

"CHAIN PROTESTS ARE A SHARIA TEST"

Istanbul News Service – It was emphasized that the chain protest held yesterday in Istanbul, allegedly aimed at opposing the *türban* ban at universities, represents a "test for a Sharia uprising." It was claimed that this reactionary act was organized by the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi- FP).

In addition to Istanbul residents, political parties also reacted against the chain protest and against turning the Eurasia Marathon into a political show

by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Mayor of Istanbul. The head of the Istanbul branch of the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi- CHP), Etem Cankurtaran, emphasized that the historic and global city of Istanbul had been trampled by yesterday's protest. In a written statement issued yesterday, Cankurtaran said: "While, on one hand, the city was trampled by protesters with a dark mindset, clad in black, who protested the *türban* ban by raining curses on the secular republic, on the other hand, Tayyip Erdoğan, who has been convicted of crimes against the republic, tarnished the name of a traditional sports event." Highlighting that reactionary activities once again prove that the *türban* is not just an ordinary means of covering but is being used as a political symbol, Cankurtaran added: "We, as CHP, condemn those responsible for this disgrace and those who supported it, and we consider it our duty to protect the state from those who exploit religion for political purposes, those who seek Sharia law, and those who have handed over their parties to the mafia. I call on all who stand for a secular, democratic republic to unite against the reactionary forces, which had retreated underground for some time but have now resurfaced."

The head of the Istanbul branch of the Workers' Party (İşçi Partisi - IP), Turan Özlü, claimed that the chain protest was a rebellion against the republic in its 75th year. In a written statement regarding the protests, Özlü described the defining feature of the chain protest as follows: "The protests were planned and organized from a single center. In almost all regions of Turkey, protests began on the same day and at the same time. Pro-Sharia columnists and newspapers called for these protests."

Özlü expressed the opinion that the protests were planned and organized by the Virtue Party, drawing attention to the fact that the FP's chairman, Recai Kutan, supported this unlawful act that destroys the republic. Özlü accused the government of merely observing the events and failing to take necessary measures, emphasizing that FP lawmakers participated in the protest. Özlü stressed that it was impossible to fight reactionary forces with such a government in Turkey, once again calling for a "united left." He further stated: "While Turkey is struggling abroad with problems imposed by the U.S. and the West, internal forces of evil have also been set into motion. While Turkey is facing critical national problems, a knife is being stabbed into it from within. Reactionary forces are leading Turkey toward civil war, aligning themselves with the West and hiding behind the West. The reactionary forces' attack must be stopped before it reaches a point of no return."

The Socialist Power Party (Sosyalist İktidar Partisi - SIP) also demanded accountability from public officials who supported the protests. In a written statement issued by SIP's headquarters, it was stated that during the chain protest, an attack took place on SIP's regional building in Izmit,

and an attempt was made to remove the sign that read, "The *türban* is Maraş, the *türban* is Sivas. Curse Reactionism." The statement continued: "To aid the reactionaries attempting to enter the building, police officers and firefighters intervened and removed the sign from the exterior." In the statement, it was emphasized that it is widely known that institutions such as primary education, the police, and universities in our country have been occupied by reactionary forces. It was also noted that both the fanatics and those who protect and encourage the reactionaries would be held accountable for the attacks.

Numerous citizens who contacted Cumhuriyet expressed their reactions, saying: "Those who turned a blind eye to the fact that Istanbul is besieged, those who have underestimated these and similar actions until now, are incapable of seeing the future. We call on those leading the state, political parties, and civil society organizations to fulfill their duties."

This newspaper article focuses on protests organized across cities in Turkey under the slogan *İnanca saygı, düşünceye özgürlük için el ele* "Hand in hand for respect, for faith, and freedom of thought". During these protests, participants formed a large chain by holding hands, which is why the events were referred to in the news as "chain protests" (*zincir eylemleri*). The goal of this peaceful gathering, conceptualized and organized by veiled female students facing discrimination, was to protest the ban on headscarves at universities. Alongside students, a large number of citizens also participated in the protests. In Istanbul, the protests coincided with the traditional Istanbul Marathon.

In reporting on these events, the newspaper *Cumhuriyet* adopted a strategy of presenting the perspectives of social actors aligned with Kemalist ideology, including representatives of three political parties and "numerous citizens who called our newspaper" (*gazetemizi arayan çok sayıda yurttaş*). This approach is part of what Norman Fairclough describes as the rhetoric of factuality (Fairclough, 1995a: 93). However, the central social actors of this event – female students who were victims of university discrimination and organizers of the protest – are not directly mentioned in the article. Instead, they are silenced, effectively dehumanizing them. According to Fairclough's scale of the presence of social actors in texts (1995a: 106), these actors are only presupposed, as the text begins by stating that the protest was organized "under the pretext of the *türban* ban" (*türban yasağı bahanesiyle yapılan protesto*). On the other hand, the protest participants are depicted using a strategy

of *collectivization* (Machin and Mayr, 2012: 80) with the following lexical choices:

- *şeriat provası* – ''test for Sharia"
- *şeriatçi kalkışma* – "Sharia uprising"
- *kara giysili, kara zihniyetli göstericiler* – "protesters with a dark mindset, clad in black"
- *şer güçleri* – "forces of evil"
- *irtica (eylemleri)* – "reactionary (activities)"
- *irtica* – "reactionary forces"
- *irtica (saldırısı)* – "(attack by) reactionary forces"
- *gerici (eylem)* – "reactionary (action)"
- *gericiler* – "reactionaries"
- *yobazlar* – "fanatics"

This lexical inventory reflects a discursive strategy typical of Kemalist ideology, which frames any public manifestation of faith as a direct threat to the Kemalist conception of secularism and modernism, equating it with an act of undermining the state order. Ultimately, this implies undermining the hegemony of Kemalist elites. In the Kemalist conception of secularism, there is no place for religious symbols in public spaces, such as educational institutions. Therefore, protests against the ban on wearing headscarves at universities are not treated as legitimate acts but as an "attack by reactionary forces" (*irtica saldırısı*), allegedly aiming to establish a Sharia regime (*şeriat provası* – "test for Sharia," *şeriatçi kalkışma* – "Sharia uprising"). This proliferation and accumulation of lexemes (*overlexicalization*), aimed at delegitimizing the social actors by portraying them as a reactionary threat to the order, resembles what Trew (1979b: 136) describes as "uttering magical words in an incantation, having a kind of axiomatic, tautological effect that suppresses any alternative discourse."

Conversely, social actors positioned as a structural opposition to these "reactionary forces" are represented with a lexicon that connotes legality (*laik-demokratik cumhuriyetten yana olanlar* – "those who stand for a secular and democratic republic," *devletin tepesindekiler* – "those who lead the state," *siyasi partiler* – "political parties," *sivil toplum kuruluşları* – "civil society organizations") and national cohesion (*yurttaşlar* – "fellow citizens," *İstanbullular* – "residents of Istanbul").

The veiled female students demanding the right to education and the citizens supporting them are also portrayed through material processes describing their activities. These material processes reflect the Kemalist discourse's intent to delegitimize their actions and reinforce a perception of these protests as threats to secularism and state order. The following verbs are used:

1) *ezmek* "to trample, to crush":

a) *CHP İstanbul İl Başkanı Etem Cankurtaran tarih ve dünya kenti olan **İstanbul'un önceki günkü gösteriyle ezildiğini** vurguladı.*
   The head of the Istanbul branch of the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi- CHP), Etem Cankurtaran, emphasized that the historic and global city of **Istanbul had been trampled by yesterday's protest**.

b) *Cankurtaran dün yazılı bir açıklama yaparak "Bir taraftan laik cumhuriyete lanet yağdıran kara giysili, kara zihniyetli **türban göstericileri kenti ezerken** diğer cumhuriyete karşı suç işlemekten mahkum Tayyip Erdoğan geleneksel bir spor yarışmasının adını kirletmekteydi" diye belirtti.*
   In a written statement issued yesterday, Cankurtaran said: "While, on one hand, **the city was trampled by protesters** with a dark mindset, clad in black, who protested the *türban* ban by raining curses on the secular republic, on the other hand, Tayyip Erdoğan, who has been convicted of crimes against the republic, tarnished the name of a traditional sports event.

In example a), the mentioned social actors are represented through the metonymy ACTION FOR ACTOR, realized via the noun *gösteri* "protest", which functions as the instrumental subject of the verb *ezilmek* "to be trampled", found in the noun phrase *tarih ve dünya kenti olan İstanbul'un önceki günkü gösteriyle ezildiğini* "that the historic and global city of Istanbul had been trampled by yesterday's protest". In the transitivity model, the process *ezilmek* ("to be trampled") involves two participants, which in the original sentence are as follows:

GOAL	ACTOR	PROCESS
Istanbul	*gösteriyle*	***ezildi.***
Istanbul	by the protests	**had been trampled.**

In example b), the ACTORS - the participants in the protests against the *türban* ban (*türban göstericileri*) - are depicted through attributes such as *kara giysili, kara zihniyetli* (with a dark mindset, clad in black). The manipulative strategy behind the attribute *kara giysili* "clad in black" relies on the metonymy PART FOR WHOLE: Among the protest participants were women wearing *çarşaf*, the loose black robes cinched at the waist, which in Kemalist discourse symbolizes conservatism and patriarchy. This metonymic representation of the participants implies that the protest's goal was not to advocate for the societal position of veiled women (e.g., securing their right to study and work in public institutions) but rather to establish the rule of a "dark mindset" (*kara zihniyet*), aiming to impose the wearing of a headscarf on all women and exclude them from public life. Other newspapers employed the same manipulative strategy through metonymic representation in photographs taken during these events, a topic that will be addressed later.

2) *işgal etmek* "to occupy":

Ülkemizde temel eğitim, güvenlik, üniversiteler gibi **kurumların gericiler tarafından işgal edildiğinin** *herkesçe bilindiği vurgulanan açıklamada gericilere arka çıkıp cesaret verenlerin saldırıların hesabını yobazlarla birlikte verecekleri belirtildi.*
In the statement, it was emphasized that it is widely known that **institutions** such as primary education, the police, and universities in our country **have been occupied by reactionary forces**. It was also noted that both the fanatics and those who protect and encourage the reactionaries would be held accountable for the attacks.

In the original sentence, which has been transformed into the phrase *kurumların gericiler tarafından işgal edildiği* "that institutions have been occupied by reactionary forces" through nominalization, the following participants are present:

GOAL	ACTOR	PROCESS
Kurumlar	*gericiler tarafından*	*işgal edildi.*
Institutions	by reactionary forces	**have been occupied.**

3) *kuşatmak* "to besiege, surround"

> *İstanbul'un kuşatılmasına göz yuman, bugüne dek bu ve benzer eylemleri küçümseyenler yarını göremeyenlerdir.*
> Those who turned a blind eye to **the fact that Istanbul is besieged**, those who have underestimated these and similar actions until now, are incapable of seeing the future.

The process *kuşatmak* "to besiege, surround" in the phrase *İstanbul'un kuşatılması* "the fact that Istanbul is besieged" involves the following participants:

GOAL	PROCESS
Istanbul	*kuşatıldı.*
Istanbul	**is besieged.**

The ACTOR of the process *kuşatmak* "to besiege, surround" is not explicitly stated, but from the context, it is clear that it refers to the protest participants or reactionaries. In the previous sentence, reactionaries are identified as the ACTOR of the process *işgal etmek* "to occupy" in the nominal phrase *kurumların gericiler tarafından işgal edildiği* "that institutions are occupied by reactionary forces", which parallels the phrase *İstanbul'un kuşatılması* "the fact that Istanbul is besieged". In the latter case, the choice of the verbal noun ending in -mA is dictated by the verb *göz yummak* "to turn a blind eye", to which it is an argument. This parallelism emphasizes the contextually implied role of the ACTOR, attributed to the protest participants.

4) *yıkmak* "to destroy"

> *Eylemi planlayan ve örgütleyen gücün Fazilet Partisi olduğunu öne süren Özlü, FP Genel Başkanı Recai Kutan'ın bu yasadışı ve cumhuriyet yıkıcısı eyleme sahip çıktığına da dikkat çekti.*
> Özlü expressed the opinion that the protests were planned and organized by the Virtue Party (FP), drawing attention to the fact

that the FP's chairman, Recai Kutan, supported this unlawful **act that destroys the republic**.

The process *yıkmak* "to destroy" is used in this sentence in the form of the noun *yıkıcı* "destroyer", which designates the actor of an action (*nomina actoris*) (Čaušević, 1996: 443). Since the suffix -(y)IcI, which forms this noun, also has participial features (Haig, 1998: 55-56), it creates space in the sentence for both an ACTOR, expressed by the noun *eylem* "act", and a GOAL, expressed by the noun *cumhuriyet* "republic", which functions as an attribute within the phrase. The noun *eylem* "act" represents the realization of the metonymy ACTION FOR ACTOR, thereby making the protest participants, i.e., the veiled female students, the implicit ACTOR of the process *yıkmak* "to destroy".

The four processes used to represent the activities of the protest participants (*ezmek* "to trample, crash", *işgal etmek* "to occupy", *kuşatmak* "to besiege" and *yıkmak* "to destroy") converge into the conceptual metaphor PROTESTERS ARE A HOSTILE/DESTRUCTIVE FORCE. This conceptual metaphor is part of the strategy used to portray the protest participants, specifically the veiled female students, as fanatics and reactionaries who pose a threat to the secular order because they aim to impose Sharia law. This framing constructs veiled female students as a tangible and widespread danger to the secular order, presenting them as a hostile force that has besieged or occupied institutions and cities with the goal of destroying the secular republic.

The threat from reactionary forces is further emphasized by the information that the protests were "planned and organized from a single center" (*belirli bir merkez tarafından planlanmış, örgütlenmiştir*). This brings us to the question of agency – did the veiled female students, who took to the streets to fight for their right to attend universities, initiate the protests themselves, or is someone else behind them? Were they the true ACTORS, or were they merely tools? At the beginning of the text, the following claim is made:

Gerici eylemin Fazilet Partisi'ince örgütlendiği öne sürüldü.

"It was claimed that this reactionary act was organized by the Virtue Party."

This claim is further supported in the text by the fact that the leader of the party supported the protests and that several members of parliament

from the same party participated in the demonstrations. However, while this conservative party is identified as the organizer of the protests, the real actor is expressed in the following sentence:

> Türkiye dışarıda ABD ve Batı tarafından dayatılan sorunlarla boğuşurken içerideki şer güçleri de harekete geçirilmiştir.

> "While Turkey is struggling abroad with problems imposed by the U.S. and the West, internal forces of evil have also been set into motion."

With the process *harekete geçirmek* "to set into motion", which is expressed in the passive voice in this sentence, only the participant *şer güçleri* "forces of evil" is explicitly mentioned, functioning as the GOAL. The process *harekete geçirmek* "to set into motion" is a causative type of process, which means that the subject of this verb in the transitivity model represents the ACTOR (Lukšić, 2017: 164). Although the ACTOR is not explicitly stated, it is implied through the particle de/da "and", which suggests that the ACTOR of the process *harekete geçirmek* ("to set into motion") is the same as the ACTOR of the process *dayatmak* "to impose", namely, the U.S. and the West. This implication is reinforced in the continuation of the text, where it is stated that "reactionary forces are leading Turkey toward civil war, aligning themselves with the West and hiding behind the West" (*İrtica kendini Batı'ya bağlayarak Batı'yı arkasına alarak Türkiye'yi iç savaşa sürüklemektedir*). Thus, the participants in the process *harekete geçirmek* "to set into motion" can be represented as follows:

GOAL	ACTOR	PROCESS
Şer güçleri	*ABD ve Batı tarafından*	*harekete eçirilmiştir.*
The forces of evil	by the U.S. and the West	**were set into motion.**

Through this strategy of deagentification, the protest participants – specifically, the veiled female students fighting for their right to education – are further dehumanized and delegitimized. They are portrayed not only as threatening and dismantling the secular order to impose Sharia law, but also as lacking autonomy and self-awareness. They are not independent agents (ACTORS) of their actions but are instead manipulated and used by others for ulterior motives. At the same time, they are portrayed as performing their role with great fervor, as implied by the verbal process

lanet yağdırmak "to rain curses", a hyperbolic version of the process *lanetlemek* "to curse, condemn", used to describe their behavior at the protests (*laik cumhuriyete **lanet yağdıran** kara giysili, kara zihniyetli türban göstericileri* "protesters with a dark mindset, clad in black, who protested the *türban* ban by **raining curses** on the secular republic").

The deagentification strategy is "illustrated" through a cartoon published above the news text:

Figure 1. A caricature published in the *Cumhuriyet* newspaper on October 13, 1998.

The cartoon depicts veiled female students fighting for their right to education as merely a "ram" in the hands of fanatical reactionaries, used to break down the gates of the fortress called the secular republic.

4.3.2. Multimodal Manipulation and the Discursive Framing

On October 12, 1998, the daily newspaper *Radikal* published the following news about the protests:

Figure 2. A news article published in the *Radikal* newspaper on October 12, 1998.

THE *TÜRBAN* TOOK TO THE STREETS

Tens of thousands of people, who have transferred the tension over the *türban* issue from universities to the streets, formed a protest chain by holding hands. In the capital Ankara, protesters carried a banner reading "The injustice regarding the headscarf is 75 years old."

ISTANBUL/ANKARA – Yesterday, protests against the *türban* ban at universities were held in various parts of the country. Protesters, gathered under the slogan "Hand in hand for respect, for faith, and freedom of thought", formed "human chains."

In the protests, a "human chain" was formed as participants held hands from 10:30 AM on the European side of Istanbul, from the Cerrahpaşa Medical Faculty to the entrance of the Bosphorus Bridge, and on the Anatolian side in areas such as Üsküdar, Maltepe, Kartal, Tuzla, and Gebze. It was observed

that the protesters, who formed the chain along the roadside so as not to disrupt traffic, carried white balloons and banners opposing the *türban* ban. Police forces, who did not intervene against the protesters, monitored the event from the air via helicopters and on the ground via teams stationed at certain points. The protesters began to disperse at 12:30 PM.

A Protester Jumps Off a Bridge

The protests in Istanbul passed without incidents, except for one protester named Abdulkadir Ekşi, who jumped off the Galata Bridge. He was rescued from the water by members of the maritime police. After a large group gathered in Aksaray, police took significant security measures around the municipal administration building. However, the group dispersed before they managed to gather in front of the municipal building. It was notable that, during the protests in Istanbul, men and women did not hold hands but instead used ribbons or scarves to form the chain.

In the capital Ankara, protests were also held to support veiled female students. Protesters, who began gathering at 10:30 AM at various points along the Istanbul and Samsun roads, formed a "human chain" on the sidewalk by holding hands and avoiding stepping onto the road, symbolizing support for veiled students. It was observed that no slogans were chanted during the protests and that very few banners were used. Attention was drawn to a banner reading, "The injustice against the headscarf has lasted 75 years," displayed near Mehmet Elkatmış, a member of parliament from the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi - FP).

Security forces took precautions starting early in the morning, particularly at intersections. Ankara police, who warned protesters via megaphones not to disrupt traffic, monitored the events from the air using helicopters.

On the other hand, the police information center, before the protests began, warned via walkie-talkie that participants should not be allowed to approach military zones. Mehmet Elkatmış, a member of parliament from the Virtue Party, supported the gathering by holding hands with the protesters. Meanwhile, Ankara Mayor Melih Gökçek, on his way to the opening of the Altınpark Running and Gymnastics Area, was seen changing his route after spotting the protesters. (Radikal)

This news article conveys some almost factual details about the protests. In representing social actors, it avoids using the lexicon typical of Kemalist discourse, such as *irtica* "reactionary forces", *gerici* "reactionary", *şeriatçı* "supporter of Sharia", or *yobaz* "fanatic". Nevertheless, other strategies are employed to relativize the discrimination against veiled female

students and delegitimize their activities, primarily through the use of photographs and highlighted elements of the text: the headline, lead, and bolded captions beneath photographs. As Fairclough (1995: 58) emphasizes, an analytical framework for newspaper discourse should also include multimodal analysis, as other semiotic modalities – such as photographs and layout – interact with language, resulting in their integration and the creation of new meaning.

In the multimodal meaning structure represented by the above news article, the strategy of manipulation is based on the trans/cross-modal principle of *foregrounding* (Buljubašić, 2015). The photograph centered within the article shows a portion of the chain formed by the protesters, prominently featuring women dressed in *çarşaf*. In Kemalist discourse, these robes symbolize conservatism and patriarchy, or the absence of freedom for women.

In the multimodal semantic unit represented by the news item shown above, the strategy of manipulation is based on the trans/cross-modal principle of foregrounding (Buljubašić, 2015). In the photograph centered within the news, a part of the chain formed by the protest participants is depicted, with women dressed in *çarşaf* in the foreground, which, in Kemalist discourse, symbolizes conservatism and patriarchy, or the lack of freedom for women. This strategy of representing social actors by emphasizing one of their features - women in *çarşaf* - correlates with the highlighted part of the sentence beneath the image, *eğitim özgürlüğü bahanesiyle* "under the pretext of freedom in education", forming a kind of discursive antonymy. The sentence beneath the image reads:

> **Eğitim özgürlüğü bahanesiyle** *gerçekleştirilen eylemde kara çarşaflıların çokluğu dikkat çekiciydi.*

> "The large number of women in *çarşaf* drew attention at the protest organized under **the pretext of freedom in education**."

By integrating the highlighted parts of the photograph and the sentence beneath it, the text emphasizes the contradiction and incompatibility between the concepts of *kara çarşaflılar* "women in çarşaf" and *özgürlük* "freedom", forming an antonymic pair:

$$çarşaf \text{ "black robe" } \neq özgürlük \text{ "freedom"}$$

Although dictionaries do not explicitly record such an antonymic pair, it is discursively constructed (Fairclough, 2003: 23), resulting in the following implicature: While the declared goal of the protest is the fight for "freedom in education," this is merely a "pretext" and a cover for reactionary activities, as evidenced by the "large number" of women in *çarşaf*, which symbolize reactionism and female "unfreedom."

This antonymic pair is not an isolated example but part of a broader discursive strategy aimed at delegitimizing the struggle against discrimination toward veiled female students. This is confirmed by a cartoon published in *Cumhuriyet* on May 11, 1999:


Figure 3. A caricature published in *Cumhuriyet* newspaper on May 11, 1999.

The text on the cartoon reads:

> **Türbana özgürlük** *yürüyüşümüz devam edecektir!*

> "Our march for **freedom for the *türban*** will continue!"

The strategy of representing women wearing *çarşaf* as a symbol of the absence of freedom is realized on two levels:

a) Denial of agency and subjectivity: Veiled women in the protests are portrayed as mere participants in a "march" (*yürüyüş*) led and organized by a man. The man is assigned the role of the ACTOR, while the women are depicted through mental processes such

as frowning, suspicion, and anger toward their surroundings. These processes emphasize a lack of emotional self-control. The women's role is further reduced to a verbal process, as the last woman in the procession articulates the declarative motive for marching: *Türbana özgürlük* "Freedom for the *türban*".

b) Use of stereotypes about four women: The stereotype of "four women" implies that the true goal of the protests is not the fight for freedom for veiled women but rather the establishment of Sharia law, which dehumanizes women by allowing men to "possess" four wives. This stereotype, intended to portray Islam as immoral and irrational, is rooted in Orientalist discourse. It is based on a superficial interpretation of the Qur'an and ignores the lived experiences of Muslims (Richardson, 2004: 9).

The headline in *Radikal*, *Türban sokağa döküldü* "The *türban* took to the streets", represents veiled students through the metonymy PART OF CLOTHING FOR PERSON, realized through the noun *türban*. This strategy of *impersonalization* (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 46) ideologically interprets and dehumanizes the social actors by emphasizing one of their characteristics - in this case, their clothing - while ignoring their key attribute: being individuals denied the right to education. The manipulative potential of this strategy is significant, as headlines serve not only as authoritative summaries of events (Fairclough, 1995: 82) but also as interpretations of their significance for the social order (White, 1997: 129).

The strategy of masking and relativizing social inequality continues in the lead, which, together with the headline, represents a prominent part of the news text and expresses its macroproposition (Van Dijk, 1998b: 33). In the sentence from the lead *Üniversitelerdeki türban gerginliğini sokağa taşıyan on binlerce kişi, el ele tutuşarak protesto zinciri oluşturdu.* "Tens of thousands of people, who have transferred the tension over the *türban* issue from universities to the streets, formed a protest chain by holding hands.", the emphasized part contains the euphemism *Üniversitelerdeki türban **gerginliğini*** "**the tension** over the *türban* issue from universities", which avoids or masks the unpleasant reality – discrimination at universities. Through this euphemism, which represents the metonymy CONSEQUENCE FOR CAUSE, the source of the social issue is obscured, while the information that veiled female students

have transferred this tension to the streets through these protests is foregrounded. This opens up room for the implicature that they also brought that tension to the universities. This implicature is reinforced by the second sentence of the lead: *Başkent Ankara'da göstericiler 'Başörtü zülmü 75 yaşında' yazılı döviz açtı* "In the capital Ankara, protesters carried a banner reading 'The injustice regarding the headscarf is 75 years old'". Through this slogan, the participants of the protest explicitly expressed their view that Kemalist ideology, shaped in the early years of Kemalist rule following the establishment of the republic, is responsible for the discrimination against veiled women. In the bold part of the text beneath the image, it is specified that this banner was carried by two protesters in Ankara, who are shown in a smaller photograph in the bottom-right corner. By highlighting this specific banner from the protests, which involved tens of thousands of participants and numerous other banners, the news text aims to contextualize the protests as an activity of reactionary forces that have been opposing the secular republic since its founding. Based on the interpretive framework of this news story described above, the following conclusion can be drawn: By entering universities, reactionaries disturbed the peace within these institutions, and now they have transferred this tension to the streets.

4.3.3. Veiled Women as Symbols of the Middle Ages' Darkness

On October 13, 1998, *Sabah* newspaper published a report on the protests under the headline *Şeriatçı tahriki* "Provocation by Sharia Supporters".

The content of the report is similar to what was mentioned in *Radikal* newspaper: information on when the protests began, the locations where they took place, and similar details. As in the case of *Radikal*, *Sabah* also focused its manipulative strategy on the prominent elements of the text: the headline, the photograph, and the caption beneath the photograph. The graphically highlighted headline provides an ideological interpretation of the event's significance for the social order (White, 1997:129): peaceful protests organized to fight discrimination in educational institutions are characterized as a provocation against the secular order, that is, against the hegemony of Kemalist elites who do not allow alternative interpretations of secularism

and base their dominance on a version of secularism that leaves no room for the public manifestation of faith. In the Kemalist conception of secularism, faith belongs exclusively in mosques and the private conscience of believers. Therefore, any demand for the recognition of the right to manifest religious symbols in public spaces is seen as a direct provocation.

Figure 4. A news article published in the *Sabah* newspaper on October 13, 1998.

Before providing details about the protests themselves, the article frames the event in an extremely negative, delegitimizing way with the following interpretive context:

Şeriatçı tahriki

Orta Çağ karanlığı özlemcileri, tam da barış, hoşgörü ve dayanışmaya en çok ihtiyaç duyduğumuz bir dönemde, tahrik amaçlı eylemleriyle ortalığı karıştırma peşinde.

Modern Türkiye'nin kuruluşunun 75'inci yılını kutladığımız bu günlerde, şeriat özlemcileri yine sinsi planlarını uygulamaya başladı. Türban için uçak kaçıran, üniversitelerde karşı görüşlü öğrencilere bıçaklı saldırı düzenleyen

karanlık beyinler, önceki gün Türkiye'nin birçok yerinde düzenlenen ve üniversitelerde uygulanan türban yasağını protesto eden eylemlerde kendilerini gösterdiler.

Provocation by Sharia Supporters

Those who yearn for the darkness of the Middle Ages seek to stir unrest through their provocative actions, precisely at a time when peace, tolerance, and solidarity are most needed.

On these days, as we celebrate the 75th anniversary of the founding of modern Turkey, those who yearn for Sharia have once again begun implementing their sinister plans. Dark minds, who have hijacked airplanes for headscarves and launched knife attacks against students with opposing views, appeared during protests held in many parts of Turkey yesterday against the headscarf ban in universities.

Veiled female students, as victims of discrimination and organizers of the protests, are neither mentioned in this report nor directly acknowledged, except through a presupposition that the protests were motivated by the headscarf ban in universities. In this way, they are dehumanized, and their activities are delegitimized by framing the protest participants in the lead as *Orta Çağ karanlığı özlemcileri* "those who yearn for the darkness of the Middle Ages" and in the first sentence of the text as *şeriat özlemcileri* "those who yearn for Sharia". This strategy of representing social actors is based on yet another construct of Kemalist discourse, manifesting here as a synonymous pair:

Orta Çağ karanlığı "darkness of the Middle Ages" = *şeriat* "Sharia"

The protest against the headscarf ban in universities is further delegitimized by emphasizing the antagonism between Sharia, on which the practice of veiling is based, and modern Turkey, referenced in the prominent part of the text's opening sentence. This antagonism is further underscored by the caption beneath a photograph showing protest participants:

BURASI 20'NCİ YÜZYIL TÜRKİYESİ.

THIS IS 20TH-CENTURY TURKEY.

The implicature is clear: in 20th-century Turkey, such scenes should not exist, because veiled women are relics of the (darkness of the) Middle Ages.

4.3.4. The Dichotomy of Modernity

On October 12, 1998, *Hürriyet* newspaper published a report under the headline *Türban kışkırtması* "Provocation Over the *Türban*". Similar to *Sabah, Hürriyet* framed the protests as a provocation and an attack on national cohesion. In addition to the headline, this interpretative framing is established in the first sentence of the report:

> *Cumhuriyetin 75'inci yıl kutlamaları ve Suriye gerginliği nedeniyle ülkenin birlik ve beraberliğe en çok ihtiyacı olduğu bir dönemde dün 25 il ve çok sayıda ilçede izinsiz türban eylemleri yaşandı.*

> At a time when the 75th anniversary of the Republic is being celebrated and the country most needs unity and solidarity due to tensions with Syria, unauthorized protests over the *türban* took place yesterday in 25 major cities and numerous smaller towns.

This interpretative framework is further developed through a manipulative strategy of representing social actors via photographs. *Hürriyet* featured the following protest photograph prominently in the center of the page:

Figure 5. A photograph published in the *Hürriyet* newspaper on October 12, 1998.

The manipulation in this photograph, as in the case of the report in *Cumhuriyet*, relies on the metonymic principle of the PART FOR THE WHOLE; The photograph shows four women in *çarşaf* with their faces almost completely covered, positioned around one man. This arrangement clearly alludes to the stereotype of "four wives," evoking a reductive and demeaning association. Such a portrayal delegitimizes the participants' actions by focusing on one narrowly chosen aspect of their identity. The fear of a potential imposition of Sharia law, fueled by these stereotypes, eliminates any space for considering the validity of objections to the headscarf ban in universities. This fear is rooted in the following syllogism: If veiled women are allowed into universities and other public spaces, this will pave the way for Sharia law. Once Sharia law is implemented, all women will have to wear veils, and men will be allowed to have four wives. This reasoning is explicitly reinforced in the caption beneath the photograph, which reads:

> *Gösterilere kara çarşaflı, şalvarlı kişilerin katılması şeriat gösterisi olarak yorumlandı.*
>
> "The presence of people in *çarşaf* and *şalvar* (baggy trousers) at the protests was interpreted as a manifestation of Sharia."

This sentence demonstrates how newspapers employ passive voice to avoid openly expressing their own judgment while maintaining a façade of neutrality. By not specifying who interpreted the protests as a manifestation of Sharia, the newspaper relies on the assumption that the stereotype of Sharia is so deeply ingrained in the mental frameworks of its readers that no one will question the implied proposition: "Women in *çarşaf* and men in baggy trousers are a manifestation of Sharia." However, Kemalist elites build their hegemony not only in opposition to women in *çarşaf* - symbols of female subordination stereotypically associated with Sharia – but also against all other veiled women, including female students fighting for social emancipation through education. This is illustrated by a smaller photograph and the caption beneath it, found on the same page below the previously discussed photograph:

Figure 6. A photograph published in the *Hürriyet* newspaper on October 12, 1998.

Headline and first sentence of the text below the image read:

Polis geçit vermedi

Erzurum'da türban ile çağdaş Türk kadını böyle karşı karşıya geldi.

"The police officer did not allow passage"

This is how, in Erzurum, the *türban* found itself against the modern Turkish woman."

The representation of veiled female students in this context employs a dual strategy of dehumanization. First, they were represented through the metonymy PART OF CLOTHING FOR PERSON, as part of an *impersonalization* strategy (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 46). Unlike the policewoman, with whom they are juxtaposed, they are not women, and certainly not modern Turkish women – they are merely *türban*, i.e. headscarves. The dehumanizing nature of this representational strategy becomes clear when the same strategy is applied to the police-woman: "This is how, in Erzurum, the *türban* found itself against **the baton**!"

Second, the veiled students are presented as one part of a dichotomy, with the other part being the policewoman, represented as *çağdaş Türk kadını* "modern Turkish woman". This dichotomy generates the meaning that the sole criterion for a woman to be considered modern is the absence of a headscarf. The veiled students peacefully and civilly fight for their right to education as a means of social emancipation, yet they remain the negative side of the dichotomy. This is further confirmed by the phrasal verb in the headline, *geçit vermemek* "to deny passage, to stop", used to describe the action of the policewoman, which in Turkish carries the connotation of halting something harmful and dangerous. The above-discussed discursive construct can be summarized as the following antonymic pair:

turbanlı kadın "veiled woman" ≠ *çağdaş kadın* "modern woman"

This dichotomy occupies an important, perhaps central, place in Kemalist discourse, as the "civilizing project of the Kemalist revolution is constituted and culturally encoded in gendered terms" (Göle, 1996:14). Within this culturally encoded modernization project, the role of women is paramount, as "Kemalists claimed that civilization would change if women became visible, and the sexes interacted" (Ibid: 73). The cultural codes underpinning Kemalism are further illustrated in the following newspaper text.

4.3.5. Free Woman vs. Veiled Woman

The article *Özgür kadın* "Free Woman" by Bekir Coşkun, published on July 13, 2004, in *Hürriyet*, is structured around the aforementioned dichotomy between veiled women and modern women. The bold sections in the original text emphasize this stark opposition.

Özgür kadın...

GERİCİ, özgür kadını istemez.
Çünkü özgür kadın onun sonudur.
Özgür kadın kültür demektir.
Özgür kadın; sanat, resim, edebiyat, kitap, dergi, gazete, heykel, sinema, tiyatro, müzik demektir.

*

Özgür kadın; *akıl demektir...*
Öyle şeyh-meyh uçmaz...
Özgür kadın *dürüsttür.*
*Şeyh uçmadığı zaman zaten **'Hani uçmadı... Niye uçtu diyecek mişim?...'***
der özgür *kadın.*

*

Özgür kadın; *modern yaşamdır.*
Çatal-bıçak demektir.
Çağdaş kadın için; insanın karnında zikir edecek diye her gün bulgur
yenilmez.
Ne de sadece erkeğin canının istediği bir cuma gecesi sevişmenin kerameti
vardır.

*

Özgür kadın *temizdir.*
Öyle kirli çorapları, kokan ayakları, tıraşsız yüzü, gülyağından parfümü
olan erkeği sokmaz yatağına.

*

Özgür kadın *demokrasidir.*
Köle olmaz.
Mirasını ister, birey olarak tanınmak ister, söz hakkı ister, eşitlik ister.
Dayak yiyip, aşağılanıp, itilip-kakılmak istemez.

*

Özgür kadın *çağdaşlıktır.*
*Çünkü **özgür kadının** doğurup büyüttüğü çocuklar **gericiye** asla ümmet*
olmazlar.
*Ne dergahlara müşteri çıkar **özgür kadının** yetiştirdiği çocuklardan, ne*
tarikatlara mürit, ne de gericiye oy verecek saflar...

*

*Bu yüzden; **gerici özgür kadını sevmez**.*
*Kadın **özgür** olsun istemez.*
Ve onu örtmek, kapatmak, susturmak, bastırmak için çarşafa-türbana
sarmak ister.
*'**Türban'** diye tutturmaları bu yüzdendir.*
*Gericinin sonudur **özgür kadın**...*

A Free Woman...

A reactionary does not want a free woman.
Because a free woman is his end.
A free woman means culture.
A free woman means art, painting, literature, books, magazines, newspapers, sculpture, cinema, theater, and music.

<div align="center">*</div>

A free woman means intellect...
For her, there's no such thing as a sheikh being able to fly...
A free woman is honest.
When the sheikh doesn't fly, **a free woman** will simply say, "**See, he didn't fly... Why would I say he flew when he didn't**?"

<div align="center">*</div>

A free woman means modern life.
She means knives and forks on the table.
With a modern woman, it's not the case that bulgur is eaten every day just because, supposedly, it glorifies God in the stomach. And there is no such thing as making love only on Friday night because the man felt like it.

<div align="center">*</div>

A free woman is clean.
She won't let a man with dirty socks, smelly feet, an unshaven face, or rose oil perfume into her bed.

<div align="center">*</div>

A free woman means democracy.
She will not be a slave.
She demands her inheritance, wants to be recognized as an individual, demands the right to speak, demands equality.
She does not want to be beaten, humiliated, or pushed around.

<div align="center">*</div>

A free woman means modernity.
Because the children born and raised by a free woman will never become part of a **reactionary's** "ummah."
The children raised by a free woman will never become customers for dervish lodges, disciples of sects, or naive voters for reactionaries.

<div align="center">*</div>

For this reason, **a reactionary does not like a free woman**.
He does not want her to be **free**.

And to cover her, silence her, suppress her, he wants to wrap her in *çarşaf-türban*.
That's why they insist on the '***türban***'
A free woman is the reactionary's end.

The text confirms that the second member of the dichotomy, through which the concept of the modern woman is constructed, is not only women in *çarşaf* but also all other veiled women (*çarşafa-türbana sarmak ister* "he wants to wrap her in *çarşaf-türban*"). Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that "the logic of binary relations involves not only an absolute distinction with no points of contact between the characteristics of the members of the binary opposition, but also a hierarchy between the two constitutive elements belonging to the same level of distinction. The second element is excluded from the domain of value or at least becomes less valuable compared to the 'unique' one, which has the privilege to, thanks to its status, serve as a reference point in comparison." (Barat, 2010: 241) Which member of the dichotomy in the given text represents the reference point is already clear from the title itself, but also from the fact that the veiled woman is not even mentioned in the text but is represented as the negation of the values attributed to the modern woman. The structural opposition that elaborates the dichotomy between the modern and veiled woman in the given text can be represented as follows:

çağdaş kadın "**modern woman**"	*türbanlı kadın* "**woman in a *türban***"
özgür "free"	*köle* "slave"
akıllı "intelligent"	*akılsız* "unintelligent"
kültürlü "cultured"	*kültürsüz* "uncultured"
temiz "clean"	*kirli* "dirty"
söz hakkı var "has the right to speak"	*susturulmuş, bastırılmış* "silenced, suppressed"
tanınmış "respected"	*aşağılanmış* "humiliated"
eşit "equal"	*itilip kakılmış* "pushed around, oppressed"

4.3.6. "Women Who Cover Their Heads Like Scarecrows"

The dichotomy between the "woman in a *türban*/veiled woman" (*türbanlı kadın*) and the "modern woman" (*çağdaş kadın*) will be illustrated with another example. On March 8, 1998, the newspaper *Cumhuriyet* published an interview with Aydeniz Alisbah Tuskan, the president of the Turkish Association of Women Lawyers (*Türk Hukukçu Kadınlar Derneği*), under the headline *Türban kadın haklarını da örtüyor* "The *Türban* Also Covers/ Conceals Women's Rights". Before the interview itself, the following introduction is provided:

> *Bugün 8 Mart; Dünya Kadınlar Günü. Bugün Türkiye'nin, kadın açısından manzara-i umumiyesine bir bakın. Bir yandan dünyaya açık, dünyada olup bitenleri izleyen, her yaşta bilgi edinmeye ve öğrenmeye açık çağdaş kadınlar, bir yandan da umacı örneği başlarını örtüp sadece dinden, yobazlıktan medet uman zavallı kadınları... Erkeklerin elinde oyuncak olmuş, erkek egemenliğinin daha da pekiştirilmesine çalışan kadınlar. İkinci, üçüncü eş olmaya, onuncu sınıf vatandaş muamelesi görmeye razı kadınlar. Peki, bu kadınlar kendilerine onlarca yıl boyunca sağlanan haklarından, erkeklerle eşitlik mücadelesinden ödün vermeye neden razılar? Neden geri planda kalmayı kabullenmeye hazırlar? Neden, 2000 yılına iki kala kafalarının içini bağlayan örümcek ağlarını süpürmek istemezler? Neden solcu geçinen öğrenci kızlar, türban diye dayatan kara yobazlarla demokrasi adına işbirliği yaparlar? Neden bazı çağdaş görünümlü, ama akılları kısa kadınlarımız sırf modaya uymak için politik yobazlığın simgesi olan türbanı desteklerler? Bütün bu sorulara yanıtları, Türk Hukukçu Kadınlar Derneği Başkanı Avukat Aydeniz Alisbah Tuskan'la aradık.*

Today is March 8, International Women's Day. Just look at the general state of women in Turkey. On one side, we have modern women who are open to the world, who follow what is happening globally, and who want to learn and acquire knowledge at any stage of life. On the other side, we have pitiful women who cover their heads like scarecrows and rely solely on religion, on fanaticism... Women who have become playthings in the hands of men and strive to further solidify male hegemony. Women who are resigned to being the second or third wife and to being treated as tenth-class citizens. So why are these women willing to give up the rights secured for them over the decades and abandon the fight for equality with men? Why are they willing to remain in the background? Why don't they want to sweep away the cobwebs that constrain their minds? Why do young girls, who claim to be leftists, cooperate with dark fanatics who impose the *türban* in the name of democracy? Why do some of our women, who appear modern but are

of limited intellect, support the *türban* – the symbol of political fanaticism
– just to follow fashion? We sought answers to all these questions from
lawyer Aydeniz Alisbah Tuskan, president of the Turkish Association of
Women Lawyers.

Aforementioned dichotomy structures the text as follows:

çağdaş kadın "**modern woman**"	*türbanlı kadın* "**woman in a türban**"
dünyaya açık "open to the world"	*umacı örneği başlarını örten* "cover their heads like scarecrows"
dünyada olup bitenleri izleyen "follows what is happening globally"	*dinden, yobazlıktan medet uman* "relies solely on religion, on fanaticism"
her yaşta bilgi edinmeye, öğrenmeye açık "eager to learn and acquire knowledge at any stage of life"	*kafasının içini bağlayan örümcek ağlarını süpürmek istemez* "unwilling to sweep away the cobwebs that constrain her mind"

At this point, it is important to focus on the following question: how
can a text portray the veiled woman as the opposite of the modern
woman, who is "eager to learn and acquire knowledge at any stage of
life" (*her yaşta bilgi edinmeye, öğrenmeye açık*), even though these veiled
women are fighting precisely for the right to education? What enables
the production and consumption of such lexical relationships, which
reflect a classification of reality that contradicts factual evidence?

The answer lies in the fact that every text is grounded in a
sociocultural practice that enables the generation of ideologically
conditioned classifications of reality and their acceptance as "natural,
self-evident, or commonsensical" (Allan, 2004: 98). Through intertextual
analysis, textual *cues* can be uncovered that reveal the sociocultural
practices which construct and legitimize a preferred pattern of classifying
reality (Titscher et al., 2000: 148-150). Such cues can also be identified
in this text. Veiled women, deprived of the right to study and work in
public institutions, are portrayed as "pitiful women" (*zavallı kadınlar*).
However, this expression of pity does not reference the discrimination
these women face but rather the fact that they "cover themselves like
scarecrows" and "rely solely on religion and fanaticism" (***umacı*** *örneği
başlarını örtüp sadece dinden, yobazlıktan medet uman zavallı kadınlar*).

By simply accepting the role that, according to the Kemalist discourse, religion had assigned to them, veiled women have "become **playthings** in the hands of men" (*erkeklerin elinde de **oyuncak** olmuş*) and are "willing to accept being in the **background**" (***geri planda** kalmayı kabullenmeye hazırlar*). The emphasized lexical elements serve as cues indicating that the text is rooted in sociocultural practices reproduced in textbooks for the subject *Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılâp Tarihi* "Atatürk's Principles and the History of the Revolution". For instance, one such textbook states that "the Turkish woman before Islam did not walk around like a **scarecrow** but was **with men** in every field" (*İslamdan önceki Türk kadını umacı gibi dolaşmaz, her alanda erkeğin yanında olurdu*) (Mumcu, 1988: 168).

The subordination of veiled women to men is emphasized through the participle ending in -mIş (*erkeklerin elinde de oyuncak olmuş* "they have become a plaything in the hands of men"). This participial form transforms the sentence's predicate to express completion and resultativity (Čaušević, 2018: 198). The meaning of completion and resultativity correlates with the earlier statement that they "rely solely on religion and fanaticism" (*sadece dinden, yobazlıktan medet uman*). In Kemalist discourse, religion inherently implies the subordination of women.

On the other hand, the participial construction ending in -mIş also correlates with the participial construction ending in -An, forming a cause-effect relationship. This means that veiled women, having become a plaything in the hands of men, "strive to further solidify male hegemony" (*erkek egemenliğinin daha da pekiştirilmesine çalışan*), which ultimately leads to their being "resigned to being the second or third wife and to being treated as tenth-class citizens" (*ikinci, üçüncü eş olmaya, onuncu sınıf vatandaş muamelesi görmeye razı kadınlar*). Thus, in order to mask the fact that veiled women in Turkey were treated as second-class citizens – denied access to educational institutions because of their headscarves – Kemalist discourse re-produces the stereotype of female subordination in Islam, which allows men to "possess" more than one wife. These structural elements of the text can be represented as follows:

sadece dinden, yobazlıktan medet uman zavallı kadınlar
"pitiful women who rely solely on religion and fanaticism"
↓
erkeklerin elinde de oyuncak olmuş
"they have become a plaything in the hands of men"
↓
erkek egemenliğinin daha da pekiştirilmesine çalışan
"strive to further solidify male hegemony"
↓
ikinci, üçüncü eş olmaya, onuncu sınıf vatandaş muamelesi görmeye razı
"resigned to being the second or third wife and being treated
as tenth-class citizens"

This discourse culminates in the metaphorical portrayal of the headscarf as a "cobweb that constrains their minds" (*kafalarının içini bağlayan örümcek ağları*). This metaphorical description is derived from the idiomatic expression *örümcek kafalı* (literally, "someone whose head is full of cobwebs"), which denotes a person with archaic views who is hostile to anything new (Türkçe Sözlük TDK, 2005: 1550). Such a representation of the headscarf is rooted in the Kemalist discursive strategy that frames the display of religious symbols as a relic of the Middle Ages, preventing women from thinking independently and freeing themselves from male hegemony. Thus, in Kemalist discourse, the headscarf is not merely a piece of clothing that covers the "external part of the head" but rather a cobweb or marker of backwardness that "blocks/constrains **the inner part of the head – the mind**" (**kafalarının içini** bağlayan). In this discourse, veiled women are seen as solely responsible for their situation because they "do not want to clear (the) cobwebs" (*örümcek ağları süpürmek istemezler*).

4.3.7. The Language of Reversal: How Victims Become the Culprits

The following text, titled *Türban neyi örtüyor?* "What Does the *Türban* Cover?", was published in *Cumhuriyet* on May 14, 1999.:

Türban neyi örtüyor?

Siyasi İslam sokak, okul ve Meclis'te şimdilik türbanı kullanıyor. Demokratik haklar isteminin ardındaki niyeti anlamak için FP'den milletvekili seçilen Mervee Kavakçı örneğini iyi anlamak yeterli

Bertan Ağaoğlu: Fazilet Partisi'nden milletvekili seçilen Merve Kavakçı'nın 2 Mayıs Pazar günü yemin töreninin yapıldığı genel kurula türbanla girmesi sonrasında Türkiye gündemine 'türban' oturdu. DSP milletvekilleri alkışlarla Kavakçıyı 'Dışarı, dışarı' diye bağırarak protesto ederken FP'liler de karşı protestoya geçtiler. ANAP, DYP, MHP sıraları ise sessiz kaldı...

Gerçi, seçmenine 'Türban zulmüne son vereceğiz', 'Ürkekçe değil, erkekçe' vaatleriyle seslenen MHP'nin türbanlı milletvekili Nesrin Ünal başını açarak yemin etti. Ancak grup toplantılarına türbanıyla geldi, Anıtkabir'i türbanıyla ziyaret etti...

İşte, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası'nın değiştirilemez 'laiklik ilkesi' tartışmaları ve bağlı olarak yıllardır siyasetin gündemine oturtulan 'türban', merkez sağ partilerin bu 'tavırsızlık' tavrı nedeniyle TBMM'de kriz yaratacak noktaya geldi.

1950'de Demokrat Parti, kırsal kesimin ezilmiş ve dışlanmışlığına karşın 'dini kullanarak' ezici ve çoğunlukla iktidara geldi. 1960'ların ikinci yarısı, sol hareketlere karşı dinci ve gericilerin desteklendiği yıllar oldu. Üniversitelere başörtülü girme tartışmaları 1968'de İlahiyat Fakültesi'nin 'sıkmabaşlı' kız öğrencileri tarafından başlatıldı. İlahiyat Fakültesi ve Ankara Dil Tarih Coğrafya Fakültesi, başörtülü okula girme amacıyla boykot ve açlık grevlerine sahne oldu.

1980'e gelindiğinde generaller, 12 Eylül askeri darbesinin gerekçelerinden birini, 'şeriatçı güçlerin giderek güçlenmesi' olarak gösterdiler. Ancak 1980'li yıllar, din derslerinin zorunlu kılınması, imam-hatip liseleri ve Kuran kurslarının sayısının neredeyse patlamasıyla geçti.

Yine aynı yıllarda MEB'e bağlı okullara başörtüsüyle girmeyi yasaklayan yasalara karşın 'başörtüsü' ve 'türban' tartışmalarıyla geçti. Yasalar 'ek' maddelerle, kararnamelerle delinmeye, Anayasa Mahkemesi ve Danıştay'ın türbanı yasaklayan kararları değiştirilmeye çalışıldı.

Türkiye'de İslamcı hareketler güçlendiği yıllarda dünya da İslamcı siyasetleri, radikal İslamcı hareketleri tartışıyordu.

İran'da şahı deviren 1979 hareketi, İslamı kendisine bayrak edindi. Humeyni önderliğindeki mollalar, devrimi birlikte gerçekleştirdikleri

sol güçleri şiddetle ezerek dini esaslara dayalı bir devlet oluşturdu. İran devrimiyle birlikte yeni bir malzeme keşfedildi: 'Kadın'.

İran devriminin başarıya ulaşmasında en önemli etkenlerden biri olan kadın artık siyasal malzeme olarak sokaklardaydı. Kadınlar İran'da misyonlarını tamamlayıp evlerine döndüler. Ülkemizde de, kadının dini inancı ya da gelenekleri gereği kullandığı başörtüsü siyasal İslamcı hareketinin bayrağı, üniversiteler bu savaşımın alanı haline getirildi.

İslamcı erkekler 'yasalara aykırı olmayan' kıyafetleriyle üniversitelerde okur, bürokraside önemli yerlere gelebilirken inançlarının kapanmayı gerektirdiğini söyleyen kadınlar 'kamusal alanlarının dışında' kaldılar.

12 Eylül sonrasında giderek artan imam-hatip liselerinde, Kuran kurslarında örtünen kızlara, üniversite kapısına geldiklerinde başlarını açmaları 'buyuruldu'. TV'de yayımlanan bir tartışma programında bir öğrenci 'Başımı açtım, ama başörtüsü kafamda' sözleriyle yeni neslin nasıl bir ideoloji ile yetiştirildiğini gösteriyordu.

İslamın kendilerini 'özgürleştirdiğini' söyleyen kadınlar, üniversite kapısında, dini kuralların kendilerini eve kapatan yüzüyle karşılaştılar.

Başlarını kapatarak özgürleştiklerini iddia eden kadınlar, kamu alanına din ilkeleriyle girmeye çalıştılar. Ancak laik devlet ilkeleriyle karşı karşıya kalan kadınlar hâlâ kendilerini 'karanlığa' mahkûm ediyorlar.

What Does the *Türban* Cover?

Political Islam currently employs the *türban* in the streets, schools, and parliament. To understand the intention behind the demand for democratic rights, the example of Merve Kavakçı, elected as a Member of Parliament (MP) from the Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*, FP), provides sufficient insight.

Bertan Ağaoğlu: The issue of the "türban" came into the spotlight of Turkish public discourse after Merve Kavakçı, an MP elected from the Virtue Party, entered the parliamentary general assembly wearing a *türban* on Sunday, May 2, during the oath-taking ceremony. While MPs from the Democratic Left Party protested Kavakçı by clapping and shouting "Out, out!", members of the FP launched a counter-protest. The seats of the Motherland Party, the True Path Party, and the Nationalist Movement Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, MHP) remained silent...

Notably, Nesrin Ünal, an MHP MP who appealed to her voters with slogans like "We will end the oppression of the *türban*" and "Not timidly, but courageously," took off her headscarf to take the oath. However, she attended group meetings wearing her *türban* and visited Anıtkabir, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's mausoleum, with her head covered.

Precisely because of this stance by center-right parties - "having no stance" - debates about the "principle of secularism" enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, which cannot be amended, as well as

the related issue of the "*türban*," which has been in the spotlight of political attention for years, have reached a point where they are causing a crisis in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

In 1950, the Democrat Party came to power with overwhelming support, primarily by "using religion" to appeal to the rural population's sense of marginalization and oppression. The late 1960s were marked by years when Islamist and reactionary movements were supported to counter leftist movements. The debate over entering universities wearing headscarves was initiated in 1968 by veiled (*sıkmabaşlı*) female students from the Faculty of Theology. The Faculty of Theology and the Faculty of Language, History, and Geography in Ankara became sites of boycotts and hunger strikes to demand the right to wear headscarves at school.

By 1980, the generals cited the "growing strength of Islamist forces" as one of the justifications for the September 12 coup. However, the 1980s witnessed the mandatory introduction of religious education, a rapid increase in the number of imam-hatip schools, and a near-explosion in the establishment of Qur'an courses.

During the same years, despite laws prohibiting entry into schools under the Ministry of Education with headscarves, debates over "headscarves" and "türban" persisted. The laws were circumvented through "additional clauses" and decrees, while attempts were made to overturn Constitutional Court and Council of State decisions banning the *türban*.

While Islamist movements in Turkey gained strength, the world was also debating Islamist politics and radical Islamist movements.

In Iran, the 1979 revolution that overthrew the Shah adopted Islam as its banner. The mullahs, led by Khomeini, violently crushed the leftist forces with whom they had initially collaborated and established a state based on religious principles. With the Iranian Revolution, a new tool was discovered: women.

Women, who played a crucial role in the success of the Iranian Revolution, were now on the streets as political tools. Women completed their mission in Iran and returned home. Similarly, in Turkey, the headscarf, used by women for religious or traditional reasons, became the banner of the political Islamist movement, with universities transformed into battlegrounds for this struggle.

While Islamist men can attend universities and rise to prominent bureaucratic positions in attire that is "not against the law", women, who say their faith requires them to cover themselves, stayed 'outside the public sphere'.

For girls who had covered themselves in the growing number of imam-hatip schools and Qur'an courses after the September 12 coup, they were "ordered" to uncover their heads upon reaching the gates of the university. In a televised debate, one student demonstrated the ideology shaping the new generation by saying, "I took off my headscarf, but the scarf is still on my mind."

> Women who say that Islam 'liberates them' were confronted at the gates of the university with the face of religious rules that confine them to their homes.
>
> Women who claim that by wearing a headscarf they become free, attempted to enter the public sphere guided by religious principles. However, when confronted with the principles of a secular state, these women continued to condemn themselves to "darkness".

This text offers a reflection on the genesis and true nature of the issue of wearing a headscarf in Turkey from the perspective of Kemalist ideology. The title of the text, *Türban neyi örtüyor?* "What Does the *Türban* Cover?", contains a strong implication that the struggle for women's right to wear the headscarf conceals ulterior motives. Over time, this phrase from the title has become a cliché of Kemalist discourse, used to suggest that the conservative/religious segment of society, by displaying and exploiting religious symbols, hides its true nature – be it criminality, opposition to the secular constitutional order, or other motives depending on the context in which the cliché is deployed. To support the claim in the subtitle that political Islam uses the *türban* (head covering of women) for political purposes, the author outlines the genesis of the issue of women's head covering in Turkey.

At the beginning of the text, the author states that the *türban* "**came** into the spotlight of Turkish public discourse" (*Türkiye gündemine 'türban' oturdu*) **after** Merve Kavakçı, who was elected as a Member of Parliament in the 1999 general elections, attempted to take her parliamentary oath while wearing a headscarf, which was ultimately prevented from happening precisely because she was wearing a headscarf. The author later states that the *türban* **had**, in fact, **been** in the spotlight of political discourse **for years** and was related to "**debates about the 'principle of secularism'** enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, which cannot be amended" (*Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası'nın değiştirilemez 'laiklik ilkesi' tartışmaları ve bağlı olarak yıllardır siyasetin gündemine oturtulan 'türban'*). It remains unclear whether the *türban* had been in the spotlight of Turkish public discourse for years or if this only happened after Merve attempted to take the oath wearing a headscarf.

In an effort to mystify or relativize the discrimination against veiled women, Kemalist discourse employs various strategies. In the section

addressing the 1970s – a period when veiled female students were first barred from studying at Turkish universities due to their headscarves – this issue is related to debates about the constitutional principle of secularism, which are futile and illegitimate because, according to the Turkish Constitution, the principle of secularism "cannot be amended, nor can its amendment be proposed" (*değiştirilemez ve değiştirilmesi teklif edilemez*). The text further reveals that during those years, alongside the illegitimate debates on the principle of secularism, there were also "**debates over entering universities with headscarves**", initiated in 1968 by veiled female students of the Faculty of Theology" (***Üniversitelere başörtülü girme tartışmaları*** *1968'de İlahiyat Fakültesi'nin 'sıkmabaşlı' kız öğrencileri tarafından başlatıldı*). From this formulation, it follows that there was no discrimination against veiled female students at universities; rather, there were merely "debates over entering universities with headscarves". The use of nominalization in the phrase *girme tartışmaları* "debates over entering" obscures agency and conveys less information than a finite verb form (Billig, 2008). As a result, the reality in which veiled female students were victims of discrimination is abstracted and blurred. Who debated, about whose entry, and whether anyone entered universities with headscarves or simply sought to do so – all of these questions are obscured by nominalization. Agency, and consequently responsibility for initiating the very "debates" that were contrary to the constitutional principle of secularism, is attributed to the veiled female students (*kız öğrencileri tarafından başlatıldı*). The negative connotation of this act is implied in the preceding sentence, which states that during the years when these debates were initiated, "support was provided to proponents of theocracy and reactionaries" (*dinci ve gericilerin desteklendiği yıllar*).

In the paragraph discussing the 1980s, it is noted that "debates about the *türban*" persisted – rather than acknowledging discrimination against the *türban* – but this time the debates occurred "**despite** laws prohibiting entry into schools under the Ministry of Education with headscarves" (*MEB'e bağlı okullara başörtüsüyle girmeyi yasaklayan yasalara **karşın***). This suggests that in the 1970s, the debates were considered illegal because they contradicted the constitutional principle of secularism, whereas in the 1980s, they were against specific laws. The text provides no information on who passed these laws or when they were enacted because, evidently, the intention is to obscure this

reality, which is inconvenient: these laws were enacted by the Kemalist bureaucratic elite following the military coup of September 12, 1980. To mystify these circumstances, the author employs the strategy of *impersonalization*: the ACTOR of the process "to prohibit" is not individuals but rather the laws. In this way, it is the laws that prohibit veiled female students from entering schools and universities, not people. This strategy shifts the focus away from the identity and role of social actors, giving the statement an aura of impersonal authority (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 46-47). The linguistic tools used in this part of the text to mystify and relativize discrimination can be illustrated as follows:

		Concealed Process: **DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF THE HEADSCARF**	Concealed ACTOR: **KEMALIST ELITES**
KEMALIST DISCOURSE	1970s	*üniversitelere başörtülü* ***GİRME TARTIŞMALARI*** **"DEBATES OVER ENTERING** universities with headscarves"	***SIKMABAŞLI KIZ ÖĞRENCİLER*** *tarafından başlatıldı* "Initiated by **VEILED FEMALE STUDENTS"**
		DELEGITIMIZATION ***bağlı olarak: değiştirilemez*** *laiklik ilkesi tartışmaları* "**related to**: debates about the principle of secularism, **which cannot be amended"**	
	1980s	*başörtüsü ve türban* ***TARTIŞMALARI*** "**DEBATES** over headscarves and *türban*"	*okullara başörtüsüyle girmeyi yasaklayan* ***YASALAR*** "**LAWS** prohibiting entry into schools with headscarves"
		DELEGITIMIZATION *okullara başörtüsüyle girmeyi yasaklayan yasalara* ***KARŞIN*** "**DESPİTE** the laws prohibiting entry into schools with headscarves"	

In the final part of the text, a parallel is drawn between the position of women in Iran and the position of veiled women in Turkey. According to the author, women in Iran were exploited as a "tool" (*malzeme*) for the goals of the revolution, and after they had "completed their mission, they returned home" (*misyonlarını tamamlayıp evlerine döndüler*). This outcome occurred because "the mullahs, led by Khomeini, (...) established a state based on religious principles" (*Humeyni önderliğindeki mollalar (...) dini esaslara dayalı bir devlet oluşturdu*).

The similarity between the two countries, according to the author, lies in the fact that in Turkey as well, "the headscarf, used by women for religious or traditional reasons, became the banner of the political Islamist movement" (*Ülkemizde de, kadının dini inancı ya da gelenekleri gereği kullandığı başörtüsü siyasal İslamcı hareketinin bayrağı haline getirildi*). The key question remains: what happened to veiled women in Turkey, given that there was no Islamic revolution in Turkey to send them back home? The answer is as follows:

> *inançlarının kapanmayı gerektirdiğini söyleyen kadınlar 'kamu alanları dışında'* **kaldılar**.

> "women, who say their faith requires them to cover themselves, **stayed/remained** 'outside public sphere'"

This statement emphasizes the position of veiled women in Turkey as somewhat more favorable compared to women in Iran, who, according to the text, were forced to return home (*evlerine döndüler*). In Turkey, by contrast, veiled women merely "stayed/remained outside the public sphere", i.e., outside educational institutions and other public institutions. However, the discrimination against veiled women in Turkey is obscured and relativized through the use of the ambiguous material process *kalmak* "to stay/remain", which can express both intentional and unintentional actions. In this context, it is clearly an unintentional action, as veiled women wanted to study but were prevented from doing so. Thus, Kemalist discourse presents the situation of veiled women in Turkey in the following way:

ACTOR	CIRCUMSTANCE	PROCESS
Başörtülü kadınlar	*kamu alanları dışında*	*kaldılar.*
Veiled women	outside public sphere	**stayed/remained.**

The aim of this representational strategy is to obscure the following reality:

GOAL	ACTOR	CIRCUMSTANCE	PROCESS
Başörtülü kadınlar	*Kemalistler tarafından*	*kamu alanları dışına*	***atıldılar.***
Veiled women	by Kemalists	outside public sphere	**were expelled.**

This strategy, based on the metaphorical substitution of a transitive verb with an intransitive one (Fairclough, 2003: 149), shifts agency of Kemalist elites and, therefore, their responsibility for the discrimination against veiled women to the background. Furthermore, responsibility for this situation is redirected onto the women themselves. The syntactic tool used to achieve this is a participial phrase functioning as an attribute, which closely resembles a relative clause in English. This linguistic structure is one way of expressing a causal semantic field (Kovačević, 1988). Subordinating one element of the sentence to another through the use of a participle is a characteristic means of expressing a cause-effect relationship (Lakić, 2014: 65). This relationship can be represented as follows:

> *inançlarının kapanmayı gerektirdiğini **söyleyen** kadınlar 'kamu alanları dışında' kaldılar.*
> "women, **who say** their faith requires them to cover themselves, stayed/remained outside the public sphere."
> ↓
> *inançlarının kapanmayı gerektirdiğini **söyledikleri için** kadınlar 'kamu alanları dışında' kaldılar.*
> "women stayed/remained outside public sphere **because they say** their faith requires them to cover themselves."

This construct of female responsibility for their situation is further shaped by the converbial phrase in the first part of the sentence, which serves a *framing* function (Fairclough, 2003: 53): "While Islamist men can attend universities and rise to prominent bureaucratic positions in attire **that is 'not against the law'**" (*İslamcı erkekler **'yasalara aykırı olmayan'** kıyafetleriyle üniversitelerde okur, bürokraside önemli yerlere gelebilirken*). This construct can be paraphrased as follows: If Islamist

men can study in Turkey, veiled women could too – if they had not chosen to stay/remain outside the public sphere by refusing to wear attire that is "**not against the law**," as men do.

In the continuation of the text, it is stated that veiled girls, when they arrived at the gates of the university, were "ordered to uncover their heads" (*başlarını açmaları buyuruldu*). The use of the passive voice again avoids referencing the Kemalist elites who prohibited veiled girls from studying. To further push the issue of Kemalist agency and responsibility into the background, the focus then shifts to religion:

> *İslamın kendilerini "özgürleştirdiğini" söyleyen kadınlar, üniversite kapısında, dini kuralların kendilerini eve kapatan yüzüyle karşılaştılar.*

> "Women who say that Islam 'liberates them' were confronted at the gates of the university with the face of religious rules that confines them to their homes."

The ideologically motivated choice of linguistic tools allowed the author to discuss the discrimination against veiled female students – discrimination for which the Kemalist elites were responsible – without ever mentioning either the discrimination or the Kemalist elites. Toward the end of the text, the author does mention that – precisely because of this unspoken discrimination – women were confined to their homes. However, according to Kemalist discourse, the true culprit is religion. The process expressing this idea and its participants can be outlined as follows:

ACTOR	GOAL	CIRCUMSTANCE	PROCESS
Dini kurallar	*kadınları*	*eve*	*kapatır.*
Religious rules	women	to their homes	confine.

The responsibility of the women themselves for their situation is expressed through a participial phrase functioning as an attribute from the earlier sentence. This phrase parallels the participial phrase in the subsequent sentence:

*İslamın kendilerini "özgürleştirdiğini" **söyleyen** kadınlar*

"Women **who say** that Islam 'liberates them'"

*Başlarını kapatarak özgürleştiklerini **iddia eden** kadınlar*

"Women **who claim** that by wearing headscarf they become free"

In the first participial phrase, the verbal element is the neutral structuring verb *söylemek* "to say", whereas in the second instance, the expressive metapropositional verb *iddia etmek* "to claim" is used (Coulthard, 1994: 305-6). In the first sentence, it is stated that women "say that Islam liberates them," but they were confronted at the gates of the university with the reality that "religion confines them to their homes." This implies that what they say is contradictory to reality.

That conclusion is verbalized in the next sentence through the verb *iddia etmek* "to claim", which conveys something that is not factual but disputable and problematic (Machin, Mayr, 2012: 61). Under this disputable and problematic pretext, veiled women, it is further stated, "attempted to enter the public space with religious principles" (*kamu alanına din ilkeleriyle girmeye çalıştılar*), but there they "were confronted with the principles of the secular state" (*laik devlet ilkeleriyle karşı karşıya kalan kadınlar*). They forgot that, according to the Kemalist conception of secularism, "the boundary for expressing religion in Turkey is the skin of a citizen. Religion has no place in society, administration, or politics" (Atalay, 2018: 85). Because of that forgetfulness:

kadınlar hâlâ kendilerini "karanlığa" mahkûm ediyorlar.

"women continued to condemn themselves to 'darkness'."

The linguistic choices employed in this part of the text to mystify the agency and responsibility of Kemalist elites can be summarized as follows:

KEMALIST DISCOURSE		CONCEALED PROCESS AND ACTOR
Cause	Consequence	
inançlarının kapanmayı gerektirdiğini söyleyen kadınlar "women who say their faith requires them to cover themselves"	*kamu alanları dışında **KALDILAR*** **"STAYED / REMAINED** outside public sphere"	*Kemalistler tarafından kamu alanları dışına atıldılar.* "Veiled women were expelled outside the public sphere by Kemalists."
İslamın kendilerini özgürleştirdiğini söyleyen kadınlar "Women who say that Islam liberates them"	***DİNİ KURALLARIN** kendilerini **EVE KAPATAN** yüzüyle karşılaştılar* "were confronted with the face of **RELIGIOUS RULES** that **CONFINES THEM TO THE HOUSE**"	*Kemalistlerin uygulamaya koyduğu başörtü yasağı ile karşılaştılar* "They were confronted with the headscarf ban imposed by Kemalists"
Başlarını kapatarak özgürleştiklerini iddia eden kadınlar "Women who claim that by wearing headscarf, they become free"	*hâlâ **KENDİLERİNİ** karanlığa **MAHKÛM EDİYORLAR*** "continued to **CONDEMN THEMSELVES** to 'darkness'"	*KEMALİSTLER BAŞÖRTÜ YASAĞI İLE KADINLARI EVE MAHKÛM EDİYORLAR* "KEMALISTS CONDEMN WOMEN TO THE HOUSE BY THE HEADSCARF BAN"

By employing such manipulative language, the goal defined by Fowler and his colleagues is achieved as follows: "Thus, someone who has something done to him by another can be made responsible for their own suffering" (Fowler et al., 1979: 41).

4.3.8. Apparent Solidarity with Women from "Their Territories"

The following newspaper article was published in *Radikal* on October 19, 1998:

Başörtüsü neyi örtüyor?

Perihan Mağden: Yalnızca Pazartesi Dergisi için ayda bir kez yazı yazdığım günlerdi. Kitap Fuarı'ndaki Pazartesi stadında türbanlı kızlar yanıma gelip yazılarımı ne kadar beğendiklerini, sevdiklerini söylüyor, bir-ikisi benimle fotoğraf çektiriyor, gidiyorlardı. Işıl ışıl kızlardı. Yazdıklarımın onlara uyacak hiçbir yanının olmaması gerekirdi. İşte yazdıklarımda onlara dair, akıllarından geçenlere dair şeyler buluyorlardı. Her şeyden önce onlar benim hemcinsimdi. Dışarıda hoyrat ve acımasız bir erkekler imparatorluğu hüküm sürmekteydi. Özellikle onların yaşadıkları topraklarda. Okuyabilmeleri için, evden çıkabilmeleri için, varolmaları için başörtüsü takmak zorunda olanları vardı. Onlara zorla dayatılan kuralları, sonra gönüllü olarak benimseyenleri, sahiplenenleri vardı. Türban takan, çarşaf giyen benim yanıma asla gelmeyen ve gelmeyecek olan, benim gibi zındıkları parça parça doğramak gerektiğine inanları da muhakkak vardı. Ben onları görmüyordum, görmek de istemiyordum. Beni gözleri ışıl ışıl bu kızlar ilgilendiriyordu. Ben, bu kızlar üniversite kapılarında yalnızca başları örtülü oldukları için itilip kakıldıklarında, gözyaşlarımı tutamıyordum.

'Vay biz ONLARA şu, bu haklarını diyelim tanıdık, peki onlar bize şu şu şu haklarımızı tanıyacaklar mı?' tartışması burkula burkula uzuyor.

Şimdi bu insanların demokratik haklar ve hukuk mücadelesi için değil, Kuran'ın kuralları için mücadele verdikleri ortada. Ama Fazilet tabanı olsun, başörtüsü takanlar olsun, başörtüsünün yasaklanması hukuka aykırıdır diyenler olsun homojen bir bütün değil. O nedenle de kimin neyi, ne amaçla söylediğini iyice kavramadan, ağzımızdan köpükler saçarak faşist söylemlere dalmamızda fayda var.

Benim için başörtüsü takan kadınların çalışmaması, okumaması gerçek bir adaletsizlik örneği. Zira aynı düşünceleri paylaşan erkekler için, böyle bir ayrımcılığın kurbanı olmak söz konusu değil. Geçenlerde sohbet ettiğim başörtülü çok değerli hukukçu bir hanım: 'Onlara anlatmak isterdim' diyordu, 'okumalarının, çalışmalarının çok daha mühim olduğunu anlatmak isterdim.' Benim şahsi penceremden, başörtüsü bir kadın meselesi. Beni yalnızca kadınların okuyabilmeleri, çalışabilmeleri, hayatın içinde yer alabilmeleri ilgilendiriyor. Ama aldığımız şu kavşakta, bunun tam anlamıyla herkes tarafından 'kullanılmaya' müsait mümbit ve o derece de belalı bir toprağa dönüştüğü ortada.

Önce Ege Üniversitesi'nde, sonra Teknik Üniversite'nin Ayazağa Kampüsü'nde beter olaylar yaşandı. Kafaları yarılmış öğrenciler, hastaneye götürülmek üzere bir minibüse doldurulurken, bir televizyon muhabiri sordu: 'Kim yaptı size bunları?'

'Özgürlük havarisi kesilenler.'
'Peki neden yaptılar?'
'Özgürlüklere katlanamadıkları için.'

Sen başörtüsü hakkın için yürüyüşler düzenleyeceksin, afişinle, pankartınla politik bir harekete dönüştüreceksin, 'Başörtüsü ve İnsan Hakları' diye paneller vs. (ki dincilerin insan hakları adına verdikleri hiçbir mücadeleye şahit olmuşluğumuz yoktur); sonra da birileri kalkıp başörtüsünü sorgularsa, bu kadar gündemde bir konu üstüne karşıt fikirler beyan ederse, broşür basıp masa açarsa, demir çubuklarla onların üstlerine yürüyeceksin. Üç genç ölümle yaşam arasında gidip geliyor şimdi. Türban meselesi, büyük bir maharetle buralara kadar tırmandırıldı. Ve her zaman olduğu gibi kabak gençlerin başına patlıyor. Her zaman okkanın altına giden gençler, her zaman hakları kısıtlananlar kadınlar. Her zaman.

Sonra, bir türlü kurtulamadığımız o iğrenç görüntüler: Polis görüntüleri. Olaylar yaşandıktan sonra (ilk gün olan bitenler medyadan gizlenmiş), SİP'li gençler, ertesi gün bir protesto gösterisi düzenliyorlar okullarında. Vay sen misin okulunda gösteri düzenleyen! Polisimiz her zamanki kuşulsuz nefretiyle, hıncıyla iş başında. Kaçmaya çalışan çocuklardan birine silahı dayıyorlar. Defalarca ekranda izliyoruz: Çocuğa silahını doğrultup peşinden, silahı çocuğu nişan alarak koşan polisi.

Türkiye'ye musallat olduğu yıllar boyunca en çok 'imam hatip lisesini açmakla övünen' demirbaş Cumhurbaşkanımız Süleyman Demirel, başkanlık tartışmalarına filan ara verip, düşük bir profil izleyerek, sahnenin kanatlarında gizlenmekte bugünlerde. Kendisi dünyanın en büyük zamanlama ustası olup, hangi zamanlarda insanların gözüne gözükmemesi gerektiğini mükemmelen bilir. Dinciliğin bugün geldiği noktada, bu 'ideolojinin' kimlere karşı kullanılmak üzere, kimler tarafından beslenip, semirildiğini hatırlamakta fayda var. Ve tabii bu itiş kakış esnasında kadınların haklarından taviz vermemekte. Burda, artık sorumluluk başörtülü kızlarımıza da düşüyor. Hangisi daha önemli: Okuyup hayatın içinde yerlerini almaları mı, birer piyon olarak kullanılıp yine evlere, kafeslere tıkılmaları mı?

What Does the Headscarf Cover?

Perihan Mağden – It was during those days when I was writing exclusively for the magazine *Pazartesi*. While I was at the *Pazartesi* booth at a book fair, girls wearing turbans would approach me, tell me how much they liked my writings and how much they enjoyed reading them. Some would even take pictures with me before leaving. The girls were radiant. My writings had nothing that should have resonated with them. Yet, they found in my texts something about themselves, about what was going through their minds. Above all, we were of the same gender. Outside, the brazen and ruthless male empire prevailed. Especially in the territories where they lived. Among them were those who had to cover themselves to be able to study, to step outside their homes, to simply exist. There were also those

who later voluntarily embraced and began defending rules that had been forcibly imposed on them. Surely, there were also those who wore *türban* or dressed in *çarşaf*, who never approached me and never would, who believed that unbelievers like me should be cut into pieces. I didn't see them, nor did I want to see them. I was interested in the girls with radiant eyes. When these girls were harassed at university gates just because they were covered, I couldn't hold back my tears.

The sorrowful debate continues along the lines of: "Let's say we grant THEM these rights; will THEY grant us such and such rights?"
Now, it is quite clear that these people are not fighting for democratic rights or rights in general but rather for Qur'anic regulations. Yet this is not a homogeneous group - whether we're talking about the voter base of the Virtue Party, veiled women, or those who say that the headscarf ban is against the law. That's why it would be better not to resort to fascist rhetoric, foaming at the mouth, before understanding who is saying what and why.

For me, it is a real example of injustice that women who wear the headscarf do not work or study because men who share the same mindset do not face such discrimination. A highly respected veiled lawyer I recently spoke with said: "I would like to explain to them that it is much more important to study and work." From my perspective, the headscarf is a women's issue. I am only interested in women being able to study, work, and take their rightful place in life. But it is clear that, at the crossroads where we find ourselves, this has become fertile yet equally painful ground for everyone to 'use.'

First, dreadful events took place at Ege University, and later on the Ayazaga campus of the Technical University. As students with head injuries were being loaded into minibuses to be taken to the hospital, a TV reporter asked: "Who did this to you?"

"Those who present themselves as freedom fighters."

"And why did they do it?"

"Because they can't tolerate freedom?"

You will first organize protest marches for your right to wear the headscarf, turning it into a political movement with your posters and banners, then come to the panels such as 'The Headscarf and Human Rights' (though we have never witnessed advocates of theocracy fighting for human rights). And when someone starts questioning the headscarf, expressing a dissenting opinion on this much-debated issue, printing brochures and setting up booths, you will attack them with metal rods. Now, three young men are fighting for their lives. The issue of the *türban* has been skillfully escalated. And as always, it is the youth who bear the brunt. Young people are always the ones who pay the price, women are always the ones whose rights are restricted. Always.

Then come those revolting scenes we can never seem to rid ourselves of: scenes involving the police. The day after these events (the case was

kept from the public on the first day), young members of the Socialist Power Party organized protests at their schools. And you're the one who found yourself organizing protests! Our police sprang into action, showing their unprovoked hatred in full force. A policeman points a gun at a boy who tries to run away. The scene is shown repeatedly on television: a police officer pointing a gun at a child and chasing him, keeping him in his sights. President Süleyman Demirel, our permanent fixture, who boasts about having opened the most schools for imams and hatips during the years he hung over Turkey's neck, has briefly paused discussions about the presidential system and retreated from the spotlight. He's a master of timing, knowing exactly when not to show his face. Given the current extent of the advocacy for theocracy, it's useful to remember who nurtures and fattens this "ideology" and against whom they intend to wield it. And, of course, amidst this scuffle, women's rights are entirely disregarded. The responsibility here also lies with our veiled girls. What is more important: studying and claiming your place in life, or being used as pawns and forced back into homes and behind bars once again?

The author of this text also employs the previously mentioned cliché in the title, *Başörtüsü neyi örtüyor?* "What Does the Headscarf Cover?", which carries a strong implication that some ideological motive lies hidden behind the struggle for the right of veiled female students to study. Unlike previous articles, the author here expresses sympathy and solidarity with the veiled female students for what they endured at university gates:

> *Ben, bu kızlar üniversite kapılarında yalnızca başları örtülü oldukları için itilip kakıldıklarında, gözyaşlarımı tutamıyordum.*

> "When these girls were harassed at university gates solely because they were wearing headscarves, I couldn't hold back my tears."

Although this sentence explicitly conveys sympathy for the veiled female students, a more careful analysis reveals strategies of negative portrayal, indicating that this sympathy and solidarity are merely declarative. The most prominent linguistic tool used to portray the veiled students negatively is pronouns, one of the most common linguistic devices for ideological polarization through the opposition of *Us* versus *Them* (van Dijk, 2006a). Even though the author expresses sympathy toward the veiled students, she positions and constructs them

as the Other, as members of a foreign and antagonistic collective. After noting that the common ground between her and the veiled students is that they share the same gender, in an environment dominated by "a brazen and ruthless male empire" (*hoyrat ve acımasız bir erkekler imparatorluğu*), the author adds...

> *Özellikle **onların** yaşadıkları topraklarda.*

> "Especially in the territories where **they** lived."

The ideological polarization, conveyed through the pronoun "they" (*onlar*), is emphasized by a highly stylistic technique of segmentation, where the phrase is isolated from the structure of the preceding sentence (Bakšić, 2004). Additionally, the distance and irreconcilability between the two polarized groups are expressed through the noun *toprak* "territory, land" in the plural form, which can be interpreted as a realization of the conceptual metaphor IDEOLOGICAL DISTANCE IS SPATIAL DISTANCE. Thus, although these groups live in the same country, they inhabit different "territories" – i.e. they do not share the same living space, let alone the same ideas.

The author then describes the situation in "the territories where they live." From her perspective, there are three groups of women living there:

1. *Okuyabilmeleri için, evden çıkabilmeleri için, varolmaları için başörtüsü takmak zorunda olanları vardı.*

   "Among them were those who had to cover themselves to be able to study, to step outside their homes, to simply exist."

The first group consists of women who had to cover themselves not only to leave their homes and study but to even remain alive – to simply exist.

2. *Onlara zorla dayatılan kuralları, sonra gönüllü olarak benimseyenleri, sahiplenenleri vardı.*

   "There were also those who later voluntarily embraced and began defending rules that had been forcibly imposed on them."

Although the second group of women "later voluntarily embraced the rules," including wearing a headscarf, the first part of the sentence emphasizes that these rules were initially "forcibly imposed." The verb *dayatmak* "to impose" inherently contains the semantic component *zorla* "by force" as it means "**to compel** someone to accept something" (*bir şeyi* ***zorla*** *kabul ettirmek*). Therefore, the expression *zorla dayatılan* "forcibly imposed" is a pleonasm that functions to underscore the negative aspects of "theirs," in line with Van Dijk's concept of the "ideological square" (2006b: 356–356).

> 3. *Türban takan, çarşaf giyen benim yanıma asla gelmeyen ve gelmeyecek olan, benim gibi zındıkları parça parça doğramak gerektiğine inananları da, muhakkak, vardı.*
>
> Surely, there were also those who wore *türban* or dressed in *çarşaf*, who never approached me and never would, who believed that unbelievers like me should be cut into pieces.

The depiction of these three groups of "their" women represents an example of textual gradation culminating in a climax (Katnić-Bakaršić, 1996). The first group consists of women who had to cover themselves not just to study but to simply stay alive. The second group comprises women who not only accepted the imposed covering but also began defending it. The third group includes women who would not only force others to cover themselves but also believe that unbelievers should be cut into small pieces.

From this gradational series, it can be inferred that the key difference between "our" women and "their" women is that "in the territories where they live," there are no free women capable of independently deciding how to live and which rules to follow. In "their territories" women are subordinate, humiliated, restricted, and sometimes fanatical — assumptions that remain unquestioned. It is therefore not surprising that "the sorrowful debate continues along the lines of: 'Let's say we grant **THEM** these rights, will **they** grant **us** such and such rights?'" (*Vay biz **ONLARA** şu bu haklarını diyelim tanıdık, peki* ***onlar*** *bize şu şu hakları**mızı** tanıyacaklar mı? tartışması burkula burkula uzuyor*). Thus, not only do *We* and *They* exist, but there are also *Our* and *Their* rights. Such debates demonstrate that "our" actual denial of "their" rights is justified by "their" hypothetical denial of "our" rights.

Aware of how incoherent this line of reasoning is, the author creates an illusion of distancing herself from such discussions - a frequent strategy of manipulation in discriminatory discourses (van Dijk, 2008: 48). This illusion of distancing is realized through two linguistic devices. First, the pronoun "them" (*onlara*) is written in uppercase, as if to emphasize that the debate is rooted in ideological polarization and the portrayal of "them" as the Other, even though the author herself resorts to and deepens this polarization. Second, the adverb *burkula burkula*, derived from the verb *burkulmak* "*to be sad, to feel sorrow*" through the manner converb ending –(y)A, is used alongside the verb *uzamak* "to continue, to drag on". Since the subject of the converb in –(y)A must be co-referential with the subject of the main clause, except when expressing inalienable possession (e.g., *içimiz burkuldu* "we were saddened") (Čaušević, 2018: 283), it is unclear who is saddened by this debate. Nevertheless, this adverb qualifies the process of *uzamak* "to continue, to last long" as negative. After creating the illusion of distancing herself from these "sorrowful" debates, the author once again employs arguments aligned with "her" side:

> *Şimdi bu insanların demokratik haklar ve hukuk mücadelesi için değil, Kuran'ın kuralları için mücadele verdikleri ortada.*

> Now, it is quite clear that these people are not fighting for democratic rights or rights in general, but for the rules of the Qur'an.

This categorical statement confirms that the author does not question the premise regarding the ideological background of the demand for the right of veiled female students to education. Despite her apparent expression of sympathy and solidarity with these students and her distancing from the "sorrowful" debates about "our" and "their" rights, the author adheres to the fundamental premises of Kemalist discourse regarding the wearing of a headscarf:

a) Wearing a headscarf is forcibly imposed on women.
b) The struggle for the right to study by veiled female students is merely a façade concealing the fight to impose a religious order.

Starting from these ideological positions, the author is unable to view the struggle of veiled women for their rights in the broader context of

women's struggles for rights in general. Although she demonstrates apparent solidarity with them, she perceives them as part of an antagonistic collective:

> *Benim için başörtüsü takan kadınların çalışmaması, okumaması gerçek bir adaletsizlik örneği. Zira aynı düşünceleri paylaşan erkekler için, böyle bir ayrımcılığın kurbanı olmak söz konusu değil.*

> For me, it is a real example of injustice that women who wear the headscarf do not work or study. Because men who share the same mindset do not face such discrimination.

For the author, the injustice is not that veiled women cannot work or study while women who do not wear a headscarf can, but rather that veiled women cannot work or study while men of the same mindset can. In other words, the injustice against veiled women would be resolved if men of similar views were also prohibited from studying and working - since they live in the same "territories," the same rules should apply to them. On the other hand, the factual discrimination against veiled female students is obscured by the use of the verbal noun ending in -mA, which typically conveys the sense of a potential or hypothetical action, stripped of factuality. The manipulative nature of this usage becomes evident when contrasted with the use of the verbal noun ending in -DIk in a sentence discussing the ideological background of the struggle for the right of veiled female students to study. Unlike -mA, -DIk carries a temporal marker and expresses a concrete verbal action (Čaušević, 2018: 84):

Verbal noun ending in -DIk	Verbal noun ending in -mA
...bu insanların Kuran'ın kuralları için **MÜCADELE VERDİKLERİ**	*başörtüsü takan kadınların* **ÇALIŞMAMASI, OKUMAMASI**
"these people **ARE FİGHTİNG** for the rules of the Qur'an"	„that women who wear the headscarf **DO NOT WORK OR STUDY**"
Function: Emphasizes concreteness and factuality of "their" negative action	Function: Softens and obscures concreteness and factuality of "our" negative action

In the first part of the text, discrimination against veiled female students is mystified and legitimized by reproducing ideological polarization rooted in unquestioned premises about the motives of the antagonistic side. This ideologically marked position is further legitimized in the continuation of the text in two ways: a) By citing a "relevant" source, b) By highlighting a negative act of the antagonistic side, used synecdochically to represent the entire group.

a) To validate her views, the author refers to a "highly respected veiled lawyer" *(başörtülü çok değerli hukukçu)*. Her legitimacy stems from the fact that she is associated with the domain of law – a fundamental measure of legality and the foundation of social order. Furthermore, being "veiled" means that she belongs to "their" group, which should make her viewpoint easier for the opposing side to accept:

Geçenlerde sohbet ettiğim başörtülü çok değerli hukukçu bir hanım: 'Onlara anlatmak isterdim,' diyordu, 'okumalarının, çalışmalarının çok daha mühim olduğunu anlatmak isterdim.'

A highly respected veiled lawyer I recently spoke with said: 'I would like to explain to them that it is much more important to study and work; I would like to explain that to them.

Two noteworthy aspects of expression are observed in this quoted part attributed to the veiled lawyer: She repeats "I would like to explain to them" (*onlara anlatmak isterdim*) twice. This strategy embodies the conceptual metaphor MORE FORM IS MORE CONTENT (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003: 92), which emphasizes the difficulty in reaching the minds of the veiled students living in "their territories," where wearing a headscarf has been imposed upon them. The comparison made using the adjective "much more important" (*çok daha mühim*) is ambiguous, as it lacks an explicit point of comparison. This omission conceals "our" negative characteristic, namely the fact that due to the ban on wearing a headscarf at universities, veiled students are forced to choose between their religious beliefs and the opportunity to study and work.

b) Following the citation of a "relevant" source, the author employs another manipulative device commonly found in discriminatory discourses: generalization. This strategy involves portraying the opposing side negatively by highlighting a specific example of "their" behavior, whose negative characteristics are synecdochically extended from the part to the whole (Richardson, 2007: 170). The author describes incidents at two universities where students protesting the headscarf ban allegedly attacked other students who had printed brochures opposing wearing a headscarf at universities, severely injuring three individuals. The ideological polarization, previously constructed through the opposition *We – They*, is now reframed as *We – You*.

Sen başörtüsü hakkın için yürüyüşler düzenleyeceksin, afişinle, pankartınla politik bir harekete dönüştüreceksin, 'Başörtüsü ve İnsan Hakları' diye paneller vs. (ki dincilerin insan hakları adına verdikleri hiçbir mücadeleye şahit olmuşluğumuz yoktur); sonra da birileri kalkıp başörtüsünü sorgularsa, bu kadar gündemde bir konu üstüne karşıt fikirler beyan ederse, broşür basıp açarsa, demir çubuklarla onların üstlerine yürüyeceksin.

You will first organize protest marches for **your** right to wear the headscarf, turning it into a political movement with **your** posters and banners, then come the panels such as 'The Headscarf and Human Rights' (though **we** have never witnessed advocates of theocracy fighting for human rights). And when someone starts questioning the headscarf, expressing a dissenting opinion on this much-debated issue, printing brochures and setting up booths, **you** will attack them with metal rods.

The use of the emphatic and informal second-person pronoun *sen* "you" serves to highlight the immediacy of the situational context, expressing the author's frustration and anger toward the actions of the opposing side. Unlike the discrimination against veiled students, which is presented abstractly and generically, the situation where "the other side" engages in a negative act – physically attacking people with opposing views – is depicted concretely and in detail. The next step after portraying the antagonistic side through the negative action of one segment (which is

synecdochically transferred to the whole) is to use this negative action as a justification for discrimination, thus legitimizing a state order based on social inequality. Following the description of the incident where students advocating for the abolition of the headscarf ban allegedly attacked students opposing it, inflicting serious injuries on three individuals, the text concludes with:

> *Ve her zaman olduğu gibi kabak gençlerin başına patlıyor. Her zaman okkanın altına giden gençler, her zaman hakları kısıtlananlar kadınlar. Her zaman.*

> And as always, it is the youth who bear the brunt. Young people are always the ones who pay the price, women are always the ones whose rights are restricted. Always.

In a different context, the sentence *her zaman hakları kısıtlananlar kadınlar* "women are always the ones whose rights are restricted" might have expressed genuine solidarity with female students subjected to discrimination. However, here it functions as a manipulative strategy of apparent solidarity, aiming to obscure and relativize the actual cause of discrimination: the denial of rights to veiled female students did not result from a few students injuring others but was imposed by Kemalist elites who built and maintained their hegemony by (re)producing fear of reactionary forces. Just as textbooks on *Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılâp Tarihi* "Atatürk's Principles and History of the Revolution" use the story of Kubilay to legitimize totalitarian rule and the one-party system esta-blished after the founding of the Turkish Republic, the author here uses this single incident to rekindle fear of reactionaries and thus justify discrimination against veiled female students.

The use of the first-person plural possessive suffix in the following part of the text similarly serves the function of expressing apparent solidarity:

> *Burda, artık sorumluluk başörtülü **kızlarımıza** da düşüyor. Hangisi daha önemli: Okuyup hayatın içinde yerlerini almaları mı, birer piyon olarak kullanılıp yine evlere, kafeslere tıkılmaları mı?*

> The responsibility here also lies with **our** veiled **girls**. What is more important: studying and claiming your place in life, or

being used as pawns and forced back into homes and behind bars once again?

Although the author uses the possessive suffix for the first-person plural (*başörtülü kızlarımıza* "our veiled girls") to emphasize solidarity and a sense of shared identity, she simultaneously employs one of the fundamental discursive strategies in Kemalist discourse for representing veiled women: deagentification. According to this strategy, only women who do not wear a headscarf are portrayed as actors who actively "study and take their place in life" (*okuyup hayatın içinde yerlerini almaları*), while veiled women are stripped of agency. Veiled women are not autonomous subjects who act of their own volition but rather "used as pawns" (*birer piyon olarak kullanılıp*). The only way for them to achieve freedom and shift from being passive objects (patient) to active subjects (agent) is by uncovering their heads, studying, and thereby earning their rightful place in society.

The final sentence of the text once again confirms that Kemalist discourse leaves no room for alternatives: either women uncover their heads to study and work, or they are confined to homes and behind bars (*kafesler*) – a metaphor alluding to the Ottoman period and Islamic order. This framing suggests that the practice of wearing a headscarf leads backward, returning society to the "dark medieval times." However, contemporary Turkish society has demonstrated that an alternative does exist. Today, veiled women can study, become university professors, mayors, and ministers, all without forcing uncovered women to cover themselves. There is no longer a fear that anyone will compel others to cover themselves – a fear that Kemalism built its hegemony upon and sustained itself with.

CONCLUSION

This book, whose theoretical-analytical framework is based on Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), confirms the legitimacy and importance of integrating linguistics into interdisciplinary social research. The developmental trajectory of CDA presented in this book originates from Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL), which centers on the dialectical relationship between the linguistic and social systems, as well as the active role language plays in constructing our experiences and perceptions of the world. This active role of language manifests itself through the selection of one linguistic form from a set of potential linguistic forms, with that choice being conditioned by the social context. On these theoretical foundations, SFL later evolved into Critical Linguistics, whose research confirmed that the choice of linguistic forms - reflecting social processes and structures - contributes to the affirmation and consolidation of those processes and structures. The key contribution of critical linguistics lies in the conclusion that the choice of linguistic forms is principled and systematic. This systematicity is primarily reflected in the classification of processes and participants, as well as in the representation of agency and interaction.

Moreover, CDA is inspired by the emancipatory spirit of post-structuralist critique, rooted in the criticism of binary oppositions that generate numerous false or rigidly fixed hierarchical relationships. Built upon such theoretical foundations, CDA is defined as "the analytical study of discourse, primarily investigating how the abuse of social power and inequality are realized and reproduced in text and speech, but also how they are challenged in social and political contexts. Through such *dissident research*, the critical discourse analyst adopts an explicit stance,

seeking to understand, expose, and ultimately oppose social injustice." (Van Dijk, 2015: 466) The social injustice that motivated this research is the discrimination against veiled female students, which was prevalent in the Republic of Turkey during the second half of the 20th and early 21st centuries. Although the official ban was lifted in 2013, the ideology that produced and legitimized this discrimination remains alive.

The root cause of the aforementioned social injustice lies in the concept of modernism, which was shaped and imposed in the Republic of Turkey by political and intellectual elites led by Mustafa Kemal, the founder of the republic. According to this concept, modernization meant striving to reach the "level of contemporary civilization" (*muâsır medeniyet seviyesi*), often manifesting as blind imitation of Western civilization. This mimetic character of Turkey's modernization project resulted in modernization being equated with Westernization. One consequence of this was the adoption of European prejudices against Islam (Sayyid, 1997: 68-69; Cronin, 2014: 2-3).

The most significant prejudice – or construct of Orientalist discourse – that heavily shaped Kemalist discourse is the ontological scheme which views Islam, as a fundamental feature of the Orient, as inherently backward and therefore an obstacle to progress (Richardson, 2004: 5-6). In this discourse, criticism of the practice of wearing a headscarf held a prominent position, based on the premise that the entire society suffered devastating consequences from women being covered and excluded from public life, which was seen as the primary reason for the backwardness of the Muslim world (Cronin, 2014: 2-3). This antagonistic stance toward Islam in Turkey led to a rigid secular regime in which religion was permitted only within the confines of the mosque and an individual's conscience (Turan, 2015: 271; Tanör, 1999: 191).

Although the Kemalist regime implemented a series of radical reforms in its early period to neutralize the presence and influence of religion in public life, it did not initially enact a nationwide legal ban on covering. Instead, it sought to regulate this aspect of social life through local authorities, primarily targeting the practice of wearing the *çarşaf* and the face veil. It was only in the second half of the 20th century, when there was a noticeable increase in the number of veiled female students at universities in Turkey, that the authorities introduced a ban on wearing a headscarf at universities and other public institutions. To relativize and legitimize the discrimination against veiled female students, the

Kemalist discourse found in the analyzed daily newspapers (*Cumhuriyet, Hürriyet, Radikal, Sabah*) employed the following strategies of linguistic manipulation:

I) Dehumanization of social actors, carried out in three ways**:**

- In some news articles reporting on protests against the ban on wearing a headscarf, veiled female students, who are both victims of discrimination at universities and organizers of protests, are not mentioned directly. Instead, they are omitted and thus dehumanized. As Erzsébet Barát (2010: 233) states, such "silence is very telling".

- In certain news texts, veiled female students are represented through the metonymy PART OF CLOTHING FOR PERSON, realized through the noun *türban*. Examples include *Türban sokağa döküldü* "The *türban* took to the streets" and *Erzurum'da türban ile çağdaş Türk kadını böyle karşı karşıya geldi.* "This is how the *türban* found itself against the modern Turkish woman in Erzurum." These examples are part of an impersonalization strategy (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 46), in which social actors are ideologically interpreted and dehumanized by highlighting a single characteristic – in this case, an article of clothing – while ignoring and concealing their other, essential identity: that they are individuals denied the right to education.

- Veiled female students are further dehumanized by being presented as the negative pole in the dichotomy between *türbanlı kadın* "woman wearing *türban*" and *çağdaş kadın* "modern woman". This dichotomy is manifested in various ways throughout the analyzed corpus.

çağdaş kadın "modern woman"	*türbanlı kadın* "woman in a türban"
özgür "free	*köle* "slave"
akıllı "intelligent"	*akılsız* "unintelligent"
kültürlü "cultured"	*kültürsüz* "uncultured"
temiz "clean"	*kirli* "dirty"
söz hakkı var "has the right to speak"	*susturulmuş, bastırılmış* "silenced, suppressed"
tanınmış "respected"	*aşağılanmış* "humiliated"
eşit "equal"	*itilip kakılmış* "pushed around, oppressed"
dünyaya açık "open to the world"	*umacı örneği başlarını örten* "covers herself like scarecrows"
dünyada olup bitenleri izleyen "follows what is happening globally"	*dinden, yobazlıktan medet uman* "relies solely on religion, on fanaticism"
her yaşta bilgi edinmeye, öğrenmeye açık "eager to learn and acquire knowledge at any stage of life"	*kafasının içini bağlayan örümcek ağlarını süpürmek istemez* "unwilling to sweep away the cobwebs that constrain her mind"

II) Delegitimization of social actors, carried out as follows**:**

- Delegitimization of veiled female students is achieved through the use of lexical elements such as *irtica* "reactionary forces", *gerici* "reactionary", *şeriatçı* "supporter of Sharia", *dinci* "advocate of a theocratic system", *bağnaz* "bigot" and *yobaz* "fanatic". This vocabulary exemplifies a discursive strategy that polarizes society into "good" Muslims, who fit the Kemalist concept of religion confined to "four walls", and "bad" Muslims, who disrupt this concept (Azak, 2010: xi). In this specific case, the disruption of the Kemalist concept of religion is reflected in the demand for veiled female students to be granted the right to education.

- Veiled female students are depicted as a threat to the regime through the use of verbs/processes characterizing their actions during protests, such as *ezmek* "to trample, to crush", *işgal etmek* "to occupy", *kuşatmak* "to besiege" and *yıkmak* "to destroy".

These processes converge into the conceptual metaphor: VEILED FEMALE STUDENTS ARE A HOSTILE/DESTRUCTIVE FORCE.

- The substrategy of deagentification through the use of the passive voice conveys the idea that veiled female students are not self-aware and autonomous initiators of action, i.e., ACTORS, but are instead manipulated and used for the goals of others. For instance: *içerideki şer güçleri de harekete geçirilmiştir* "the internal forces of evil have also been set into motion"; *birer piyon olarak kullanılıp yine evlere, kafeslere tıkılmaları mı?*"or being used as pawns and forced back into homes and behind bars once again?".

III) Mystification of agency and responsibility of Kemalist elites**:**

- **Through nominalization:** (e.g., *üniversitelere başörtülü girme tartışmaları* "debates over entering universities with headscarves", *başörtüsü ve türban tartışmaları* "debates over headscarves and *türbans*"). This obscures agency and conveys less information than finite verb forms (Billig, 2008), thereby abstracting and masking the reality in which veiled female students were victims of discrimination.

- **Through impersonalization strategies:** (e.g., *okullara başörtüsüyle girmeyi yasaklayan yasalar* "the laws prohibiting entry into schools with headscarves". This formulation pushes the identity and role of social actors (the actors of action) into the background, giving the statement an aura of impersonal authority (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 46-47). Such wording presents laws as the actors of the "prohibition" process, mystifying the fact that Kemalist elites were the true actors and therefore responsible for social injustice.

- **Metaphorical substitution** (Fairclough, 2003: 149) of the transitive verb *atmak* "to expel" with the intransitive verb *kalmak* "to stay/remain", as in *kadınlar kamu alanları dışında kaldılar* "women stayed/remained outside public sphere". This formulation suppresses the agency of Kemalist elites.

- **Use of passive voice:** (e.g., *başlarını açmaları buyuruldu* - "they were ordered to uncover their heads").

IV) Shifting responsibility for discrimination onto veiled female students:

This is done by subordinating one element of a sentence to another through the use of participles, which is a characteristic way of expressing cause-and-effect relationships (Lakić, 2014: 65). An example where the cause of discrimination is implied by a participial construction reads as follows:

*inançlarının kapanmayı gerektirdiğini **söyleyen** kadınlar 'kamu alanları dışında' kaldılar.*

"women, **who say** their faith requires them to cover themselves, stayed/remained outside public sphere."

↓

*inançlarının kapanmayı gerektirdiğini **söyledikleri için** kadınlar 'kamu alanları dışında' kaldılar.*

"women stayed/remained outside public sphere **because they say** their faith requires them to cover themselves."

SUMMARY

In this book, I explored the discursive strategies used to represent veiled women in Kemalist discourse, with a particular focus on the manipulative use of language aimed at legitimizing the discrimination against veiled female students in the Republic of Turkey during the second half of the 20th century and the early 21st century. The theoretical and analytical framework for this research is rooted in Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which gives the study its interdisciplinary character.

In the first and second chapters, I presented the theoretical foundation and key principles of CDA. Methodologically, the research adopts Norman Fairclough's triadic structure of discourse, comprising text, discursive practice, and sociocultural practice. In the third chapter, I analyzed sociocultural practice through the example of textbooks used in the Republic of Turkey for the subject *Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılâp Tarihi* "Ataturk's Principles and History of the Revolution". I identified the core discursive strategies of Kemalist discourse, which are rooted in the narratives found in these textbooks, and then deconstructed them using contemporary literature.

In the final chapter, I analyzed how the newspapers *Cumhuriyet*, *Hürriyet*, *Radikal*, and *Sabah* reported on the discrimination faced by veiled female students, who were banned from attending universities in the Republic of Turkey. I found that these newspapers employed the following strategies to relativize and legitimize this discrimination:
a) Dehumanization
b) Delegitimization
c) Mystification of agency and responsibility of Kemalist elites
d) Shifting the responsibility for discrimination onto veiled female students

The realization of these strategies involved the use of linguistic tools such as nominalization, passive voice, subordination through participles, metonymy, metaphor, and pronouns. These findings confirmed the justification and importance of including linguistics in interdisciplinary social research.

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This book presents interdisciplinary research that explores the discursive strategies used to represent veiled women in Kemalist discourse, with a particular emphasis on the manipulative use of language aimed at legitimizing discrimination against veiled female students in Turkey. The theoretical and analytical framework of this research is based on Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which also determines its interdisciplinary nature.

The subject of this analysis is newspaper articles, though other semiotic tools—such as photographs, cartoons, and newspaper page layouts—will also be considered as needed, as they combine with the text to form a multimodal whole.

Through this analysis, I aim to demonstrate the discursive tools these newspapers used to relativize or legitimize the discrimination against veiled female students.